98. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State1
4123. Subject: PLO & 242.
1. [1½ lines not declassified] Fatah moderates had prevailed upon Yasir Arafat to amend his stand on the question of whether the PLO should announce its acceptance of UNSC Resolution 242, or make some other statement of PLO acceptance of Israel’s right to exist, in order to meet President Carter’s requirement for the opening of a US/PLO dialogue.
2. The PLO had informed the Saudis earlier that it was prepared to make a statement on 242 which fit the US suggestion of “reserved acceptance,” if the US would agree to three conditions. They were:
[Page 488]A. The US would state that it recognized the PLO as the “legal representative” of the Palestinian people.
B. The US would “guarantee” PLO participation in the Geneva Conference.
C. The US would make some kind of statement, defining the Palestinian “homeland” or “entity” as an independent state. The Saudis informed the PLO circa August 9 of US rejection of the above conditions.
3. The new position, to which Arafat agreed prior to his departure for Libya and Egypt August 21, is that the PLO will make a statement which fits the US requirements if the US will agree “privately” that the US will state publicly that its dialogue with the Palestinians will be opened because the US “believes”:
A. The PLO represents the Palestinian people;
B. The Palestinian people should live independently in their homeland; and,
C. The PLO should participate in negotiations of a settlement which involves their national fate and interests.
4. The Fatah moderates had argued that the US could not meet the earlier conditions. The question of the “legality” of PLO representation was simply too complex to expect the US to make a statement on it. PLO participation could not be guaranteed by the US because of the Israeli right to veto any new participants in the Geneva Conference. Use of the specific term “independent state” was not a realistic possibility for the US at this time.
5. The new position has been carefully worked out to avoid making impossible demands on the US. The Fatah moderates argued that the PLO had to demonstrate its willingness to enter the peace process by setting up reasonable and attainable goals for US concessions, rather than by making conditions that made it impossible for the US to talk directly with the PLO.
6. [2½ lines not declassified] He said that the PLO expected that the official US response to this position would be passed through the Saudis. [2½ lines not declassified] He claims that Arafat and other PLO leaders are suspicious of the accuracy of Arab statements of the US position. Arafat describes the Saudis and Egyptians as “overzealous” and inclined to exaggerate the positive in their statements of US policy, while the Syrians seem to have sufficient interest in preventing further PLO movement toward the US to exaggerate negative elements in US statements. [6½ lines not declassified]
7. Ambassador’s comment: [4 lines not declassified]
8. Formulation proposed above is getting close to what Walid Khalidi apparently had in mind at our last conversation, i.e., private assurances as to our intentions. Formulation is considerably more re[Page 489]strained than I had anticipated. Assume point A (para 2) would be most difficult for US, but B and C are not much different from what we put to Khalidi. In fact, formulation is so moderate I wonder whether it will be acceptable to Palestinian rank and file and whether it will serve Arafat’s purpose of justifying his decision. It furthermore is not clear what “statement which fits US requirements” means in practice. Nevertheless, as seen from here we are making progress.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840086–2452. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.↩