Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, October 28, 1977, 1351Z

258388. Subject: Presidential Message for Sadat. Ref: Cairo 17817.²

1. To save time, we are sending you in this telegram the proposed talking points and Presidential message to Sadat for your meeting with him this evening. Text has not repeat not yet been fully approved and therefore cannot be delivered until we give you the green light. We will Flash and/or phone you as soon as approval is received, together with any last minute changes that may be made.³ If you have not heard from us as time for your meeting approaches, you will have to be judge of the latest time you must cancel appointment and request rescheduling Saturday morning.⁴

2. Following are points you should make orally as appropriate in delivering Presidential letter in para 3 below.

—We appreciate that Sadat and Fahmy are making a sincere attempt to suggest changes in the working paper that would make it acceptable to the Arab side. We recognize the importance of their concerns on the various points they raise. However, our objective appraisal is that while the working paper exercise has served a valuable purpose, we would all be wasting a lot of time trying to push it through to an agreed text. It is not just the problem of reconciling Egyptian and Israeli views; as Sadat and Fahmy know, the Syrian concept is far afield from either the Egyptian or Israeli positions.

—To continue the process of committing all this to writing will tend to widen rather than narrow the gap. We therefore think the time has come to get away from paper exercises. As we have repeatedly stressed, element of ambiguity is required if we are to make it to Geneva. We are convinced that, even though procedure can be related to substance, negotiations create a dynamic of their own which will tend to reduce to more manageable proportions variations in procedural arrangements that can seem significant at the outset.

—We believe the President’s letter contains the reassurance Egypt seeks on the question of the status of the multilateral working group or groups that are to take up the Palestinian question—i.e., West Bank and Gaza, and refugee problems. If Sadat queries you as to exactly how we see this working group constituted at Geneva, say we believe it should be set up in the same way as bilateral groups. Any written formulation attempting to describe precisely what this working group is supposed to do (e.g., “discuss” versus “negotiate”) is difficult to resolve and in any case essentially semantic, so we need move beyond this. We believe it will be possible at the plenary conference to define the responsibility and composition of this working group in simple terms that will be acceptable to both sides. We would not support any attempt to downgrade the importance of this group in relation to other working groups.

—If Sadat favors this new approach, we look to him to broach it with the Palestinian leadership and hope this can be done as soon as possible. We discussed this approach with Prince Saud,⁵ who seemed receptive. We will also be proposing it in next day or so to the Syrians and Jordanians, but wanted first to broach it with our Egyptian friends and get any quick, initial reaction they may have.

—We have not yet taken this up with the Israelis, and do not plan to pending a response from the Arab side. This puts a premium on expeditious response from the Arabs, since the longer we delay, the greater the risk of public leaks and attendant hardening of positions. It is obviously essential that the Arab leaders to whom we are communicating this proposal hold it in absolute confidence. Premature public disclosure of the working paper as a result of the Israeli Knesset debate has compounded the difficulty of reaching an agreed text. We want to do everything possible to avoid this problem in our new effort.

—For Sadat’s own information, you may say the visit of Prince Saud here was cordial and very useful. Saud is a strong advocate of PLO participation at Geneva, and we were able to explain to him in detail the complexities of this issue and why we think ways have to be found to get around this issue. He felt that a statement by us making clear that the Palestinian question has to be dealt with at Geneva would make a solution of the representation issue easier.

—As for the Syrian and Jordanian replies,⁶ they contained no surprises. The Syrians continue to want explicit PLO participation and favor having the main issues negotiated by the unified Arab delegation, although they did for the first time agree that geographic or bilateral groups could be formed to work out implementing details. The Jordanians also prefer that at least the peace and Palestinian issues be dealt with by the unified Arab delegation but indicated flexibility to accommodate the need to overcome procedural hurdles and get to Geneva.

3. Begin text of letter:

Dear President Sadat:

Thank you for your recent reply to my letter.⁷ I particularly appreciate the constructive approach reflected in your letter, as well as Foreign Minister Fahmy’s helpful discussions with Ambassador Eilts. I am gratified that you share my view that we must not allow our main purpose to be thwarted by obstacles and delays over procedure.

I have now had the opportunity to study carefully your suggestions for changes in the working paper as well as the replies we have received from the other Arab governments. The exchanges we have been conducting concerning the working paper on procedures for a Geneva Conference have served a useful purpose. They have achieved agreement among the parties on some key points where before there had been serious disagreement, and they have pointed the way to the next steps we should now take in preparing to convene the Conference. So far as the text of the working paper itself is concerned, I do not, frankly, see any likelihood of reaching agreement on a paper acceptable to all parties nor do I believe that this is necessary. Keeping the concerns and desires of all the parties in mind, I believe there is sufficient flexibility, and that we have provided sufficient clarification of our views, to meet your basic concerns, with the understanding that any remaining problems can be worked out at Geneva where every party will be in a position to protect its interests. I believe we can now move boldly to convene the Conference in a way which will safeguard the positions of all.

