Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

107. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 25, 1978

SUBJECT

• Letter from Foreign Minister Dayan

In his letter at Tab A,² Dayan asks how we propose to discuss with Israel the question of our “assurances as to the full implementation of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel.”

I propose, and State concurs, that Secretary Vance should meet with Dayan after his return on Friday³ to find out what he has in mind. Insofar as Dayan wants us to commit the moral authority of the United States to the good faith implementation by the parties of the peace treaty, we can state this in a number of ways, including your signing the treaty as a witness. It is hard to see how we can go further and guarantee the performance of Egypt or Israel.

Dayan may also have in mind getting commitments from us on aid and codifying other bilateral assurances in a “memorandum of understanding.” In the first instance, I believe Secretary Vance should talk to Dayan about these issues. We also have a military team going to Israel on November 1 to survey the airbase problem. At some point, we may want Secretary Brown to talk to Weizman, but the Israelis do not yet have a very precise notion of what their military requirements will be in conjunction with the relocation of their forces.

Before we commit ourselves, we should keep several points in mind:

—The signing of the treaty should not⁴ become contingent upon any specific new commitment on our part to increase aid levels.⁵

—We should avoid tying ourselves to any specific project or item of equipment at this point. It might make more sense to think of a “peace package” for both Egypt and Israel which would commit us to a certain level of aid during the period of implementation of the treaty, but which would put the burden primarily on Egypt and Israel to determine their own priorities in how they use the aid.⁶

—In general, the simpler our commitment, the better. Eventually, we want to think of cutting back on aid to the Middle East, not increasing it indefinitely.⁷

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 49, Israel: 10/25–31/78. Secret. Sent for information. In the upper right-hand hand corner of the memorandum, Carter initialed “C,” indicating that he saw the memorandum.
2. Attached but not printed. Dayan’s October 21 letter to Carter stated: “During our discussions last night we proposed that the United States give assurances as to the full implementation of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, in its role as signatory to it. I would be grateful if you could, upon my return from Israel, be kind enough to inform me as to the channel through which talks would be held concerning this issue.”
3. October 27.
4. Carter underlined this word.
5. In the right-hand margin adjacent to this sentence, Carter wrote: “Be firm on this.”
6. In the right-hand margin adjacent to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “good idea.”
7. In the right-hand margin adjacent to this sentence, Carter wrote: “correct”.