106. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud
  • John C. West, American Ambassador

SUMMARY

Crown Prince Fahd, in a two hour late night session at his Jidda home on October 24, outlined in detail the actions which he and SAG are taking to provide all-out support for President Carter’s efforts to implement the Camp David accords. Actions taken or underway include: (1) A message of “strong” support to Sadat including assurances of continued economic and political support. Specific assurances include commitment to $108 million in aid for purchase of military vehicles and a “set aside” of $350 million as down payment on purchase of F–5s. On political side, Fahd has guaranteed that Egypt will not be embarrassed at Baghdad Summit;2 (2) A message to King Hussein urging him to support the Camp David accords by at least encouraging Palestinians on the West Bank to join the process; (3) In communication with Iraq, making plain that the Saudis will not tolerate any action at Baghdad designed to embarrass or isolate Egypt; (4) To insure that Baghdad Summit does not embarrass Egypt, a “time bomb” understanding with YAR to raise the abortive October 15 coup3 as issue with consequent embarrassment to Libya and Iraq; (5) Visit by FonMin Saud to each of Gulf states to make Saudi position clear and secure support therefore.

Further, the Crown Prince said he was summoning Yasser Arafat to Saudi Arabia and proposed to tell him in clear, unmistakable terms: (1) that Saudi Arabia is supporting the Camp David accords and strongly recommends that the PLO do likewise; (2) that if the PLO is truly the leader of the Palestinians, its leadership can be affirmed and [Page 377] strengthened by the political processes of the accords; (3) that SAG thinks that the Camp David accords offer an unusual opportunity for the Palestinians, one that they cannot afford to reject and SAG does not want to share in the responsibility of a rejection as they see no feasible alternative for the Palestinians in the future; (4) that SAG recognized that Arafat may have political problems in an immediate, public acceptance and endorsement of the accords; therefore Fahd will understand if he “froths” publicly for a while. However he (Fahd) will insist that Arafat encourage quietly rank and file Palestinians including West Bank PLO to join the political process immediately.

The meeting ended with Fahd reviewing the Russian threat and making a plea for USG to take a firm stand to counter Soviet aggression in the Gulf. END SUMMARY.

Isa Sabbagh and I met with Crown Prince Fahd at his home in Jidda on the evening of October 24. Our appointment was for 9:30 pm and lasted until nearly midnight. Only the three of us were present.

I opened the meeting by giving to Fahd three multi-colored maps of the area which indicated the progress Russia was making in extending its influence in the area. He and Isa had discussed some weeks ago the possibility of such maps to show visually the rapid extension of Soviet influence in the area. Our USMTM group, headed by General Cathey, working with our Embassy, had produced three maps which the Crown Prince seemed to appreciate.

I next told Fahd that I had asked for the meeting even if it had to be late at night as I was leaving for Washington early the next morning; that I was terribly worried and concerned about the success of the Mideast peace process; that for the process to move forward, President Carter desperately needed additional Arab support, especially from Saudi Arabia. I told him that I recalled vividly the meeting I had with him last April4 just before I returned to the United States for the final round of the F–15 “battle”. At that time he had sent President Carter a message of friendship, faith and encouragement, epitomized by the words of his five year old son Abd al Aziz who said “Daddy Carter, we love you.”

I said that I knew on this critical occasion President Carter would truly appreciate any words of encouragement or support which Fahd could send.

The Crown Prince interrupted at that point. “If you don’t mind,” he said, “I’d like to tell you about some of my feelings and some of the things I’ve been doing since I saw you last.”

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“First of all”, he said, “I firmly believe that President Carter was sent by God to help us secure a just and lasting peace in the Mideast. I have the utmost faith in his integrity and high motives. We cannot fail to support him in this time of need. And I want you to take to him personally what I am about to say to you.” “I was terribly pained,” he said, “Yes, actually in physical distress when I could not offer more support at our last meeting (October 18) with the President’s representative, Mr. Saunders.5 However, I could not tell him that I would do that which at that time I was not certain that I could do. So I had to be frank and honest although I’m sure he felt that I was negative and not giving the support which he would have liked.”

