Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

74. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, August 7, 1978

SUBJECT

• FY 1980–1984 Defense Program

As you know, the Defense Department’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System is somewhat different from that used in other Departments. In particular, we make much more extensive use of a programming phase (now nearing completion) during which we settle major issues before we enter the budgeting phase during which we settle details. The programming phase addresses not only the coming year, but the next five, and it is cast in “programmatic” terms (e.g., Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, etc.) rather than budget category terms (e.g., Military Personnel Army, Other Procurement Navy, etc.).

Last March I issued my Consolidated Guidance to the Services as the basis for the preparation of their 5-year programs. You will recall that I sent you a 10-page summary of its key points, and we discussed it over a luncheon with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, followed by an NSC meeting last May 10th.²

In response to that Consolidated Guidance, the Services have now submitted their recommended programs. I have reviewed them and will, during the second week in August, be discussing with them and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff modifications that I have in mind. Following that, and—insofar as we could—having settled the major issues of the Defense program, we will be ready to turn to the resolution of its details through the budgetary process. However, before taking that next step, I again need your guidance.

This year we have extended the principles of ZBB³ to our programming process, and have prepared not one, but three complete, alternative Defense programs at significantly different fiscal levels. While I do not think you want—or need—to concern yourself with all the differences between those alternative programs, I think that an appreciation of the major ones, not only with respect to cost but also the implications for effectiveness, is essential prior to your decision on what the Defense program should be. This whole process—everything we have been doing since last November—has been designed expressly to give you that appreciation, and it is now ready for decision.

With that in mind, I propose to send to you by August 15th a memorandum of between 5 and 10 pages. It will describe the highlights of what we could achieve at the basic program level, as well as the effect of a higher program level and what that would cost, as well as what we would have to sacrifice at the lower program level and how much that would save.

Each of the three program levels would be, in my view, internally balanced. At the same time, alternative levels for particular categories (strategic forces, naval forces, etc.) have been considered in arriving at the proper program for each of the three levels. Some of these program decisions have sufficient national importance and foreign policy impact to warrant your personal attention and guidance now. The memorandum would highlight the items I see falling into that category.

Following your receipt of that memorandum, I would like to meet with you during the latter half of that week, before you leave Washington. After a discussion of the issues raised in the memorandum, I would like to make my recommendations to you and get from you at least a tentative decision on the budget level for FY 1980 and the program through FY 1984. One possibility is an NSC meeting.⁴ Another is to use the breakfast of Friday, August 18th for this purpose.

I know you face difficult decisions this year. Among them are the need to respond to the severe effects of a rising inflation rate, to the growing costs of domestic programs, and to the massive buildup of Soviet military power. I cannot make decisions about such responses simple, but I do think you will find that the review of the outcome of our programming process that I am proposing will be informative and useful. Moreover, I believe it should precede the budget scrub; such program decisions are more properly associated with foreign policy issues.⁵

Harold Brown

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 7–8/78. No classification marking. Carter drew a line from the heading to the top of the memorandum and wrote: “Harold—NSC format best—after I have paper for a day or so. J.”
2. Carter hosted a luncheon with the Joint Chiefs on May 10. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes of the meeting were found. The NSC meeting that followed is Document 64. For Brown’s 10-page summary of key points of the Consolidated Guidance, see the attachment to Document 63.
3. Zero-based budgeting.
4. Brzezinski underlined this sentence, drew an arrow to the bottom of the memorandum, and wrote: “We propose to use the NSC meeting to introduce this review. Z.B.”
5. Brzezinski sent the memorandum back to Brown under cover of an October 10 memorandum in which he wrote: “Attached is a copy of your August 7 memorandum to the President on FY 1980–1984 Defense Program. Please note the President’s comment.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 7–8/78)