Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

222. Presidential Directive/NSC–62¹

Washington, January 15, 1981

TO

• The Vice President
• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of The Treasury
• The Secretary of Defense
• The Secretary of Commerce
• The Secretary of Energy
• The Director, Office of Management & Budget
• The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

• Modifications in U.S. National Strategy (U)

I set forth U.S. National Strategy in 1977 in Presidential Directive/NSC–18. It remains our strategy, but in light of increased projection of Soviet power which threatens U.S. vital interests in the Persian Gulf region, it has become necessary through a series of individual directives to modify emphasis and priority in the strategy. This Directive will elaborate and codify our progress in building a security framework for the Persian Gulf. (S)

Greater Readiness Required

Given the increased risk of major local or regional conflict involving key U.S. interests in the 1980s we must increase the priority given to readiness in defense resource allocations. (C)

Shifts in Priority for General Purpose Forces

Presidential Directive/NSC–18 put the focus for our general purpose forces on Europe but also called for capabilities for contingencies in Korea and the Persian Gulf region. Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan have, in the interim, increased substantially the threat to our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region. Moreover, the chaotic situation following the Iranian revolution, the Iraq-Iran war and the intensifying intra-Arab and Israeli-Arab tensions have increased the instability in the region. This has also increased the risk to U.S. and Allied interests, both directly and by giving the Soviets added opportunities for interference. At the same time, our success in normalizing relations with the People’s Republic of China has improved our strategic position in East Asia. Given the danger that Soviet success in asserting influence over the oil producing status of the Persian Gulf region could undermine the viability of NATO and Japan, cause enormous economic disruptions in Europe, Japan, and the United States, higher priority must be given to developing adequate strategic lift, general purpose forces and facilities access for Persian Gulf contingencies. (S)

While NATO will retain first call on force deployments in peacetime for wartime operations, the Persian Gulf shall have highest priority for improvement of strategic lift and general purpose forces in the Five Year Defense Program. This priority calls for continued improvement of relations with the People’s Republic of China, accelerated growth of Japan’s defense capabilities as a contribution to U.S.-Japanese security ties, improved relations with the ASEAN states, and greater progress in getting our NATO Allies to bear a larger share of the burden of defense in Europe.² (S)

Soviet projection of power in the Caribbean region with Cuba’s assistance over the past two years has created another area of increased security concern. In support of the objectives of Presidential Directive/NSC–52, it is necessary to achieve quietly a stronger military presence in the region by gradual shifts in our military exercise activities and basing of U.S. forces in the Southeastern part of the United States and its territories in the region which will be perceived by Cuba and the Soviet Union as evidence of our determination to limit Soviet and Cuban regional influence. (S)

Sharing the Security Burden with Our Allies

Because the Soviet military buildup and the projection of Soviet military power have increased our strategic requirements, we must make more effort and devise better ways to share the economic and military burden with our Allies. We must insist that our European Allies undertake the programs and make available the resources needed to make up for the reduction in U.S. force commitments caused by our effort oriented toward the Persian Gulf. At the same time, certain of our Allies, particularly the British, French, and Australians, should contribute forces to the security framework for the Persian Gulf.³ (S)

Germany, other members of NATO, ANZUS, and Japan should contribute non-military resources such as economic assistance to the security framework. Two countries which flank Southwest Asia and would be most important recipients of this economic aid—as well as of military aid from selected donors—would be Turkey and Pakistan. (S)

Our European and regional Allies should provide overflight, transit and staging for U.S. forces moving to Southwest Asia. Procedures should be established to facilitate overflight and refueling clearances. (S)

Arms Control

Arms control negotiations which promise to constrain Soviet forces—strategic and general purpose—and particularly to limit resources that both sides must commit to the strategic competition will be pursued vigorously. This latter element of our strategy must be exploited to the extent possible for alleviating both the economic burdens of defense and for reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. (S)

Persian Gulf Security Framework

Presidential Directive/NSC–63 elaborates U.S. strategy for the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia region.⁴ (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 24, PD/NSC–62. Secret. Carter signed the top of the directive. Brzezinski sent the final version of the directive to Carter for his signature under cover of a January 14 memorandum in which he described two slight changes that Brown recommended (changing “maintaining improved” to “continued improvement of” relations with the People’s Republic of China; and adding Australia to the United Kingdom and France as countries to contribute forces to the Persian Gulf security framework) and of which Brzezinski approved. Brzezinski went on to say that “Ed Muskie chooses not to comment on the wording of the directives. He maintains his previous position recommending that the directives not be issued.” (Ibid.)
2. Carter drew a checkmark in the left margin next to this paragraph.
3. Carter drew a checkmark in the left margin next to this paragraph.
4. See footnote 3, Document 221.