Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

32. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, August 24, 1977

SUBJECT

• Follow-on Studies for PD/NSC–18

Concurrently with the issuance of PD/NSC–18 on US National Strategy,² the President has instructed that the Secretary of Defense will review current targeting policy and recommended targeting criteria for NSC consideration and Presidential decision. This review will consider the relevant political and strategic advantages of several options including among others:

— an option which would effectively target 70 percent of all identified Soviet economic recovery resources, 70 percent of all identified political recovery resources, 70 percent of all identified military recovery resources and 90 percent of all other identified Soviet military targets and related commands, control and communications facilities. It would also consider options which would preclude the Soviet Union from inflicting more fatalities on the United States than the United States could inflict on the Soviet Union, also taking into account demographic differentials. Pending the completion of this review, the United States will continue to employ forces according to NSDM 242.³

The Secretary of Defense should provide, through the NSC, his assessment of the specific amount of hard-target kill capability the US should maintain into the future, identifying the strategic purposes such capabilities would serve. No action should be taken to diminish US hard-target kill capabilities pending the President’s decision.

The Secretary of Defense, together with the Director of Central Intelligence, will undertake an examination for NSC review of the wartime target acquisition capability required for the secure reserve force.

The Secretary of Defense will provide an analysis and recommendations to the NSC for the President’s decision of the appropriate United States response regarding the future of the US Triad concept.

Recommendations on the appropriate level of US capability to sustain a worldwide conventional war against the Soviet Union and its allies should be coordinated by the National Security Council for the President’s decision. This should be based on:

1. an evaluation of Warsaw Pact capabilities to sustain combat;

2. consultations with our NATO allies concerning their willingness to agree upon a uniform goal for sustained combat capability;

3. the necessity to emphasize early combat capability so as to fulfill NATO strategy and minimize reliance upon nuclear weapons and the resultant tradeoff with the capability to sustain extended conflict;

4. an examination of the implications of alternative US–NATO mobilization and industrial preparedness postures;

5. a review of the interrelationship between US global political objectives, defense strategy, and naval deployment.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Huntington, Box 57, PRM–10, (PD–18). Top Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum next to the dateline.
2. See Document 31.
3. See footnote 5, Document 31.