Office of the Historian

113. Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, October 27, 1978

SUBJECT

  • Israeli “Thickening” of Settlements

After seeing the President’s letter2 to Begin last night, Dayan informed Roy Atherton that there is no chance of getting Begin to reverse his decision. In brief, we will either have to back down or we are on a collision course.

If we do back down or let this issue slide by, as I suspect we will, we should recognize that there will be consequences. Our credibility with both Begin and the moderate Arabs will be damaged. Begin will conclude that he can proceed as he chooses on new settlement activity in the West Bank. We should have no illusions about the effect this will have on our efforts to organize West Bank/Gaza negotiations. There [Page 395] will simply be no takers. In brief, a completely separate Egyptian-Israeli peace is all we can hope for. The Saudis and Jordanians will retreat back into their passive, possibly even negative posture, just as they were beginning to emerge.

If instead we decide to make an issue out of Begin’s most recent decision, we will have a big political flap on our hands and we may delay the conclusion of the Egypt-Israel peace negotiations. The steps available to us are the following:

—Suspend McGiffert trip3 to Israel indefinitely.

—Review outstanding economic and military programs and delay some items.

—Ignore Begin’s visit to New York in early November—no invitation to Washington.

—Presidential statement at next week’s press conference condemning settlement activity as an obstacle to peace.

—Release publicly answers to King Hussein’s questions.

—Suspend US involvement in Egypt-Israel peace negotiations.

—Suspend routine high-level visits to Israel.

I realize that the President faces a very difficult choice, especially on the eve of elections. On foreign policy grounds, I think a case can be made for sticking to our position and trying to put some teeth into it, even if the Egypt-Israel negotiations are temporarily affected. But any such decision should be made only after very careful analysis of all the alternatives. My point in this memo is simply to highlight some of the main considerations.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 72, Middle East: Box 3. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Outside System. Sent for information. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski added the following handwritten notation: “Let me know what happened with Vance. ZB.”↩
  2. See Document 108.↩
  3. As part of a Middle Eastern trip which was also scheduled to include Egypt and Jordan, McGiffert was scheduled to visit Israel for talks November 1–5. (Telegram 266572 to Amman, October 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780431–0230)↩