Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

33. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 3, 1977

SUBJECT

• The Issue of Continuing Two ALCM Development Programs

In response to your request (Tab 3),² Harold Brown has sent you a point paper (Tab 1) that argues for continuing both the Tomahawk ALCM (TALCM) and ALCM–B development programs for the time being.

I have also had some counter-arguments developed in order to put forth both sides of the case (Tab 2).

RECOMMENDATION

As the next step, I recommend you ask Harold for some more detail as to what precisely he envisages as the next stage of development and testing, the cost implications of possible deployments, and the strategic rationale. In addition, you should ask him for his recommendation should you decide to consolidate the two cruise missile programs.

Attached at Tab 4 for your signature is a memorandum to Harold Brown requesting this additional information.

Tab 1

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense³

Washington, July 20, 1977

POINT PAPER ON CONTINUATION OF BOTH ALCM AND TOMAHAWK PROGRAMS

The principal considerations are:

1. Risk: The risk represented by the ALCM program is different from that of the TALCM (TOMAHAWK Air-Launched Cruise Missile) program. The ALCM is less mature in its development and test program, having had only six flight tests of which four were successful, although all tests have been in conjunction with a B–52 bomber. The TOMAHAWK, on the other hand, has had 22 flight tests, 18 of which have been successful; however, it is untested and unevaluated in the context of the B–52 operational weapon system.

The cruise missile will now be crucial to maintaining the bomber leg of the TRIAD. I am therefore convinced that it is appropriate to minimize the risk by maintaining both of these programs in parallel until either or, preferably, both have completed comprehensive tests in the B–52 environment. Furthermore, cancellation now (or soon) of a cruise missile program could raise questions about the B–1 decision, and about our determination to pose a severe air-breathing threat to the Soviets into the 1990s. In the long run it may indeed prove to be economical to pick only one for the inventory, though depending on the number of different applications (ALCM, GLCM, SLCM—nuclear and/or antiship), several different designs may be appropriate for the inventory.

2. Competition: Continuing both ALCM and TOMAHAWK in RDT&E will create a healthy competition between the two missile configurations as strategic air-launched cruise missiles. We expect, as a result, both programs will achieve better performance and lower cost than if there were only one program.

At about $1M per missile in recurring costs (for a buy of 3000 to 5000 missiles), even a 10 to 15% cost reduction by virtue of competition will realize a savings to the government of $300M to $750M. Such a savings in procurement costs, together with the importance of reducing risk by having a back-up program, is a worthwhile trade for the additional RDT&E expenditure required to carry both programs at least to the point of final production selection.

3. SALT Aspects: Dropping ALCM could result in foreclosure of air launched cruise missile options during SALT as a result of constraints on TOMAHAWK. TOMAHAWK, having an identical external configuration for SLCM, GLCM, and bomber-launch (including B–52 and cruise missile carrier) application, may create weapon counting complications. Should there be a SALT constraint on GLCM/SLCM, the bomber-carried TOMAHAWK may be also constrained. ALCM, having an entirely different configuration from that of TOMAHAWK, and not being launchable from submarines, will avoid any potential SALT entanglement between sea-launched cruise missile and ground-launched cruise missile from a strategic air launch cruise missile system. Such an option should be preserved until the SALT situation is clarified.

4. Legal Aspects: If signed into law, the Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1978 directs that: “Competitive cruise missile development programs shall continue until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives that (1) a single airframe for the cruise missile can be selected which meets all operational requirements, and (2) cost data clearly establish that termination of the competitive cruise missile development programs will result in lower development and procurement costs for the cruise missile.”

5. Asymmetric Strengths: The two systems have different strong points and, thus, are not 100% comparable:

a. TOMAHAWK:

— Longer range [less than 1 line not declassified]

— Probably cheaper in missile unit cost.

— More matured in missile tests.

— Essentially common missile for SLCM and GLCM missions.

b. ALCM:

— More matured in system test for B–52 Launch.

— Avoiding entanglement with SALT constraint which might be placed on GLCM/SLCM.

— Single-Service management and thus, better system integration.

— Compatibility with existing SRAM support equipment.

As time goes by, many of these will be resolved one way or the other, and a decision between them should then be possible for this application.

