Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

123. Memorandum of Conversation¹

October 1, 1977, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud

PARTICIPANTS

• Saudi Arabia
• Foreign Minister Prince Saud
• Ambassador to the US Ali Alireza
• Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Abdulla Mansuri
• United States
• The Secretary
• Under Secretary for Political Affairs Philip Habib
• Assistant Secretary Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
• Deputy Assistant Secretary Arthur R. Day
• David Korn, Policy Planning Staff (notetaker)

(Before the meeting began, Mr. Atherton told the Prince about the joint statement that the US and the Soviet Union were planning to issue that afternoon.)²

Saud said Mr. Atherton had told him about the joint statement. The Secretary gave Saud a copy of the statement and said he thought it would be helpful. The Secretary drew Saud’s attention to the phrases in the statement concerning the resolution of the Palestinian question and the rights of the Palestinians. The Secretary reiterated that the statement ought to be helpful to the Palestinians. Saud asked who drafted the statement, the US or the USSR? The Secretary said the drafting was combined.

Saud asked how the Palestinians would be represented at Geneva. The Secretary said we have not yet agreed what is meant by Palestinian representation. However, the Secretary said, all the parties have now agreed to go to Geneva on the basis of a united Arab delegation. The Secretary pointed out that ten days ago the Israelis said they would never go on that basis. But the question of Palestinian representation remains to be resolved. As does that of the organization of the conference. The Secretary said we are spending most of our time on these two questions.

The Secretary said we have done a working paper on the organization of Geneva³ and have given copies of it to the parties. (The Secretary handed a copy of the paper to Saud.) The Secretary stressed that the paper contains only our suggestions on how to handle the issues, it is not a proposal. We have asked the representatives of the parties to convey our thoughts as contained in the paper, to their head of government, and have asked them to give us their comments.

Saud asked what the Soviet position was on these issues. The Secretary said the Soviets would not take a position until the Arabs do, and the Arabs have not yet taken any position; there is not a Soviet position yet. Saud asked about the phrase in the paper concerning “not well known PLO”; the Secretary said that does not mean that there cannot be Palestinians other than PLO. Saud asked if the Israelis had accepted the provisions of our working paper. The Secretary replied with an emphatic no. He said the points in the paper are our own suggestions as to what is the fair and best way to move forward. Saud asked about the September 23 Israeli government statement accepting a US proposal on Geneva.⁴ The Secretary explained that what the Israelis had accepted was not what the US had proposed, or even suggested. The Secretary said he had issued a statement pointing out that what the Israelis had said was incorrect.⁵

After carefully reading over the joint Soviet-US statement, Saud remarked that “this is novel.” He noted that this is the only joint statement that the Soviets and the US have issued on the Middle East. The Secretary said yes, this is the first time we have issued a statement with the Soviets on the Middle East. The Secretary said he had suggested some time back to Gromyko that it might be useful if we issued a joint statement on the Middle East. Before coming to New York for the General Assembly, Gromyko had sent us a draft.⁶ We went over it and put in our views, and after negotiations with the Soviets it was agreed upon. Saud said he was sure there would be questions about the statement. The Secretary said yes, there will of course be many.

Saud asked why the statement had not called for PLO at Geneva. The Secretary said that in our working paper we have “not well known PLO.” We use this term, the Secretary said, because if you have well known PLO at Geneva the Israelis will not come. We assume that the Palestinian element of any united Arab delegation would be very closely in touch with the PLO, and we imagine that those Palestinians selected to go to Geneva would be in sympathy with the PLO. Saud said that he did not see how agreement could be reached if Israel did not want to deal with the PLO. Saud asked if Israel would use the Palestinian representation issue as an excuse for not moving forward. The Secretary pointed out that we had issued a statement some two weeks earlier calling for Palestinian representation at Geneva.⁷ Israel cannot be under any illusion that the Palestinians will have to be there.

Saud asked about Israel’s reaction to the joint statement. The Secretary said it was very strongly negative.⁸ But, he added, the Israelis at first opposed the idea of a united Arab delegation and have now given in on it. We must pursue our efforts. With regard to our working paper, the Secretary again cautioned that it only contains our suggestions, it is not an official US proposal. The Secretary stressed that the paper should not become public. Saud asked about paragraph 2(e) of the paper. Was Egypt included in the list of those negotiating on Palestinian issues because of Gaza? Yes, the Secretary said, and also because of the refugee question. The Secretary said others would also be interested in the refugee question, perhaps Saudi Arabia too. Saud said yes, his country would be interested in that.