“After that meeting”, he added, “I went into a period of deep thought and concentration on what I and Saudi Arabia could do to give the support to the President which he wanted, needed and deserved. As a result of that period of concentrated thought and study I would like to tell you what I have done, what I am doing, and what I am going to do” he added with a smile.

“First of all” he said, “I sent a message to President Sadat that I would like him to send here a trusted emissary. He immediately sent his special advisor, Sayid Marii. I gave to Marii the strongest possible message of support for Sadat and Egypt. The message should make President Sadat feel strong, independent and good. I assured him that Sadat could count on continued support, both economic and political from Saudi Arabia. I told him that we would not allow any action to be taken against him as a result of the Camp David meeting.” Marii said that this strong message of Saudi support would definitely make Sadat heave a big sigh of relief and resume breathing comfortably.

“Sayid told me that Egypt now needed badly some funds to pay for some military equipment. He said $108 million was needed now to pay for some military vehicles. I told him that this was no problem, and he could get it anytime.”6

“We then discussed the payment for the F–5s. I told him that we had a cash problem; that our oil production was down from last year; that the decline in the value of the dollar had substantially affected our purchasing power. However, I told him that I was setting aside $350 million now to be applied on the F–5 purchase; that I would work with them on the balance and it would be taken care of somehow. Perhaps the U.S. would help.”

“I asked Marii to urge Sadat not to heed what he might hear or read about Saudi frigidity towards him, or that Saudi Arabia does not [Page 379] want to continue to support him. Sadat, I said, as well as the USG, should by now realize that the attitudes we took and the statements we made at both times (the Jerusalem visit and the Camp David announcements) have proved to be very beneficial to him and Carter, both of whom we decided to support in our own style based on refurbishing our credibility with our effective brethren in the area. Our attitude at the Baghdad Conference will be one further proof of our honest intentions towards both Presidents, if one were needed! I then told Sayid that Sadat must come to the Arab Summit, and I would see to it that no action would be taken which would embarrass or hurt Egypt.”

“Let me tell you about the Baghdad Summit,” the Crown Prince said. “Some weeks ago Saddam Hussein contacted me and discussed the possibility of an Arab Summit meeting in Baghdad. I promised to think about it. Down deep I thought it was good to have it especially in Baghdad. We have been trying for some time to break the Iraqis away from the Russian influence there and I have seen recently some positive signs. I felt that if they arranged for the Summit to be held in Baghdad they would feel, as the hosts, a special responsibility for its success. Therefore, after a decent lapse of time, I agreed that there should be a meeting of the Foreign Ministers on October 30–31, followed by the Summit on November 1 and 2 if everything went well.”

“When I began to get indications that the Summit was going to be used as a platform for the Rejectionists to condemn Egypt and isolate them from the rest of the Arab world, I became concerned and determined that this could not be allowed to happen. I took the occasion of the visit here of Foreign Minister Sadoum Hammadi to make plain Saudi Arabia’s position. We have invited the Foreign Minister to visit us in order to “discuss the arrangements” for the Baghdad Conference.”

“I told him in blunt terms,” Fahd said, “that SAG would not tolerate or support any action to boycott or to isolate Egypt from the rest of the Arab world. Saudi Arabia will oppose any condemnation of Egypt because of its participation in the Camp David talks.”

Hammadi said, “Well there won’t be any, because without Saudi support no action can be taken.”

“I replied that I didn’t know about that” and he answered, “Oh no, don’t kid me: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Oman, Abu Dhabi, YAR, Sudan, Tunisia and Morocco will all follow you.”

“Later,” the Crown Prince said, “I talked by telephone to Saddam Hussein and made plain to him our position. He agreed that the Summit would deal only with lofty purposes (e.g., UN resolutions, Palestinian rights, etc.) and not be an instrument of condemnation for Egypt or a platform for the mouthings of the radicals of the Rejectionist movement.”

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“But,” added the Crown Prince with a somewhat mischievous grin, “Let me tell you what I have done to guarantee that the Summit will not get out of hand and be used by the Iraqis and the Libyans to condemn Egypt and the moderate Arabs.”

