22. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Budgetary and Strategic Implications of the B–1 Production Decision
This memorandum responds to your request for a brief analysis of the budgetary and strategic implications of alternative options for modernizing the strategic bomber force. It was produced by a small working group of NSC and OMB staff members.
In moving this fast, we were forced to make some rough estimates. The information should be accurate enough to realistically appraise the relative merits of each of the options, however.
The Alternatives
Four general alternatives for modernizing the strategic bomber force were considered. These range from going ahead with B–1 production at the four aircraft per month rate that the Air Force wants, to complete termination of the B–1 program. The rationales for these options are summarized below.
—Option 1. Continue production of the B–1, building up to a maximum production rate of four aircraft per month by 1982. This option equips the B–52Gs with cruise missiles at a modest rate of 20 aircraft per year starting in 1981. The objectives of these conversions are to complicate the Soviets air defense problem, and to extend the effective lifetime of the B–52Gs. These objectives are not pursued vigorously, however, in view of the rapid and extensive deployment of the B–1.
—Option 2. This is an elaboration of Harold Brown’s tentative recommendation. It slowly builds up the B–1 production rate to a maximum of two aircraft per month. It also equips first B–52Gs and later B–52Hs with cruise missiles. These conversions are pursued more vigorously than in Option 1 in order to offset the slower rate of acquisition of the B–1.
—Option 3 (Variant A). This is an elaboration of the two-year delay concept I suggested in my previous memos. It cuts off the current production program for the B–1, buying only three aircraft over the next three years for test and evaluation purposes. In addition, it begins an R&D program for a new cruise missile carrier. Under this variant, we [Page 71] assume that events unfold in such a way as to make the B–1 clearly undesirable. Thus this variant assumes a shift toward a pure standoff bomber force starting in 1981. This shift is accomplished by equipping the B–52Gs and some B–52Hs with cruise missiles, starting in 1981 and proceeding at a fairly high rate. Under this variant, the new cruise missile carrier is procured at a relatively slow rate which builds up the overall capability of our bomber force and allows eventual replacement of our oldest B–52s.
—Option 3 (Variant B). This is the other half of Option 3 and is identical to 3 (Variant A) through 1980. However, this variant assumes that events unfold in such a way as to make the B–1 clearly desirable. Thus, in 1980 it begins a buildup to a high production rate of four B–1s per month. In addition, given the high rate of procurement for the B–1, it equips B–52Gs with cruise missiles at the same slow rate assumed for Option 1.
—Option 4. This option terminates the B–1 program completely. As an offset, it equips the B–52Gs and some B–52Hs with cruise missiles at the same relatively high rate assumed under Option 3 (Variant A).
The numbers of forces procured or equipped with cruise missiles each year under each of these options are given in Table I. All four options retain most of the current B–52 force over the 10-year period considered. Thus, Options 1 through 3 increase the overall size of our strategic bomber force. In fact, in order to stay within the strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limit of 2400 specified in the Vladivostok agreement, Options 1 and 3 (Variant B) must destroy about 175 off-line B–52s (we currently have a total inventory of about 525 B–52s) or an equivalent number of missiles.
Given the prospects for reductions below 2400 in SALT II, even greater numbers of older strategic systems might have to be destroyed during the next 10 years. We did not delve into the details of what might have to be eliminated; however, such reductions do not appear to impact significantly on the relative advantage of any of the four options we consider here; we carry out all the calculations given below in terms of the Vladivostok agreement.
Budgetary Implications
The investment costs for each of these options are given in Table II. These costs are reported in budget (inflated) dollars in the first four columns. The last column gives the investment costs for each option over the next 10 years, in constant dollars. These last figures reflect the real resource costs to our economy of each option.
In my view, Options 2 and 3A/B are the most practical choices. Both have considerably lower near-term costs than Option 1.
[Page 72]Comparison of Option 2 with Option 3A/B shows that either of the Option 3 variants will be significantly cheaper over the next five years. Further, if you choose Option 3, and by 1980 find that the cruise missile path (Variant A) is the way to go, you save a great deal of money any way you look at it. In addition, if you choose Option 3 and find you want the B–1 after all, Option 3 (Variant B) provides the entire 240 B–1s sought by the Air Force by 1987 at little or no increase in real costs.
Finally, in budget dollars, although Option 3 (Variant B) will be more expensive than Option 2 over the next 10 years by about 15%, it will produce 35% more B–1 bombers over this period.
Strategic Implications
The two most important contributions that a strategic bomber force conceivably makes to our security are:
- (1)
- It provides an objective capability to cause great damage to anyone we attack; and
- (2)
- it contributes to subjective impressions of the state of the US/USSR strategic forces balance.
In terms of the first contribution, the differences between the four options we are examining are not significant, at least for the next 10 years. Over that period, no matter which option is chosen, we will have far more than enough deliverable weapons to give us very high confidence in our ability to destroy virtually all of the significant targets in the Soviet Union. This will be true even if we have absorbed the most effective counterforce strike that the Soviets can make against us and even if we are caught completely by surprise.
The options may differ significantly in their impact on subjective impressions of the strategic balance, however. In order to assess this possibility, we have constructed the attached plots showing the relative numbers of deliverable inventory warheads, and amounts of deliverable inventory equivalent megatonnage and throw weight, for both the Soviets and ourselves—plots are given for each of our four bomber modernization options.
