Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

35. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lance) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 14, 1977

SUBJECT

• The FB–111H Strategic Bomber

Background on the Issue

The Air Force has again proposed to Harold Brown that he initiate an FB–111H strategic bomber program as part of the 1978 B–1 related budget amendment—a proposal that you considered several weeks ago but finally rejected.² This new attempt by the Air Force to start up the FB–111H program has been briefed to the Congress and has found some support (Representative Jim Wright, Senators Goldwater and McIntyre). Further, the Senate Armed Services Committee reportedly plans to add a $20 million FB–111H program for 1978. While this would only be a small step, it opens the door to a $7–10 billion program that will be extremely difficult to stop. Unless you and Harold Brown take a strong stand against initiating the FB–111H, Congress is likely to include it in the 1978 budget amendment.

The Air Force Proposal

The FB–111H builds upon certain features of the current FB–111. However, it is essentially a brand new aircraft (new fuselage, avionics, engines). It is smaller than the B–1, would carry about half the B–1’s payload, and preliminary estimates suggest that it would cost somewhat more than half the cost of the B–1.

The Air Force believes that proceeding with an FB–111H development program is a less expensive FY 1978 near term approach to retaining a penetrating bomber option than maintaining B–1 development. They would shift 1978 B–1 R&D funds into the new program.

This is only half the story however. The Air Force will agree that the FB–111 would be a less effective penetrator than the B–1. Given the great uncertainty of the cost estimates for the still to be designed FB–111H, this system could easily be more expensive to deploy than an equally effective B–1 force. In addition, the probability that we will have to exercise the production option must be assessed. Thus, the appropriate question is: Is this probability small enough to make the near term savings on the option ($200–250 M in FY 78) adequate compensation for the extra costs that we risk paying in the event that we build the FB–111H?

Arguments Against the FB–111H Proposal

A number of arguments can be made against initiation of FB–111H at this time.

• A decision to begin serious development of this system could be interpreted as essentially a reversal of your B–1 decision, since the aircraft are similar in many ways. In terms of the primary arguments made against the B–1, the only major difference is a lower unit cost. This is no justification, however, since total cost of fulfilling the required mission is what counts—not unit costs.

• The air-launched cruise missile has been out from under the shadow of the B–1 program only a few months. Renewal of the competition between the standoff and manned penetrator options should be delayed for a while to maximize the seriousness with which the ALCM program is taken.

• The FB–111H option could adversely affect our long term SALT negotiating posture, although the near term impact of starting to develop a new penetrating strategic bomber may not be great. In particular, the similarity between the FB–111H and the Soviet Backfire could lead to negotiating difficulties.

• Finally, commitment to even a very small program now is sure to generate enormous pressures for full-scale development and production within a few years. The Air Force views the FB–111H as its last chance to buy a penetrating bomber—an issue of strong emotional force with the Service. There are powerful congressional interests backing the program and unfavorable past experience with terminating the F–111 and A–7 production lines attests to the difficulties involved.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the above considerations, the B–1 option should be retained for the next year—and for this period at least, any FB–111 initiatives should be avoided. Beyond the problems the FB–111H may give us in SALT, and the fact that it is an inferior choice to the B–1, it seems premature to begin consideration of a manned bomber that is so similar a solution to the problem of maintaining the effectiveness of our bomber force as the B–1.

I recommend that you ask Harold Brown, in his testimony before the House and Senate Appropriations Committees now scheduled for September 15 and 20, to state that the Administration does not wish to initiate the FB–111H program at this time even at a minimal level. He should support continued B–1 development during 1978 at the minimum level sufficient to provide an option for production.³

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 4, Defense Department: 8–9/77. Top Secret. Sent for action. McIntyre signed for Lance. Brzezinski forwarded the memorandum to Carter under cover of an undated memorandum in which he summarized Lance’s memorandum and wrote: “I believe that you should support Bert’s recommendation. I would not, however, expend any significant amount of political capital in blocking an FB–111H program, given our need for support on more important issues such as the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty.” Carter replied by writing in the margin: “The FB–111H program should be kept at a minimum.” (Ibid.)
2. On September 7, the New York Times reported: “The Air Force, seeking to salvage technology designed for the B–1 bomber, has urged Defense Secretary Harold Brown to revive production of the controversial FB–111 fighter and covert it into a long-range nuclear manned bomber.” (Bernard Weinraub, “Air Force Urges Revival of FB–111 As a Long-Range Nuclear Bomber,” New York Times, September 7, 1977, p. 6)
3. Carter checked his approval of Lance’s recommendation. In a September 20 memorandum Brzezinski wrote Brown: “Last week OMB sent a memo to the President suggesting that you should oppose any efforts by the Congress to begin a development program for the FB–111H. Since this memo would not have gotten to the President in advance of your testimony before the Congress last Thursday, I asked David Aaron to pass on OMB’s as well as my own concerns over this issue. The President has since seen the OMB memo and has indicated that if an FB–111H program is started, ‘it should be kept at a minimum.’” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 4, Defense Department: 8–9/77)