“Just after the attempted coup in North Yemen on October 19”, Fahd said, “President Salih of North Yemen called and said he wanted to break off relations with Iraq and Libya because they were behind the attempted coup.”

“Salih told me that sometime ago one of the YAR ministers met Qadhafi at a Libyan national celebration and that he (Qadhafi) said he had been fearing disturbing things about a possible uprising or revolt in YAR. He seemed to intend it as a friendly warning.”

“I told Salih”, Fahd said, “that Qadhafi reminded me of the old Arab proverb of the man who commits the murder and then becomes a pall-bearer at the victim’s funeral!”

“Salih sent FonMin Abdullah Asnaj to see me,” Fahd said, “and I advised him not to break off relations with these two countries, but to let them stew in their own juice for a while. I suggested, however, that YAR come to the Baghdad Summit prepared to raise that issue if the Rejectionists say anything nasty about Egypt.”

“Both Asnaj and Salih have agreed to this,” Fahd concluded, “and what do you think of this as a political maneuver?” he asked.

“A masterpiece, literally a stroke of genius” I replied.

“I also have had a visit, at my request, from Abdul Hamid Sharaf, Chief of the Royal Diwan of Jordan,” Fahd said. “I explained to him our policy and told him to tell King Hussein that he should encourage the West Bankers and Palestinians to join the peace process. Hussein would thus exhibit his renowned courage and we would support him. He should urge the “inside” (West Bank and Gaza) Palestinians to agree to the Camp David agreements even if he (Hussein) could not yet openly do the same. I asked Sharaf to impress on his King that I think President Carter wants to see nothing but good happen to his Arab friends. Now is the time to support this unique friend, Carter, I concluded.”7

“I sent Prince Saud to the Gulf countries (Tonight he is in Oman) in order to explain our policy and urge them to take the right stand at the Baghdad Summit.”

Fahd next turned to the question of the PLO. “I am inviting Arafat to come to Saudi Arabia,” he said, “and I am going to talk plainly and [Page 381] frankly to him. I am going to remind him that we have been and still are his strong friends and supporters.”8

“However, the time has now come,” Fahd said, “and I will tell Arafat so—for the Palestinians to take advantage of the opportunity which is now given them. If they don’t take what’s been offered them now, I don’t see any alternative that provides any real hope at any time in the future, and I will tell Arafat just that”, he added.

“I do not want to be a party to the Palestinians passing up this opportunity as they have others in the past,” Fahd said. “I will tell Arafat that if the PLO truly represents the Palestinian people, they will strengthen and solidify that leadership through the political process that the Camp David accords provide and that he should encourage all to go in and take part.”9

“On the other hand,” the Crown Prince said, “I can understand if Arafat finds it difficult or impossible to endorse openly the Camp David results. It may take him some time, and I will tell him that we will understand if he has to make public speeches, even if he has to froth at the mouth in them. However, I want him to pass the word to his followers, especially in the West Bank and Gaza, to join in the negotiations and the peace process.”

“I will tell him to be reasonable,” Fahd said. “I will also add that I know that a reasonable approach will ultimately appeal to President Assad, and that’s important,” Fahd emphasized.10 The Crown Prince added, “I will further tell Arafat that if the Palestinian self-rule entity takes up its task seriously, then, in my opinion, within the first three years the world, including the US, would be so favorably impressed that everybody would turn to Israel and say ‘These are responsible people, the Palestinians; what do you need to keep your armed forces on their territory for?’ Obviously guarantees should be enough to convince you of your security. In fact, by the end of the three years Israel herself may come to this conclusion and start dealing with the Palestinians in this new light.”

Fahd assured me he intends to be frank, indeed almost cruelly so, with Arafat and would urge him not to heed the opinions of such extremists as Abu Iyad 11 and the others who are trading on this “Palestinian commodity”. The Crown Prince further promised to impress Ar[Page 382]afat with Saudi Arabia’s and the Crown Prince’s personal deep trust in President Carter and his administration. “I will tell him,” said Fahd, “that we did not rush to applaud or support Sadat’s Jerusalem visit or the Camp David agreements. But after careful study of the latter we’ve come to the conclusion that supporting Sadat’s and Carter’s efforts would produce such worthwhile results as no other Arab, or group of Arabs, could begin to bring about.”