These three measures are probably as reasonable a set of determinants of the perceived strategic balance as any others. My own view is that number of deliverable warheads is probably the single most important determinant; amount of deliverable equivalent megatonnage is slightly less important. Inclusion of throw weight seems somewhat redundant since this measure is really only an indicator of each side’s ability to deliver nuclear weapons or equivalent megatonnage, an ability that is included to a large degree in the first two measures. I have included throw weight, however, because it has become the focus of so much attention in recent years.
[Page 73]Examination of the plots yields the following observations:
- —
- For the next ten years, we can expect to hold a considerable edge over the Soviets in numbers of warheads; they can expect to hold an advantage over us in total equivalent megatonnage; they will have an advantage over us in total throw weight unless we increase the size of our bomber force dramatically—i.e., build up to the level of 2400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
- —
- Our advantages in warheads can be preserved pretty much equally well by either of the compromise options (2, 3 A/B).
- —
- Only the options which add the B–1 to the B–52 force (1, 2, 3 Variant B) prevent the Soviets from widening their advantage in equivalent megatonnage.
- —
- While the Soviets’ advantage in throw weight is reduced by the B–1 add-on options, aggressive deployment of the cruise missile as done by Option 3 (Variant A) can keep this advantage from increasing significantly.
- —
- To the extent that perceptions are satisfactory in the very near term (79), and to the extent that they are determined by these measures, perceptions of the strategic balance should remain acceptable or improve under either of the compromise options (2, 3 A/B).
- —
- Though the delay option (3 A/B) falls somewhat behind Option 2 (Harold’s tentative choice) by the very early 80s, if we decide that we need the B–1 after all, Option 3 (Variant B) can catch up and surpass Option 2 by 1984.
In summary, it appears that any of the compromise options should at least preserve current perceptions of the strategic balance; purchase of the B–1, or pursuit of even more aggressive cruise missile options than considered here, could begin to shift perceptions of the balance in our favor.
Modernization of US Strategic Forces
One argument commonly made in favor of producing the B–1 now is that if we don’t, we will have no immediate answer to the modernization programs the Soviets are currently pursuing. This argument ignores several modernization programs that the US currently has underway—the Trident program, the modernization of the MM III force, and the Navy and Air Force cruise missile programs.
This argument also ignores the fact that the initial deployments of ALCMs on B–52s can be made just as rapidly as the initial deployments of B–1s even if we continue with the current B–1 production program.
Interactions with the M–X
An argument can be made that failure to go ahead with the B–1 would increase pressures to build the M–X. Perhaps so, but by the time [Page 74] the Soviets deploy ballistic missile systems good enough to destroy the Minuteman force (and they have not yet), we could have a cruise missile carrier developed and ready for deployment. To the extent that improvements in our strategic bomber force can alleviate pressures to deploy the M–X, deployment of either the B–1 or a new cruise missile force should work about equally well.
A Bureaucratic Problem
Our final observation concerns the ongoing competition between the B–1 and the cruise missile advocates in the Pentagon. Because of this competition, the cruise missile programs have taken a back seat to the B–1 program, at least within the Air Force. Thus, if you choose Option 3, and thereby continue the perceived competition between the B–1 and the ALCM, the cruise missile programs will probably continue to receive less than enthusiastic support. To avoid this, you and Harold would have to show strong personal interest in these programs.
Continued Support
Your decision on the B–1 production question is clearly not an easy one—a fact that has become quite obvious to me as I have carried out my investigation of it. Though the three memos I have sent you cover what I see as the major factors bearing on your decision,2 I would be more than willing to provide additional analysis if you would find it helpful.
If you would like me to subject some additional bomber modernization options to the sort of analysis presented in this memo, I can probably turn your requests around in a single day. I could also set up a small meeting to discuss the issues involved in this decision, and answer any questions you may have.
Finally, the presentation to the Congress and the public of whatever decision you make will be important not only in terms of acceptability but for what it will convey to our allies, the Soviets, the Chinese and the world at large. I believe it would be the occasion for an authoritative statement by you on how we view the strategic relationship with the USSR and how we plan to respond to the Soviet strategic programs.
In this connection, let me reiterate my strong feeling that Option 4—if that is your choice—should be related to a US-Soviet SALT bargain. Option 3–A can also be related to SALT in that it could be made clear to the Russians that as part of the three-year interim protocol we are deferring the deployment of the B–1, subject to later agreements with regard to the issues covered by the protocol. In particular, Option [Page 75] 3–A or 4 could ease the differences we have with the Soviets regarding ALCMs and the MIRV limits.
In any case, I do feel that either a completely negative or partially negative decision on the B–1 ought to be exploited by us in our negotiations with the Soviets, given the openly stated Soviet concern over the B–1. Otherwise, your critics in Congress will have another argument against your decision.
Operationally, the above would mean postponing any public announcement of Option 4 or being imprecise as to the duration of the stretchout in Option 3–A, pending talks with the Soviets.
[Page 76] [Page 78] [Page 80]- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 6, B–1: 6/11–30/1977. Top Secret; Sensitive. An unknown hand wrote in the top right corner of the memorandum: “The President has seen.”↩
- The three memos on the B–1 production decision are printed as Documents 17, 19, and 22.↩
- Top Secret.↩
- Note that the forces procured or converted in any given year appear on-line perhaps 18 months later. [Footnote is in the original.]↩
- Secret; Sensitive.↩