99. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- The Arab League as Spokesman for the Palestinians
Presidents Sadat and Assad have both mentioned the possibility that the Palestinians might be represented at Geneva by the Arab League. For Sadat, this is a device to get around Israel’s adamant refusal to deal with the PLO, whereas Assad appears to be saying that representation does not matter as long as Palestinian rights are assured in advance of a conference. In either case, the idea merits consideration.
The Arab League and the PLO. Along with all the Arab states, the PLO is a full member of the Arab League. Created after World War II, the League has often been little more than a battleground for inter-Arab rivalries. Beginning in 1964, however, the League instituted a practice of calling for Arab Summit meetings. These have continued and have an influence on Arab politics, even though their resolutions have no binding authority.
The Arab League itself first called for the creation of the PLO in 1964. At the Arab Summit in Khartoum in August 1967 the decision was made not to recognize or negotiate with Israel, and not to abandon Palestinian rights. And at Rabat in October 1974, the Arab Summit unanimously endorsed the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of [Page 490] the Palestinians. Given this history, it is not implausible that the Arab League might in some sense serve as a surrogate representative for the Palestinians.
US-Palestinian Dialogue. For the moment it does not appear that the PLO will accept UN Resolution 242 in such a way that we will be able to begin talking directly. The door has not been completely closed, but other means will be needed if any form of dialogue is to take place. The Arab League option does not help much in this regard. Either we would find ourselves talking to a PLO representative in his Arab League capacity, which would be hard to defend, or we would be talking to Arab officials who have little direct access to the PLO, and no influence over it. If we want the PLO to understand our views, we will do better to continue relying on the Saudis, Egyptians and private US emissaries.
Representation at Geneva. The Arab League option does seem attractive, if not ideal, as a means for representing the Palestinians at Geneva. If Egypt and Syria could agree, the Secretary General of the Arab League (Mahmud Riad, a former Egyptian Foreign Minister and a very able diplomat) might be asked by Secretary General Waldheim to form a delegation to Geneva on behalf of the Palestinians. Israel would object, especially if the delegation were to contain PLO members, but we might be able to build substantial support for this alternative. The Arab League representatives might be part of a unified Arab delegation, or could be in addition to the other national delegations. For the PLO, the advantage of this approach would be that it would insure some Palestinian voice at Geneva without requiring the PLO to accept Resolution 242. If the negotiations were to proceed constructively, the PLO could presumably join the Arab League delegation at a later date.2
Problems. At some point, of course, a successful negotiation will require that Palestinians assume responsibility for the terms of an agreement with Israel, and the Arab League as a whole could hardly be asked to sign a treaty on behalf of the Palestinians. Nor would we want to encourage all of the members of the Arab League to take an active part in the peacemaking effort. Iraq, Libya and South Yemen, for example, have nothing to offer except their neutrality. But for the moment, Saudi Arabia, Syria and particularly Egypt exercise predominant influence within the Arab League, and if they view this as a useful device to get around the current stalemate on Palestinian representation, we should look carefully at the implications of such a move.
Before your meeting with Foreign Minister Dayan in mid-September, we will explore this idea further. It could become an impor [Page 491] tant means for resolving at least one of the obstacles in the path of the Geneva Conference.3
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 74, Palestinians: 8/77. Secret. Sent for information. In a handwritten note at the top right-hand corner of the page, Carter wrote “Zbig. J.”↩
- In a handwritten note to the left side of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “a possibility.”↩
- In a handwritten note to the left side of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “ok.”↩