At this point Fahd, almost plaintively, urged me to reassure Saunders of his best wishes and appreciation. “I hope,” said the Crown Prince, “that what I’ve managed to do, and will continue to do, will make up for the stiff encounter last time with you and Saunders!”

Fahd then discussed the situation in South Yemen (PDRY). He related that the PDRY President was constantly sending him messages seeking to patch up their relationship. He said he did not trust PDRY, but wanted at least to keep the lines of communication open and to continue to coordinate with the USG and the YAR.

He then concluded with an emotional appeal to President Carter.

“Please tell the President,” he said, “that Saudi Arabia is the real, true friend of the U.S. We have always been your friend, even in the days of Nasser. It was then that the voice of Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia alone was raised in defense of the U.S. in the Arab world.”

“I hope we have shown you in times passed as well as now how deep and meaningful that friendship is. It is not only a recognition of our mutual self-interest but also the mutual admiration and respect which has developed between our people as well as the leaders over the years. It has now reached its brightest point under the magnificent leadership of President Carter.”

“I now ask you to plead with him for the sake of both our countries and our people to stop the Soviets from their expansion here. Draw the line and don’t let them go any further.” The Crown Prince said with obvious emphasis “Please tell the President that in us he has the most constant friend in the region. In me he has a person who is proud of this friendship. We therefore urge him not to lose sight of this friendship but, instead, to examine it and see whether or not it deserves America’s concern for our safety and security and her consequent determination to strengthen Saudi Arabia. Thus we can be more readily and adequately cooperative in driving away the Communist dangers encircling your interests and ours: so obvious even by only looking at your very clear maps!” concluded Crown Prince Fahd.

“I will certainly give that message to the President,” I replied, “and while I cannot speak officially on this specific point for my government, I feel that your support of the Camp David accords will be of major assistance to our government in the formulation and implementation of the kind of Mideast policy which would meet with your satisfaction. If [Page 383] the Arab-Israeli controversy can be settled, then our government will have more freedom and more flexibility to counter any threat by the Soviet Union in this area.”

With tongue in cheek, Fahd brought up another topic which further illustrated his untiring efforts in the right direction, this time in Lebanon.

“We’ve been bending every effort,” he said, “to keep the lid down in Lebanon. We’ve talked to all the leaders: Phalengists, Chamounists, Muslims, Palestinians, Syrians, everybody! President Numeiri of the Sudan wanted to withdraw his forces from the Arab Deterrent Forces in Lebanon. When I heard this, I immediately ordered that 2–3 Saudi battalions be made ready to go to Lebanon to replace the Sudanese. At the same time I sent Abd al-Aziz Thunayyan (Deputy Foreign Minister) to Khartoum to convince Numeiri to keep his forces in Lebanon. The Sudanese President agreed. Now, when the Saudi forces replaced the Syrians in certain areas of Beirut they were received with flowers. This is our way of doing things,” asserted Fahd. “We decide where we want to go and we go toward the goal, whenever possible without fanfare, or rough stuff with anyone unless absolutely inescapable,” he concluded.

I next told Fahd that I was sure that the President would like to know what his thoughts were about accepting the invitation to visit the U.S. which had been extended at the time of Secretary Vance’s visit.12 I added that in view of our conversation this evening it would probably be even more important for him and the President to meet as soon as possible.

Fahd replied that he would like to come to the U.S. as soon as possible after the King’s return to Saudi Arabia. He said in view of all of the international developments, he thought it essential for him and the President to meet periodically.13

He then mentioned that he would like to suggest that the King not be burdened with any substantive discussions during the luncheon on Friday. I assured him that it was to be a social occasion and that we would not impose on His Majesty to discuss any subject which might cause a strain on his physical condition, and that I know the President would be especially sensitive and solicitous in this regard.14

Fahd replied that he was sure that such subjects as our “special relationship” and the merits of hunting with falcons vs. quail shooting as [Page 384] well as horses, agriculture, etc. would be enjoyable topics for the King and the President.