I am planning to send letters in the next day or so to President Assad and King Hussein setting forth the new step we propose, but in the spirit of our close personal cooperation I wanted first to broach the subject with you and to seek any advice you might care to give. Since time is increasingly short, I would most appreciate it if you would give the matter consideration and convey your reaction and any initial comments to Ambassador Eilts when he calls upon you to deliver this letter.

The issues of principal concern to the Arab parties involved have been Palestinian representation and the organization of working groups and their relationship to the Conference plenary. With respect to the question of Palestinian representation, I believe we have already made significant progress in reaching agreement that Palestinian representatives can be included in a unified Arab delegation. On the basis that you and Foreign Minister Fahmy and I have already worked out, I believe it will be possible for Palestinian representatives to be chosen by the Arab side who will be acceptable to all and who will faithfully represent Palestinian views.

I know that there is concern on the Arab side, nevertheless, that the Palestinian question itself might not be adequately addressed at the Conference. While I fully understand this concern, I believe it is a needless one since I have long been convinced that no negotiations and no settlement are conceivable without a resolution of the Palestinian question. In order to remove any doubts on this score I am prepared, if the Arab side agrees to the course of action I am proposing in this letter, to make an unequivocal public statement that the Palestinian question, as well as the questions of withdrawal and borders and of peace, must be dealt with seriously at the Conference with the aim of finding a comprehensive solution to all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

So far as the functioning of the Conference is concerned, a continuing role for the Conference plenary is assured by following procedures agreed to when Geneva was first convened in December 1973. At that time, Secretary General Waldheim announced at the closing session that working groups created by the Conference would submit their reports to the Conference. Furthermore, we have with difficulty achieved Israeli agreement that there will be a unified Arab delegation with Palestinian representatives included, and that the West Bank and Gaza, as well as the refugee question, will be dealt with in multilateral or functional groups whose membership will include not only the states concerned but the Palestinian representatives as well.

With these understandings, I propose that I now proceed to work out with the Soviet co-chairman a call for reconvening the Geneva Conference. Specifically, I envisage following the procedure used in 1973, with a letter from the co-chairmen notifying Secretary General Waldheim that the parties have agreed to meet at Geneva. The letter would, in this case, state that the Arab parties have agreed to form a single delegation including Palestinian representatives; it would state that the Conference procedures followed in December 1973 should govern the reconvened Conference; and it would describe the working group structure as bilateral except for those issues which it is generally recognized lend themselves to a multilateral approach.

As I mentioned at the beginning of this letter, it would be helpful to me, Mr. President, to have your reaction and advice on the course of action we now propose. It will not be easy, I fully appreciate, to persuade certain of the parties to proceed to Geneva with the element of ambiguity surrounding some of the procedural questions we have been discussing. Yet I am convinced that if we are to get to Geneva at all, it will have to be on this basis.

I would be particularly interested in your assessment as to how the Palestinians and Syrians would react to this proposal. I would also value any suggestions as to the tactics and arguments we can best use to bring them along.

I urge that you send me your private agreement to this procedure. If you will give me your help and trust by agreeing to the approach I have outlined with a view to reconvening the Geneva Conference in December, I will undertake the difficult task of obtaining Israeli agreement to this approach which I have not yet discussed with them. I cannot emphasize too strongly that, if this approach is to succeed, it must be held in absolute confidence.

I am convinced that we are now at a critical moment in the efforts my administration has been making since taking office nine months ago to chart a course that will lead to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. I want to assure you again, with all the weight of my office and the strength of my personal convictions, that I intend to persist in the search for peace in the Middle East, however long this takes, and to use the influence of the United States to the fullest extent in this effort.

With my warmest regards, Jimmy Carter. End text.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850052–2266. Secret; Flash; Exdis (Handle as Nodis). Drafted by Michael Sterner (NEA); cleared by Atherton, Quandt, and Thomas Martin (S/S–O); and approved by the Secretary. Repeated immediate on October 28 to the White House.
2. In telegram 17817 from Cairo, October 28, Ambassador Eilts requested confirmation as to whether Carter’s message to Sadat would be available by the time of his evening appointment with Sadat on October 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770396–1028)
3. Telegram 258391 to Cairo, October 28, transmitted Carter’s approval of the text of the message with two revisions. “In paragraph 2, delete first sentence of first tick. Second sentence, which becomes first sentence, revised to read: ‘We recognize the importance of the concerns raised by Sadat and Fahmy on the various points they raise.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850052–2265)
4. October 29.
5. See Document 136.
6. For the Syrian reply, see Document 135 and for the Jordanian reply, see Document 137.
7. See Documents 133 and 131, respectively.