148. Telegram From the Department of State to the White House1
276353. Subject: Instruction for Ambassador.
1. Through your talks with Begin and Dayan and Habib’s November 10 briefing of Dinitz (State 269650)2 we have kept the Israelis informed of the general tenor of our discussions with the Egyptians, Jordanians and Syrians regarding Geneva procedural problems. Since the subject may come up during the Sadat visit, we want Begin and Dayan to be filled in fully on the situation as it now stands.
2. As Israelis know, for over a month now the United States has been engaged in consultations with Egypt, Jordan and Syria in an effort to overcome the procedural obstacles to the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. Immediately after receiving GOI concurrence in the working paper, the President wrote to Sadat, Hussein and Asad to transmit the text of the working paper and to urge that they accept it as a basis for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference.3 Arab responses underscored the difficulty of getting agreement on a text which would pin down all outstanding procedural questions. The Egyptians wanted to go back to an earlier draft of the working paper which mentioned non-prominent PLO, called for “negotiation” of the West Bank/Gaza issue and specifically stated that the working groups would report to the plenary. Syrians stuck to their demand that the plenary do the substantive negotiating, though Asad was ready to have the plenary’s decisions implemented by bilateral working groups (we did not seek from Asad elucidation of this idea and therefore do not know precisely what he had in mind). Jordanians maneuvered for ground somewhere in between the Egyptians and the Syrians.
3. As our consultations with the Arab parties proceeded it became clear to us that any effort to negotiate a detailed text of agreed procedures for Geneva would involve, at a minimum, protracted exchanges, with the danger ever present that hardening of attitudes and public statements could make it difficult or impossible to reach the objective of [Page 757] opening negotiations. At the same time, it was evident that, when one left aside texts, the parties shared much common ground. What we needed was an approach that would permit us to get to Geneva without becoming bogged down in procedural disagreement but would at the same time protect the parties’ substantive interests.
4. We have been considering an approach which we believe will do so and have explored it in our exchanges with the Arabs. This is that the United States, along with the Soviet Union as co-chairman, proceed to notify the United Nations Secretary General that the parties have agreed to meet at Geneva. This is the method used for convening the December 1973 Geneva Middle East Peace Conference. Our letter to the Secretary General would state that the Arab parties have agreed to form a single delegation including Palestinian representatives; it would further state that the conference procedures followed in 1973 should govern the reconvened conference; and it would describe the working group structure as bilateral except for those issues which it is generally recognized lend themselves to a multilateral approach. Formula for choosing the Palestinian members of the united Arab delegation would remain the one agreed upon between Dayan and ourselves during the New York talks,4 though of course this would not be stated in the letter to the Secretary General or in any other document.
5. Israelis will recognize that foregoing evolution of our thinking was reflected in Habib’s November 10 talk with Dinitz and Lewis’ meeting with Dayan same day.5 We believe that the foregoing approach offers the kind of constructive ambiguity which is needed if the parties are to be able to move past procedural issues into active negotiations at Geneva. Some problems are going to have to be left unresolved at this stage in confidence and faith that they will become resolvable when larger perspectives open at Geneva. At the same time, we want to stress that what we suggest is fully consonant with the working paper which the U.S. and Israeli Governments have agreed upon; it does not in any way contradict or abrogate the terms of the working paper.
6. Sadat has accepted the approach described above and Hussein views it favorably. Asad has not yet commented on it but apparently continues to hold out for a larger role for the plenary. On the question of Palestinian representation, Asad has thus far said nothing. We are now considering what further steps might be taken—without compromising any of the principles agreed upon between ourselves and Is [Page 758] rael—with Asad. We have also discussed these ideas with the Soviets, who are considering them.
7. We hope we can count on Begin’s and Dayan’s support for this proposed method of moving on to Geneva. We are ready to discuss with them any special concerns they may have, but we must stress that in our view the approach we have described represents a valid basis on which to proceed. We consider it imperative that modification of the approach be avoided, since that would put us back into another and most likely endless round of negotiations with the Arabs. [illegible] that this approach embodies the substance of the working paper agreed upon between the U.S. and Israel. Everything agreed therein remains valid. What we have done in effect is to describe a method for the practical implementation of the working paper, without continuing the time-consuming process of attempting to formalize textually the area of agreement.
8. Please go over foregoing with Begin and/or Dayan as soon as possible, in any event before Sadat’s arrival. You should make clear that we are counting on their agreeing to this approach since it is the only way we see to maintain the momentum that will be created by Sadat’s visit. It would be a real setback if, after this extraordinary breakthrough in relations between Israel and Egypt, the parties were to go back to hassling over every detail of procedure. Furthermore, Israelis must realize that Sadat must be able to show something for his acceptance of Begin’s invitation; otherwise he could be in deep trouble. No one anticipates agreement on broad issues of substance, but if Sadat can return from Jerusalem and announce agreement on reconvening Geneva on basis of approach outlined above or some other method of proceeding mutually agreeable and likely to be acceptable to Hussein and Asad, minimum expectations of Egyptian and Arab publics should be met. Likewise assurance to Sadat by Begin that Israel will not raise undue objection to names of Palestinians to be proposed by the Arab side, on understanding that selection will be on basis discussed with Dayan in New York, and in which Sadat concurs, would be significant achievement.
9. As soon as Sadat’s visit is over we will want to be in touch with Begin and Dayan on how to move forward quickly. Vance Unquote.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 20, Geneva: Israel: 10–11/77. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Sent for action to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Sent for information to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, and Jidda.↩
- In telegram 269650 to Tel Aviv, November 11, the Department reported on Under Secretary of State Habib’s briefing of Dinitz about U.S. talks with Arabs over the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. Habib noted that the United States was waiting for an Arab response to the working paper’s procedures for covening the conference. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840070–0418)↩
- See Document 131.↩
- See Document 124.↩
- On November 10, Lewis met with Dayan, Begin, and Weizman regarding the situation in Southern Lebanon, but did not discuss negotiations. No record of a discussion solely between Lewis and Dayan on November 10 has been found. (Telegram 1825 from Jerusalem, November 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770415–0489)↩