I thanked the Crown Prince as profusely as I could and assured him that I knew the President would be most happy and reassured at my report of the evening’s meeting.

Fahd then requested again that we keep the matters discussed completely confidential, as much of the Saudi strategy depended for its success on there being no leaks.

Isa and I took our leave shortly before midnight.

Ambassador’s Comment

Had we attempted to write Fahd’s script for the meeting, I doubt that we could have improved upon it. He gave back to us as the SAG position the rationale and argument which all of us including Secretary Vance and Assistant Secretary Saunders have been advancing for the last month with only limited apparent success.

His actions including the messages to Sadat and Hussein are basically what we have wanted and asked him to do. His solution to the problem posed by the Baghdad Summit is in my opinion (and his as well!) a near genius political stroke. If he is as firm with Arafat as he indicates, it should at least defuse the opposition of the PLO. (Fahd recognizes and does not hesitate to use the leverage which money provides, and he knows as well as we do that Arafat’s sustaining power comes from the Saudis annual contribution of $40–50 million to him.)

In reviewing and trying to assess in realistic terms the meaning and future results which should be forthcoming following this meeting with Fahd, I would like to offer the following precautionary observations:

Fahd was in a good, relaxed, even exuberant mood; he had no staff or aides with him. From past experience, we know that he is far less restrained under those circumstances especially when talking only to Isa or me, or the two of us. His enthusiasm for his subject noticeably warmed as the evening progressed. As evidence of this, he asked at the outset how much time we needed and I told him 30 to 45 minutes. He said that would be fine as he did have some other visitors coming. The meeting actually consumed over two hours and I had to take the initiative to break it up.

Therefore, it is possible that he stated the Saudi support in stronger terms than he might have done in a different setting. The ultimate test now is how Sadat and Hussein are reacting to the message Fahd sent them and if they interpret it as Fahd explained it to us. Of equal interest and importance will be to observe the effect of Fahd’s moves on Arafat and the Baghdad Summit.

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It is probably appropriate at the Friday15 luncheon for the President to mention with appreciation to the King the Fahd message.

In conclusion, I would like to note the key role that Isa Sabbagh has played in bringing about this new and positive position. His personal rapport with Fahd, and his unsurpassed knowledge and understanding of the Arab mind in general and the Palestinian problem in particular have contributed much to the progress which I believe has been made.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Saudi Arabia: 6–12/78. Secret; Nodis. The memorandum of conversation was found attached to an undated covering memorandum from Vance to Carter in which Vance observed that Fahd’s comments “appear to represent a real breakthrough in our effort to obtain Saudi support for Camp David.” At the bottom of the covering memorandum, Brzezinski added the handwritten notation, “To save time, see marked passages on pp. 6–7.” At the top of the covering memorandum, Carter wrote, “Excellent! J.” Carter extensively underlined the first page of the memorandum of conversation.
  2. See footnote 7, Document 91.
  3. On October 15, a coup attempt, launched against the government of Yemen Arab Republic President Lt. Col. Ali Abdullah Saleh, was crushed by the YAR armed forces. (“North Yemen Crushes Revolt,” Chicago Tribune, October 16, 1978, p. C16)
  4. The record of this meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula.
  5. See footnote 4, Document 92.
  6. An unknown hand wrote “!” in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
  7. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin adjacent to this paragraph.
  8. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin adjacent to this and the next paragraph.
  9. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin adjacent to this paragraph.
  10. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin adjacent to this sentence.
  11. Also known as Salah Khalaf, Abu Iyad was Deputy Chief and head of intelligence for the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the second most senior official to Arafat.
  12. Vance was in Saudi Arabia September 21–24, to review the Camp David Accords with King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd. See Document 65.
  13. In the left-hand margin adjacent to this paragraph, Carter wrote “good.”
  14. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin adjacent to this and the next paragraph.
  15. October 27.