141. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
18241. Eyes only for the Secretary from Ambassador. Subj: Letter From President Sadat to President Carter. Ref: (A) para 5, Cairo 17863, (B) Cairo 18232.2
1. Shortly after his first call, Fahmy called again to ask me to come right over to his apartment. When I arrived, he recalled President Sadat’s comment to me of a few days ago of a “bold new initiative” that Sadat was contemplating (Ref A) and said he had a message to President Carter on the subject. Fahmy said the President was anxious that his message be seen only by President Carter, you and Dr. Brzezinski on the Washington side, and hoped that President Carter could give him his reaction by Saturday, November 5. Did I still have “back channel” used during previous administration?3 Told him this had been discontinued under new administration, but I thought message could be safeguarded in manner Sadat wished. Fahmy then gave me two documents, the first being a personal letter from President Sadat to President Carter, dated November 3, 1977, and the second a proposal by President Sadat to convene an international Middle East summit conference in the Arab sector of Jerusalem in December. Texts of these documents follow:
2. Text of personal letter from President Sadat to President Carter:
Quote: Dear President Carter,
You may recall that I, in my personal letter delivered to you on Monday, October 31, 1977,4 while supporting your tireless efforts to [Page 742] convene the Geneva Conference this year, informed you of my intention to propose a bold step in order to accelerate and enhance the process of peace towards a final settlement.
I was and am still committed to the points we discussed. Having this in mind, I have been evaluating the evolution of the peace process since the first meeting of the Geneva Conference up to your efforts since you have assumed the Presidency. Now, I am fully convinced that much time and effort were spent on issues of procedural nature, to the extent that the procedural aspects overshadowed the substantive essentials for peace. Moreover, I believe that if this situation is to continue unchecked, it would jeopardize the prospects of peace through endless bickering over procedural issues.
For the aforementioned reasons, I would like to inform you that I feel it imperative to move substantially ahead by proposing a new formula which I hope, would constitute a breakthrough on the road to peace.
Therefore, I came to the conclusion that it is necessary to upgrade the level of the peace conference, together with reaching specific decisions on the major problems pertaining to the final settlement.
Moreover, I believe it would be useful to enlarge the membership of the forum to discuss the “essentials of peace”, adding certain powers which carry a certain weight on account of their status. It is with this in mind that I am proposing a major step in the form of an international summit conference for peace in the Middle East.
I am sure that you will notice, Mr. President, from the annexed text of the proposal that the site of the conference would be the Arab sector of Jerusalem. Also, it may be noted that the terms of reference of the proposed summit are worded in such a manner as to conform to the established norms which have been accepted by the international community and reiterated in policy statements issued by the European Community, the United States Government and the Soviet-U.S. joint communiqué of October 1, 1977.
It is apparent that there is no contradiction between the proposed summit, which should last only for a few days, and the Geneva Conference which is to receive the decisions of the summit in order to translate them into peace treaties.
I have advisedly proposed the convening of the summit conference during the month of December, so that the Geneva Peace Conference would meet immediately afterwards on the basis of your initiative. I sincerely hope that you will find it possible to lend your support to this proposal as it is designed mainly to cement and bolster your initiative and endeavor to achieve a just and lasting peace in the near future.
[Page 743]I would like to inform you that I have not consulted with any other leader on this proposed initiative except you, Mr. President. I would like you to know that I intend to make this initiative public in my speech addressing the People’s Assembly on November 9, 1977.
Sincerely yours
Mohamed Anwar el-Sadat Unquote.
3. Text of President Sadat’s proposal:
Quote:
I. An International Summit Conference for Peace in the Middle East shall be convened in the Arab sector of Jerusalem during the month of December 1977 for the purpose of achieving a just and lasting peace in the region.
The leaders of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the People’s Republic of China, France, the United Kingdom, Israel, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Lebanon, Mr. Yassir Arafat and the United Nations Secretary General will take part in the Conference.
II. The mandate of the Conference is the establishment of a just and lasting peace based on the following terms of reference:
1—The termination of the Israeli occupation of all Arab territories occupied since 1967.
