Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

112. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, October 27, 1978

SUBJECT

• Preliminary Cost Estimates for Replicating Israeli Military Installations in the Sinai

Set out below are our preliminary estimates for replicating Israel’s military installations in the Sinai. Considerably higher costs have been mentioned both within DOD and by the Israelis, but these have, I believe, been based on assumptions going beyond replication; we have been careful to make clear both in the Pentagon and to the Israelis that no commitment has been made except with respect to the airbases and then only on a replication basis at most.

	($ million)
Etam and Etzion airbases	$1,220
Ground force installations	120
Naval facility at Sharm-el-Sheikh	95
	$1,435

In addition, the Israelis will probably want and need a military road, with laterals to bases, paralleling the Negev-Sinai border. Our estimate for this is $345 million, based on 400 km of road which Israel says it needs—a requirement which may well be overstated. Some portion of these funds would need to be expended as a precursor to construction of the facilities.

The estimates assume replication of current operational capability and support facilities, as best as these can be determined from aerial photography and other data sources. The estimate for the ground force installations could be lower if based on the tentative Israeli plan to transfer one of the two Sinai regular divisions to the reserves; it also could be reduced by taking advantage of the fact that many of the structures are relocatable. The other Sinai airbases, all small, are not costed since no aircraft are permanently deployed there and the bases probably will not be replicated; costs for any possible replication of the J–1 early warning station have not been estimated. Costs of providing water and power are included but are especially uncertain.

The estimates take into account geographic location, inflation (at US rates), time compression (three year design and construction period), and other factors; but the uncertainities are necessarily large. In particular, if the construction time was shortened from three to two years, costs might rise by as much as 50%. Also some degree of in-country procurement of material and labor is inevitable and, given Israel’s high inflation rate, this will drive costs up.

I can provide further details on these estimates if you wish.²

Harold Brown

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 81, Sensitive XX: 10/78. Secret; Sensitive.
2. Brown added the following handwritten notation after this sentence: “We will continue to be both very tight-fisted on these costs and very non-committal toward Israeli requests. HB.”