Tab 2

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

ISSUE: Whether to Continue Two ALCM Development Programs

Pro Arguments (From Harold Brown’s Point Paper)	Con Arguments (From NSC Staff)
1. Risk
—Neither missile has been adequately tested in the context of the B–52 operational weapon system. ALCM–B has been tested from a B–52, but there have been only six tests (four successful), and these were of the shorter range ALCM–A. The TALCM has not been tested or evaluated for deployment on the B–52, although it has been tested 22 times (18 successful) from other platforms.	—The Tomahawk cruise missile has been fully tested, including tests from aircraft. Since both the guidance and propulsion systems (the two critical development items) are common to both Tomahawk and ALCM–B, we can be fully confident about the basic performance of either missile. While there are some changes in transitioning to the B–52, these changes are well understood from an engineering standpoint (the TALCM proponents have been studying them for several years) and would not bear on the choice between TALCM and ALCM–B.
—Cancellation of one of the ALCM programs at this time could raise questions about the B–1 decision and our commitment to maintaining an “air-breathing” threat to the Soviets into the 1990’s.	—This argument is very unpersuasive. In fact, just the opposite might be the case—choice of a single ALCM program and direction of all development funds to this program could serve to emphasize our commitment to the ALCM program.
—In the long run, it may develop that several different designs may be appropriate for the inventory.	—While it is certainly the case that different range/payload combinations are desirable, this does not argue for having two different airframe designs—the principal difference between TALCM and ALCM–B.
2. Competition and Cost
—Continuing both programs will result in better performance and lower cost than if there were only one program.	—This seems highly unlikely, since the basic designs of both missiles are already well established, and their critical components (guidance and propulsion) do not differ.
—Continuing the competition could result in a 10–15% per missile cost reduction. This translates into a potential $300–750 million cost saving on a 3000–5000 missile buy which would cover the cost of continuing two programs for a while.	—Such a cost saving is inconceivable, since there are apparently no plans for a competitive bidding on production (which might bring costs down), and the missiles differ principally only in airframe design.
3. SALT Aspects
—Dropping ALCM–B could result in foreclosure of ALCM options through SALT; i.e., constraints on Tomahawk SLCMs and GLCMs may preclude a long-range Tomahawk ALCM because of its identical external configuration.	—We are sensitive to this problem and clearly would not permit SLCM and GLCM constraints to impact on TALCM deployment. If the current common TALCM and SLCM/GLCM external configurations are judged to be a verification problem, we can easily take a small section out of the TALCM to make it verifiably different from Tomahawk SLCMs and GLCMs. [3 lines not declassified]
—ALCM, having an entirely different external configuration from that of Tomahawk, and not being launchable from submarines, will avoid any potential SALT entanglement between ALCMs and sea-launched cruise missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles.	—While this statement is true for ALCM vice submarine-launched cruise missiles, it is not true for cruise missiles launched from surface ships or ground launchers which could have the same external configuration as the current ALCM. In addition, as noted above, the TALCM could be reduced in length (a minor engineering modification) if it is necessary to produce a unique external configuration. For example, a one-foot reduction would be readily verifiable. [5 lines not declassified]
4. Service Problems
—Single service management of both missile and aircraft argues for the ALCM–B which is an Air Force program in contrast to the TALCM which is a Navy run program.	—The Air Force clearly is not enamored of deploying an ALCM originally developed by the Navy. However, this is a matter of service rivalry and not cost/effectiveness. Once deployment starts and the Air Force deals directly with the contractor, the “problem” of working with a Navy program manager would disappear. In fact, the success and acceptance of the cruise missile can be traced primarily to the extremely successful and well-run Navy Tomahawk program and not to the ALCM–A/B program.

Tab 4

Memorandum From President Carter to Secretary of Defense Brown⁵

Washington, August 5, 1977

SUBJECT

• Choosing a Single ALCM Development Program

I have reviewed the point paper that you sent me on the issue of whether to continue two ALCM development programs.

Would you provide me as soon as possible a more detailed discussion of the program you would pursue for both versions (TALCM and ALCM–B), the development and testing schedules, tentative deployment plans, and cost implications. Additionally, would you provide your recommendation as to how to proceed should I decide to consolidate the two programs.⁶

Jimmy Carter

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missiles: 7/77. Secret. Sent for action. Attached but not printed is Brown’s memorandum to Carter, July 2, in which he wrote: “Now that we have opted for the cruise missile system in preference to the B–1, I believe that it would be unwise to terminate either cruise missile program until we have achieved the operational capabilities on whose prospect the decision was based.”
2. Attached but not printed is an undated, handwritten note from Carter to Brown: “To Harold Brown, I am not convinced that we need both the Tomahawk and the A Force ALCM. We certainly cannot afford to waste money on duplicative systems. Please Comment—Jimmy.”
3. No classification marking.
4. Secret.
5. Secret.
6. Carter wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “P.S. At what stage, assuming tests go well, could you certify that the 1978 Authorization Act requirements have been met? J.”