Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

19. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Some Additional Observations On The B–1 Production Decision

In the analysis of the B–1 production decision that I sent you last week,² I sketched out what I see as the most important issues bearing on your decision. Since then, my staff has developed some additional observations which are summarized below. I hope you find them helpful.

Political Factors

There are at least two major political considerations bearing on this decision. First, as difficult as it might be to halt production now, halting now has got to be a far easier decision than trying to halt the program later if events unfold in such a way as to make you want to stop. Currently, we have about 35,000 people working on the B–1 and three aircraft behind us. Two years from now, if we continue, we will have more than 50,000 people working on the program and 15 to 20 aircraft behind us.

Second, a decision to halt the B–1 production program will be a tough one to sell to the Congress and the public given the current slow rate of progress in SALT and the enormous publicity that has been given to the Soviets’ efforts to build up their strategic capabilities. Thus, it might be much easier to halt the B–1 production program if such a halt were accompanied by other actions designed to offset public concerns.

One package of actions that might have the desired effect was recently suggested by an OMB staffer. It consists of three elements: (1) Return the B–1 to an R&D program pending further test and evaluation; (2) Begin deployment of ALCM’s on older B–52’s; and (3) Begin an R&D program on a follow-on cruise missile carrier.

This package would suggest that we are responding to Soviet improvements in their overall capabilities by not only arming the B–52’s with cruise missiles, but also by starting immediately on a completely new bomber system based on the ALCM. The R&D program for the new aircraft could be pursued at a relatively low and inexpensive level for several years, which might help to balance the 81 budget. This program could look at aircraft that are smaller than the 747 and would thus spread the eggs across more baskets. It could also examine the applicability to a cruise missile carrier of some of the more recent ideas for reducing radar cross section and IR signature. Finally, a more immediate prospect for a large aircraft contract in place of the B–1 might win some extra support from states with large aerospace concerns.

The Basis for the OSD Study of the B–1

In evaluating the large backup study sent over by Harold Brown,³ you should keep in mind the basis of some portions of that study. Specifically, while Harold’s study is a very honest effort, it is nonetheless likely to be somewhat biased. This is because the relatively short time available for the study forced it to depend on significant portions of the analytical work done for its predecessor, the Joint Strategic Bomber Study (JSBS).⁴

The JSBS was done over three years ago by DOD at the request of the Congress. That study made a number of critical assumptions that tended to favor the B–1, and assumed the worst for the cruise missile. In fairness, this looks worse now than it did then because the cruise missile has now largely met or exceeded what were then only design goals. Nonetheless, the JSBS was sharply criticized by the Congress and by outside reviewers in the systems analysis community as being extremely biased.

Since then, various portions of the JSBS have been reexamined and in the process a great deal of bias against the cruise missile has been removed. We should not assume, however, that the cruise missile has now been given a completely fair shake. A really fair look at the relative cost effectiveness of the B–1 and the cruise missile would probably require a completely fresh start by a study team as impartial as this last one, and would probably require a year to do (the JSBS took slightly over a year). It would reexamine every assumption and would attempt to assess previously untreated effects such as the ability of large numbers of cruise missiles to attack in loosely spaced clusters and thus saturate the Soviets’ air defenses.

Midcourse Threats

The OSD study argues that large cruise missile carriers could be particularly vulnerable to extended area defenses that would attempt to attack them before they launch their cruise missiles. The particular threat envisioned by the study is based on AWACS type aircraft and long range fighter interceptors.

This concept deserves careful study, particularly to determine why such a threat would have significantly more capability against a force consisting of perhaps 60 cruise missile carriers than it would against a force of perhaps 150 B–1’s. (Note: Both forces carry about the same number of nuclear weapons.)

The study argues that a large cruise missile carrier would be difficult to mask with ECM; we would argue that an AWACS aircraft will be able to see either aircraft well enough to vector fighters out the bearing to the target at very long ranges.

The study also argues that because the large cruise missile carrier would present fewer targets it would be more vulnerable than the B–1. This argument implicitly assumes that 150 B–1’s will be sufficient to saturate the defenses. However, this does not seem likely if the Soviets do develop the capability to build systems similar to our AWACS and look-down/shoot-down fighters. Our AWACS is designed to track 100 targets simultaneously. Further, it is hard to believe that the Soviets would not produce enough look-down/shoot-down fighters to insure that our force of B–1’s will not saturate the defenses.

If our concept of this threat is valid, and saturation is thus not likely to be a significant problem for Soviet extended area defenses of this type, at best this type of defense will extract a percentage of whatever force attacks. In this case its impacts on the B–1 and the cruise missile carrier forces would be identical.

There are other midcourse threats that also deserve a more careful examination. As an example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is currently sponsoring a program that is looking into the feasibility of using some new developments in [1 line not declassified]. If this concept proves feasible, and we should have some indication [1 line not declassified], it could eventually become the basis of a severe threat to any of the strategic bomber systems considered in the OSD study.

In summary, we believe that the possibility of midcourse threats that could cut short the useful life of a new bomber force deserves a closer examination. Further, if worrisome threats of this type do look feasible, they may work just about as well against the B–1 as against the large type of cruise missile carrier considered in the OSD study.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 6, B–1: 6/11–30/1977. Top Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
2. See Document 17.
3. Reference is to the “Staff Study for the Secretary of Defense: Modernization of the Strategic Bomber Force.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 6, B–1: 2–5/77)
4. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 104.