Saud asked about negotiations between Lebanon and Israel. The Secretary said the Lebanese would negotiate a peace treaty which would affirm the present borders. Saud asked about reaction to the working paper. The Secretary said so far we have only preliminary indications. Saud then praised the US negotiating effort and commended the working paper. It does not clarify all the complicated issues involved, Saud said, but it is an important beginning. The Secretary said we have asked the representatives of the parties to try to get us the reaction of their governments to the working paper by the middle of next week, while the Foreign Ministers are still in New York.

The Secretary said he would like to discuss South Lebanon briefly. We now have not only a cease-fire in South Lebanon but a basis for implementing the Shtaura agreement. We hope that will take place within the next 24 hours. The Lebanese have told us that they will do their best now to move their troops into South Lebanon. Saud praised the US efforts to bring about a cease-fire in South Lebanon and to assist in the implementation of the Shtaura agreement. The Secretary said we have leaned heavily on the Israelis. Saud said the Israelis have been trying to sabotage the Shtaura agreement. It was the intervention of the US that brought about the cease-fire. The Secretary said we have signed an agreement with General Khoury for military equipment for the Lebanese army⁹ which we hope will make it possible for the Lebanese to move quickly. Saud said his government is very happy about American support for Lebanon. The Secretary said we will continue to give the Lebanese whatever assistance we can. The Secretary said he thought Prime Minister Boutros had shown a lot of firmness and had done very well. Saud agreed that Boutros is a good man but added that he needs something to back him up.

The Secretary said we will need Saudi Arabia’s help and advice in resolving the question of Palestinian participation in a united Arab delegation at Geneva. The problem is how do you accomplish this in a way that gives the Palestinians, including the PLO, a voice and that doesn’t prevent Israel from going to Geneva? The Secretary said that would be difficult. Saud said that in any case he thought Israel would refuse to talk with the PLO. The Secretary said if they are well known PLO, yes, but otherwise the Israelis might not necessarily refuse. Saud asked what difference it made to Israel if the PLO at Geneva were well known or not well known. There is a big difference, the Secretary said. This is a way of starting. The Israelis have said for years that they would not negotiate with the PLO. It will take them time to change. Mr. Habib pointed out that one of the Israeli arguments for not negotiating with the PLO is that it stands for the destruction of Israel. For the Israelis to agree to negotiate with the PLO would imply their recognition of it and its right to establish a state.

Saud asked about the positions of the Arab states on the Palestinian representation question. The Secretary said that some think there must be not well known PLO in the delegation while others take the more rigid line that all the Palestinians at Geneva must be PLO. The Secretary said there are also differing views regarding the organization of the conference. Some say negotiations should be on a functional basis while others say they should be bilateral. Our view, the Secretary said, is that the negotiations ought to be bilateral in some cases and multilateral in others, depending upon the issues. Negotiations on the West Bank, for instance, should be multilateral. But on Sinai, it seems to us they should be between Egypt and Israel. And on Golan, between Syria and Israel. The Secretary pointed out that there are many detailed questions that are solely between Egypt and Israel or Syria and Israel. To have all the other parties telling Egypt or Syria how wide their demilitarized zones should be makes no sense. Mr. Habib pointed out that the West Bank and Gaza cannot be negotiated solely between Jordan and Israel. You have to have the Palestinians and Egypt as well.

The Secretary said he thought our joint statement with the Soviets might solve some of the problems associated with the Palestinian issue. The Secretary said Saudi Arabia could be of considerable help to us on this matter. Saud said the Israelis seemed to have moved backward on the Palestinian question, they say there is no Palestinian question. Saud noted that another complicating factor was the lack of communication between the PLO and the United States. The Syrians have from the US a commitment that their territory will be returned and so does Egypt. This makes them secure enough to agree to negotiate with the Israelis. But, Saud said, the Palestinians don’t have any such commitments. If they had guarantees, they would move forward. The Secretary said we cannot give guarantees but we can make known what our position is. We can produce an agenda item at Geneva on the Palestinian issue but we cannot guarantee anything. However, the Secretary pointed out, we have said that we favor a Palestinian entity. We are also for Palestinian self-determination.

