Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

158. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, November 24, 1977

SUBJECT

• Analysis of Sadat-Begin Talks

We have now received reports on their talks in Jerusalem from both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin.² It is apparent that a new situation has been created which requires some adjustment in our approach to Middle East peace. Briefly, the present realities seem to be:

—Egypt and Israel have agreed to continue direct contacts at the political and military levels. Therefore, in the immediate future our intermediary role, while still important, is less central than in the past.

—Both Egypt and Israel say they want to try to work out the substance of an overall peace settlement prior to Geneva, although Israel probably hopes that talks would result in early agreement on an Egyptian-Israeli treaty. Therefore, an early reconvening of Geneva is unlikely.

—Both Egypt and Israel believe that Syria and the Soviet Union can be ignored at present.

—Sadat, however, apparently hopes to be able to show some movement on the Palestinian issue as a way of protecting himself from the charge of abandoning the Arab cause.

—Saudi support for Egypt is essential, but Sadat does not want us to approach the Saudis (or the Syrians) on his behalf.

—The breach between Sadat and Assad is serious, and probably cannot be healed immediately. It may have to run its course, but this does not mean that Syria will throw in its lot with the rejectionists.³ Indeed, it is in our interest to prevent this.

—Jordan is in a very awkward position and will fear a separate Egyptian-Israeli agreement. But Hussein is open to the idea of direct talks.

Sadat has asked your advice on three points:

1. He intends to say in his speech to the People’s Assembly on Saturday⁴ that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be solved directly by the parties concerned, not by outside powers.

2. He is toying with the idea of issuing invitations to all the parties to a conference in Cairo as a substitute for Geneva.

3. He has suggested that an Israeli diplomat (who would not be publicly identified as such) be posted to the U.S. Embassy in Cairo to facilitate direct communications.

I believe that Sadat should be encouraged to place primary emphasis on direct talks among the parties to the conflict. This is perfectly consistent with our own approach. For the moment, of course, only Egypt, and possibly Jordan through established secret channels, are prepared for such direct talks.

Concerning a Cairo Conference as a substitute for Geneva, I think we should discourage Sadat from moving in this direction at this time. At this point, neither the Soviets nor the Syrians would come, and it is in fact likely that the Israelis would be the only takers. This could only serve to dramatize Sadat’s isolation among the front-line Arab states. Instead, I suggest that we tell Sadat that we are favorable to his idea of working on the substance of peace agreements through bilateral talks with Israel, and with the emphasis he has placed on the need for careful preparation prior to any multilateral conference. At some point, his idea of a meeting in Cairo might be helpful, and we would like to discuss this further. However, we think it would be desirable to continue to emphasize that the objective remains an overall settlement and an eventual peace conference open to all the parties.

I think we should discuss further with Sadat the idea of an Israeli diplomat being assigned to our Embassy in Cairo. We will raise the idea with Begin and get his reactions.

If you agree to this approach, I will send the attached messages through Ambassador Eilts and Lewis⁵ indicating our support for the idea of bilateral Israel-Egyptian talks to prepare the way for an eventual peace conference. We will discourage Sadat from his specific suggestion of calling immediately for a conference in Cairo, and will sound him out on ways of insuring Saudi support and what we can say to the Saudis.

We will also want to be in touch with the Jordanians, Syrians and Soviets in the near future. A primary objective will be to prevent the Syrians from joining the rejectionists, but for the moment it does not seem as if an early reconvening of Geneva is the way to accomplish that.

We will obviously need to give early thought to the longer-run implications of the situation resulting from Sadat’s new approach and to adjusting our own long-term strategy to it. It is clear that Sadat himself has not thought through precisely all of the implications and that he is overly optimistic about the ease and speed with which his negotiations with the Israelis can proceed. He will almost certainly at some point come to us for help in moving the Israelis on specific issues. At this point, however, Sadat’s initiative has clearly generated its own pressure on the Israelis to reassess some of their long-held positions. We will want to let that process work to see what it can produce and should not at this point ourselves begin to press the Israelis, but should rather adopt an encouraging posture toward them.

The other area to which we will need to give attention is how we help improve the intra-Arab atmosphere, for our own interests as well as Sadat’s, and how we lower expectations for an early convening of Geneva during a period when nothing very visible will be happening, and there is little concrete that can be said to others. It is clear that Israel’s real objective is to engage Sadat in separate Israeli-Egyptian negotiations and that Sadat will be tempted to go that route if the other Arab parties continue to hold back. This has both dangers and opportunities, and we will need continually to keep under review how we can encourage the bilateral track while keeping alive the prospects for a comprehensive settlement.

Finally, we will need to give some thought to how in our public statements and in our consultations with Congress we convey some of these new realities and the new emphasis in our own policy.

Recommendation:

That you approve the draft messages to Cairo and Tel Aviv.⁶

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 3, Arab-Israeli Peace Settlement 1977: Volume II [III]. Secret; Nodis. Carter initialed at the top of the page.
2. See Documents 155 and 157.
3. See footnote 3, Document 78.
4. November 26.
5. The messages are not attached. See Documents 159 and 160.
6. Carter did not indicate his approval or disapproval of this recommendation.