159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1
282008. WH for Brzezinski. Subject: Instructions to Ambassador for Meeting With Sadat. For the Ambassador From the Secretary. Ref: Cairo 19466.2
1. Please try to see Sadat as soon as possible to convey the following comments to him in response to his report to you.
2. Tell Sadat we are, first, very grateful to him for the full and timely report of his conversations in Israel. President Carter is personally appreciative. It is now clear that Sadat’s visit to Israel will be regarded as a momentous event in the history of the Arab-Israel conflict. Negotiations he and Israelis are proposing to set in motion, together with the impact his visit has had in psychological terms, open up dramatic and hopeful new prospects for a peace settlement.
3. We want to assure Sadat that the United States is fully in support of him in this bold new venture, and that we remain ready to be of whatever assistance we can. Objective of U.S. policy throughout this long conflict has been to promote the most direct, expeditious process of negotiations among the parties.
[Page 784]4. We do not know what the Soviet feelings are about this but their ability to interfere, once the Middle Eastern parties themselves establish negotiating momentum, is in our opinion limited. We ourselves have no problem in the parties proceeding in this manner, and, in answer to Sadat’s specific question in paragraph 9 of your telegram, we would have no problem with his stating in his Peoples Assembly address that peace treaties should be reached through direct negotiations among all the parties. This coincides not only with our view but also with Israeli policy as we understand it.
5. We would like for Sadat to be as specific as possible concerning the relationship between his bilaterals with Israel and the comprehensive settlement among all the parties which both he and Begin have stressed remains the overall objective. Sadat has emphasized that “careful preparation” is needed—presumably to be accomplished in the bilateral talks he is launching with Israel—leading to the convening of a multilateral peace conference. How far does he believe the process of bilateral Egypt-Israel exploration can go before negotiations must involve the other parties? In the meanwhile, assuming the bilateral talks with the Israelis are productive but take some time, how does he propose that the rest of the Arabs be kept from mobilizing against him and withdrawing from peace talks because of their suspicions that a private Egyptian-Israeli deal is in the making?
6. As we see it, while Sadat could proceed without support from some of the other Arab states, one important key to his strategy will be retaining Saudi support. How far has he taken Saudis into his confidence about his coming program for negotiations? We take his point about our not attempting to carry his brief in Saudi Arabia but we will continue on-going dialogue with Saudis on this and other subjects and we need to know what Sadat would prefer us to say to them in connection with his initiative. We would also like to hear his view as to what line we can best take with the Syrians and Jordanians, with whom we will continue close consultations.
7. While we recognize that it will not be possible to allay all suspicions in Arab world, or to bring all the Arabs along with Sadat in his strategy, we consider it important that Sadat stress in his public statements his continuing commitment to comprehensiveness of a peace settlement and to early convening of a Middle East Peace Conference in which Palestinians and other parties would participate. Whatever he chooses to say publicly about his continuing talks with the Israelis can best be projected as exploration of substantive issues preparatory to, and a logical and necessary step toward, the convening of a Middle East Peace Conference. In this respect it is worth recalling that Sadat himself insisted that Sinai I and II agreements be cast in terms of step toward overall peace settlement—indeed, Sadat will recall that the [Page 785] Egyptians drafted the title to these agreements which stressed this point. It seems to us that the “Geneva Middle East Peace Conference” has by now become a symbol of very important progress that has been made since 1973 in Arab-Israel negotiations, and that its preservation as an umbrella, particularly in terms of public pronouncements, will strengthen Egypt’s ability to pursue its bilateral explorations with Israel. The Geneva venue for such negotiations is of course not crucial in itself but the continuing objective of a “Middle East Peace Conference” remains valid and necessary.
8. For this reason we believe Sadat’s proposal that he in effect bury the Geneva conference in his speech to the Peoples Assembly Saturday3 could be understood as an abandonment of a comprehensive peace and therefore would have adverse repercussions. The Israelis would no doubt accept the proposal for a Cairo conference instead, but we doubt if the Syrians, or main body of Palestinians would, and even the Jordanians might be a problem. If Sadat were to make such a proposal on Saturday, it might only serve to depict Egypt as violating a commitment made to other involved parties and isolated in its search for peace. While a conference other than at Geneva might become a good idea at some stage in the future, provided it includes Palestinians and others, we think it would be a mistake for him to propose it in public speech on Saturday as an alternative to Geneva. We believe Sadat would be better served, for the reasons set forth above, to restate his commitment to a reconvening of the Geneva Conference as the ultimate objective, even if, in practical terms, the immediate focus of Egypt’s diplomatic activity will no longer be directed towards an early reconvening. Such a restatement would also be entirely consistent with the line both Sadat and Begin took at the conclusion of their talks.
9. With respect to Sadat’s idea of having an Israeli diplomat stationed clandestinely at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, you should say that we see some problems and would wish to explore other alternatives with Sadat and Begin which might serve equally well.
10. We see no reason why direct, continuing discussions leading to a comprehensive peace settlement should not continue at the ministerial level between Egypt and Israel.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850002–2321. Secret; Flash; Exdis Distribute as Nodis Cherokee. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Quandt, Habib, Atherton, and Robert Perito; and approved by Secretary Vance. Sent immediate for information to Tel Aviv and the White House.↩
- See Document 155.↩
- November 26.↩