Saud asked how Palestinian self-determination would be implemented. The Secretary said it would be done by a plebiscite. This is the democratic way, the Secretary said. The Palestinians would elect a constituent assembly and they would choose their own future. The Secretary said the Jordanians have given us some very clear ideas as to how a plebiscite might be done. The Jordanian suggestions are very interesting, the Secretary said. The Secretary added that on many occasions he had said privately that there should be self-determination for the Palestinians. He had come very close to saying it publicly the other day, but had not gone quite that far.

Saud asked again about the differences between the Arab States concerning the organization of Geneva. The Secretary said that some of the Arabs think they should sit down with the PLO and come up with a proposal on Palestinian representation that won’t scare the Israelis off. Some are more rigid. Mr. Atherton said it would be fair to say that there is no Arab government that does not say that the PLO should be at Geneva, but they differ on how. Saud asked about Egypt’s position concerning the united Arab delegation. Mr. Habib said they would accept it, although it is not their preference.

Saud said the most important thing is that the PLO know where they are going, that they know what is going to happen. Pointing to the joint Soviet-US statement, Saud said this will increase PLO bewilderment. The Secretary asked why. Saud said the PLO will not know whether the statement represents the US or the Soviet position. Everybody knows the US and the USSR have differences on the Palestinian question. Does the joint statement mean that the Soviets have gone backwards or the US forwards? The Secretary replied that we did not intend to cause confusion, that Saud should reassure the PLO that we want Palestinian representation at Geneva. The Secretary said he did not think that the Soviets have withdrawn from their positions on the Palestinian issue. However, if the Arabs decide they want to handle PLO representation in a certain way, the Arab decision would probably be acceptable to the Soviets. Saud said the Arabs see Geneva as a way to get the PLO in, not to keep them out. The Secretary said that is exactly what we want to do, get them in, but not only PLO. Saud said that is very difficult for them. The Secretary said he understood this. Mr. Habib said our formula is one that can work. But if the PLO insists on a separate delegation, you will never get to Geneva. Mr. Habib added that the Israeli position is that there should be no PLO at Geneva, not even not well known PLO. But, Saud objected, the Israelis are having discussions with the PLO, they are talking with the West Bank Mayors. Mr. Habib replied that the Israelis have decided to say that the Mayors are not PLO.

The Secretary said the Israelis still maintain that they should not have to withdraw to the 1967 borders and have a Palestinian entity on the West Bank. Their position is tough, the Secretary said, but there have to be negotiations. When people get into negotiations, rigid positions diminish. But if you don’t talk, positions remain stuck.

The Secretary again stressed that our working paper should not be made public. He said we are giving copies of it only to the confrontation states and asking them to keep it confidential. Ambassador Ali Riza said that an American journalist had shown him a copy of the paper a week ago. (There ensued discussion as to how a copy of the paper might have come into the hands of a newspaperman.)

Saud said he would have to be going now. The Secretary said he would like to talk with Saud again before Saud went back to Saudi Arabia, and the two agreed that they would meet again.¹⁰ The Secretary said he would like to discuss the Horn of Africa at that time. Saud agreed. He said Saudi Arabia’s main concern regarding the Horn is that the Soviets not be allowed to impose something on both Ethiopia and Somalia. The Secretary and Saud agreed to stay in contact regarding the Horn.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Trips/Visits File, Box 107, 9/19/77–10/25/77 Vance Meetings with Middle East Foreign Ministers: 9–10/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Korn on October 6. No location is noted for the meeting, but Vance was still in New York.
2. See Document 120.
3. See footnote 2, Document 118.
4. See footnote 7, Document 113.
5. See footnote 11, Document 113.
6. See footnote 4, Document 118.
7. See footnote 17, Document 103.
8. The Israeli Government’s immediate response, reportedly drafted by Begin, was issued on the morning of October 2. (“Israel Reacts to Statement,” New York Times, October 2, 1977, p. 16) See also Document 118.
9. See footnote 6, Document 115.
10. Vance met with Prince Saud again on October 25 and discussed the Horn of Africa, South Africa, North/South issues, and U.S. weapons sales to Saudi Arabia. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Trips/Visits File, Box 107, 9/19/77–10/25/77 Vance Meetings with Middle East Foreign Ministers: 9–10/77) Carter also met with the Prince on October 25; see Document 136.