Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

34. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 2, 1977

SUBJECT

• Secretary Brown’s Memorandum on Choosing a Single ALCM Development Program

Secretary Brown has responded to your request for more information concerning his proposal to continue with both the ALCM and the ALCM–B cruise missile programs. His memo (Tab A) provides information on all the questions you raised in your memo (Tab B)² except that pertaining to tentative deployment plans, which are still being worked out.

For your information, however, we have determined at the staff level that a tentative deployment plan has been proposed—to convert 150 B–52 G’s into ALCM carriers by 1986. The conversion would start in earnest in 1981, building to a rate of about three aircraft per month, and would involve buying about 2400 missiles (which would allow 20 per aircraft plus an allowance for spare and pipeline missiles).

We have also determined a fact which is not stated explicitly in Harold’s memo—current plans are that if we proceed to a fly-off between the two ALCM candidates, our choice of a single contractor for production will be made not just on technical factors, but also on the basis of firm production price bids.

I believe that the information at hand is as reasonable a basis for decision as can be expected in the near term; in my view the determining factors in the decision whether to have one or two ALCM programs turns on two risks—1) the risk that a technical problem will delay the program significantly and 2) the risk that production costs will be much higher than now anticipated. Here is our account of these risks.

Technological Risk. While there may be an occasional short delay in either of these programs, it seems very unlikely that any of the engineering problems yet to be solved will prove very difficult. Even in the unlikely event we were to run into serious problems, our strategic posture will not be so close to the margin that our security would be affected by a delay of even several years’ duration. The issue, however, is that the political and corresponding fiscal consequences of failing to successfully deploy an ALCM in a fairly quick and orderly manner could be substantial. Specifically, there are abundant signs that the Air Force and the JCS still do not completely accept your decision on the B–1. Thus, they might seize the opportunity that would be presented by a technical problem delaying ALCM deployment to mount a campaign to get the B–1 decision reversed or push ahead with the FB–111 H.

Cost Risk. The risk that ALCM production costs might be significantly higher if a single program is pursued also seems considerable, particularly in view of the fact that, in the absence of competition, the environment may be conducive to overpricing. As Harold suggests, given a production run of 3000 missiles, a reduction of even 10 percent in the projected production costs would completely offset the additional costs of carrying both ALCM programs.

RECOMMENDATION

Cutting back on our ALCM efforts might send the wrong signal both to Congress and the Soviets. Given these considerations, I believe that we should go along with Harold’s recommendation to support both programs, at least for now. I would suggest, however, that you have me instruct Harold that, while he can tentatively plan on continuing to a fly-off and cost competition between the two missiles, he should seek to resolve the major uncertainties in these programs as rapidly as possible in order to put you in the best possible position should you decide to drop one of the programs in the FY 80 budget cycle.³

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter⁴

Washington, August 19, 1977

SUBJECT

• Choosing a Single ALCM Development Program

Your memorandum of August 5, 1977, raised questions about our plans for parallel development of the cruise missiles for the B–52. As I indicated in our conversation last week, I do not believe that we are ready to select with confidence one design (and contractor) for the air-launched cruise missile mission. Nor could we defend adequately a selection of either missile and contractor at this stage. The ALCM missile has yet to be modified to its long range (ALCM–B) version. The modification is relatively straightforward, (basically “stretching” it by adding two sections). But a successful flight test of the modified missile is indicated before this missile could appropriately be selected. The TOMAHAWK (TALCM) missile has had sufficient flight tests to tell us about its flight characteristics, but has never been mated to or launched from the B–52. Again, we believe the mating is a straightforward engineering task. But until it is demonstrated, we cannot convincingly argue that TALCM is the preferred missile. To arrive at the point where we could select either missile with the required confidence will take a minimum of 6 to 9 months of testing to conduct the necessary flight tests and evaluation of each. Based on such preliminary test results, a selection could be arrived at by a year from now, in mid-1978. However, with this much additional effort required for parallel programs, I believe it will probably make good management sense to carry the programs in parallel all the way through as a carefully conducted competitive flyoff, with selection by October 1979. The savings that could be achieved by not carrying the parallel program through a flyoff is about $200M to $300M, depending on how soon the parallel program is terminated, and which missile is selected. The benefits to be expected from maintaining the parallel program through the flyoff are as follows:

(1) The competition can be fairly determined on an objective basis from the operational tests conducted by SAC crews on B–52s.

(2) The technical characteristics of the successful missile will probably be superior because each contractor will be working hard to maximize his “score” on the indicated performance parameters, including radar cross section, reliability, guidance performance (the guidance systems are only about 70% common), and operational flexibility of the technique for mounting in the B–52. The merits of a stacked rack (9 TALCM) and a rotary rack (7 TALCM or 8 ALCM) for internal carriage are debated. A competitive flyoff will let the competition settle the argument.

(3) The unit cost of the successful missile will probably be lower because of each contractor’s motivation to incorporate manufacturing economies into his design.

In summary, I expect the life cycle cost of the program will be less with a competitive flyoff in spite of the increased R&D cost; as a bonus we should get maximum performance and minimum risk of contractor protests. Finally, we hedge against program disaster in the unlikely event of one contractor completely failing to meet program objectives.

You asked when we could certify to the Congress that the requirements of language in the FY 78 Authorization Bill have been met. The clearest case for assurance of meeting operational requirements and for knowledge that the termination would produce minimal cost is at the end of the flyoff in October 1979. Prior to that we could make the certification based on our internal estimates at almost any time, conceivably even before the preliminary development flight tests from the B–52 are completed for both missiles. I question, however, whether we could be convincing to the Congress. There is likely to be protracted acrimonious exchange with the defenders of the missile that was selected out; making a choice after flyoff would greatly reduce (though not eliminate) the points of argument. I have attached answers to the other questions you asked with the exception of tentative deployment plans.⁵ I assume you were asking about numbers, intended utilization, and basing. We are still sorting these out and I will provide an answer later.

Harold Brown

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missiles: 8–9/77. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.
2. See Tab 4, Document 33.
3. Carter indicated his approval and initialed the bottom of the memorandum. In a September 9 memorandum to Brown, Brzezinski conveyed Carter’s decision, writing that “the President has asked me to inform you that while you can tentatively plan on continuing to a fly-off and cost competition between the two missiles, you should seek to resolve the major uncertainties in these programs as rapidly as possible in order to put the President in the best possible position should he decide to drop one of these programs in the FY 1980 budget.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missiles: 8–9/77)
4. Secret.
5. Attached but not printed are three one-page papers—“Cruise Missile Deployment and Costs,” “ALCM Program Plan,” and “TALCM Program Plan”—and a one-page chart of an overview of costs for the cruise missile program.