Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

122. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 2, 1978

SUBJECT

• Israeli Requests for New Commitments

Dayan has repeatedly raised three issues with us:

—How will the U.S. express its “responsibility” to “guarantee” the implementation of the treaty? In other words, what will we do if Egypt violates the terms of the treaty.

—What economic/military assistance is the U.S. prepared to offer to offset the costs of peace for Israel? Secretary Vance has been very lukewarm on this issue, making it clear that we want to conclude the peace treaty negotiations first.

—Which of our previous commitments are we prepared to reaffirm?

—Will we confirm that if the new airfields in the Negev are not ready at the end of three years, Israel should not have to relinquish the airbases in Sinai?

In the talks with my State colleagues, I have recommended the following courses of action:

—Concerning our “guarantee” that the treaty will be implemented in good faith, the President would write one letter to Begin and Sadat spelling out our willingness to take these steps: continuation of Olive Harvest reconnaissance flights;² commitment to help create a multinational peacekeeping force if U.N. forces are not available; a general statement that we will consult with both parties in the event of a breach of the treaty and that we will offer our good offices to resolve any disputes. There is no way that we can go much further in “guaranteeing” the treaty.

—Defer discussion on aid for the moment. This may provide us with one of the few sources of leverage as the West Bank/Gaza negotiations begin.

—We should give the Israelis an oral assurance that we stand by all of our previous commitments, except where obviously overtaken by events or superceded by the Camp David agreements. If we open the door to negotiating and reconfirming each of our commitments, it will be an endless and painful process. The Israelis have no right to question our good faith in honoring our commitments and we should not go beyond an oral reaffirmation by the Secretary.³

—Brown’s letter to Weizman⁴ should suffice to establish our commitment to help build two new airfields. It would be unfair to the Egyptians to make Israeli withdrawal from Sinai contingent upon whether or not we can get the airfields built. We have told the Israelis that we will get the job done and they should not expect more than that.

I realize that my recommendations will not be easily accepted by the Israelis, but I do not think we should put ourselves in the position of buying the treaty for Egypt and Israel or of giving written assurances that we will live up to our previous commitments. Only in the case of the contingency plan for U.N. forces and our willingness to perform a reconnaissance role do I believe we should offer new written commitments to both sides.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 15, Egypt-Israel Negotiations: 10/26–31/78. Secret; Outside System. Sent for information. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “Agree. ZB.”
2. Implemented in the aftermath of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Operation Olive Harvest was a program of reconnaissance flights undertaken by the U.S. Air Force designed to monitor the disengagement of Egyptian, Syrian, and Israeli forces in the Sinai and Golan Heights.
3. Brzezinski highlighted the last two sentences of this paragraph and wrote in the right-hand margin: “Agree. ZB.”
4. See Document 57.