2—The formulation of adequate guarantees necessary to safeguard the political independence and territorial integrity of all states in the area and their right to live in peace.
3—The realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
4—The termination of belligerency and the conclusion of peace treaties between the parties.
III. The Summit Conference shall refer its decisions to the President of the Security Council, so that the Security Council transmits it to the Geneva Conference, which shall be convened forthwith with a view to formulate the decisions of the Summit Conference into peace treaties to be concluded between the parties concerned.
The Geneva Conference shall fulfill its task as soon as possible, and at any rate, not later than June 30, 1978, Unquote.
4. Fahmy then said he wished to add a few explanatory comments.
A. Sadat’s new proposal, he asserted, does not contradict President Carter’s recent new initiative, but is complementary and supportive.
B. So far as Egypt is concerned, it does not care which of the invitees from the big powers will or will not come. If, for example, China does not wish to come, this is perfectly all right.
[Page 744]C. The purpose behind Sadat’s new initiative, Fahmy explained, is “to give momentum and a real push to the peace efforts and to take some of the domestic pressure off President Carter.”
D. So far as the mandate for the proposed conference (para II of proposal) is concerned, he thought this was very mildly cast. Thus, the termination of Israeli occupation language was very close to that used by the EC–9 and is fully consistent with the preambular language of UN Resolution 242 on the non-acquisition of territory by force. The guarantees were consistent with what has repeatedly been discussed. The legitimate rights of the Palestinian people are mentioned, but he, Fahmy, had deliberately chosen not to speak of Palestinian state. He thought the pertinent language was virtually the same as the US/Soviet joint communiqué, which President Carter had reiterated only yesterday.5 He also drew attention to the fact that he had specifically mentioned treaties rather than agreements and said he had done so advisedly.
5. Such a summit conference, Fahmy continued, could give “serious instructions” to the subsequent Geneva Conference. It would in no way change plans for Geneva as they have been developed in President Carter’s most recent proposal. The Israelis, Fahmy contended, should be happy with Sadat’s new proposal. It involves Arab leaders (including Arafat) going to Jerusalem and “shaking hands” directly with Begin. It should not frighten Israelis since both the UK and French are friendly. It is also consistent, he argued, with the US/Soviet joint communiqué. So far as the Chinese are concerned, if they should decide to show up, he was sure they will not harass the Israelis.
6. As I was leaving, Fahmy said President Carter should feel free to give Sadat his candid comments on the Egyptian proposal. He claimed, incidentally, that apart from Sadat, Fahmy and myself, no one in Egypt yet knows about the proposal.
Eilts
Unquote.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 67, Middle East: Peace Negotiations 1977 Vol. III [II]. Top Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only; Nodis; Cherokee. Sent to the White House Eyes Only for Brzezinski as telegram 263868, which is the original.↩
- In telegram 17863 from Cairo, October 28, Ambassador Eilts reported on his meeting with Sadat on October 28 when Eilts read to Sadat the letter from Carter in Document 139. Eilts reported that Sadat believed a “very bold act” was required in the current situation. Eilts added that Sadat believed this especially important considering the growing pressure that pro-Israeli forces were mounting in the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850052–1874) In telegram 18232 from Cairo, Ambassador Eilts reported on his phone conversation with Foreign Minister Fahmy, which included Fahmy’s comment that “he might get in touch with me later this evening on an ‘important matter.’” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850052–1867)↩
- In 1972, President Nixon authorized Henry Kissinger to open a back channel with Fahmy that remained in place through the Ford administration.↩
- According to Carter’s diary, Sadat sent him a “private” handwritten and sealed letter that responded to Carter’s letter of October 21, which is quoted in Document 134. Carter wrote that in Sadat’s letter, Sadat “said he’s going to take bold action to strip away the argument about semantics and get down to the real issues of Geneva. He didn’t indicate what he would do.” (White House Diary, p. 126) This letter has not been found.↩
- On November 2, Carter spoke to the World Jewish Congress on this subject. (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, pp. 1955–1957)↩