Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

17. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 6, 1977

SUBJECT

• An Analysis of Your Upcoming Decision on Production of the B–1

This memo identifies the key factors that you should keep in mind as you think about Harold Brown’s paper on the B–1.² It is based on an investigation of this issue carried out over several months by Victor Utgoff, a member of my staff. While I am not an expert on some of the more technical points raised, I support its conclusion.

The Decision

As you know, Rockwell International Corporation is tooling up for production of the B–1 at an initial rate of two aircraft per month. This effort is being made under an unusual contract in which the Air Force releases the money to the contractor on a monthly basis pending a final commitment by you to go ahead with production. This contract was written in anticipation of a decision by June 30, and contains a limit on the government’s liability to the contractor if the decision is made before this date. If the decision is not made by then, the government’s liability to the contractor in the event of termination might have to be determined through litigation.

While a decision could be put off further, it probably should not be, since the political and economic costs of terminating the program are rapidly increasing.

The Alternatives

There are four broad alternatives open to you:

(1) Terminate the B–1 program completely;

(2) Put a moratorium on production for perhaps two years;

(3) Build up production slowly to a rate of two aircraft per month; or

(4) Go ahead with production, building up to a rate of four aircraft.

The Analysis

There are many interacting factors bearing on your choice of an alternative. In order to make the structure of Harold’s analysis and the key points as clear as possible, we have set out the high points with a minimum of detail.

Harold begins his argument by noting that the residual target destruction capability on both sides following a Soviet pre-emptive counterforce strike is projected to shift in favor of the Soviets before 1980, and will be more than 2:1 in their favor by 1985. While admitting that the real wartime significance of this advantage is uncertain, he says that perceptions of this Soviet advantage could have adverse effects, that we should do something about it, and that improvements in our bomber force are the only realistic near-term solution to the problem.

I believe that Harold is making too much of this measure. First, an assessment of the balance should compare similar things. A more appropriate assessment of the overall strategic balance would thus compare the situations in which the Soviets strike first to those in which we strike first. The Soviets’ impression of the balance is undoubtedly strongly influenced by this second situation. In fact, our best estimate projections suggest that the ratio of U.S. to Soviet bomber and ICBM weapons remaining after a first strike by the U.S. is in our favor now and will be increasing in the early 80’s.

Second, I question how meaningful “target destruction potential” is at higher levels. At the levels considered by Secretary Brown, we and the Soviets have long since run out of worthwhile targets. Should we spend vast sums to “make the rubble bounce?”

Finally, it doesn’t seem appropriate to use any single measure as an indicator of the perceived balance. Perceptions of the balance are molded by many indicators and given current intelligence projections, we will be ahead in enough of them to be able to claim strategic parity or even some superiority for at least the next five to seven years, whether or not we modernize the bomber force.³

I would therefore argue that any need to modernize our bomber force with the B–1 requires an argument that the force we have is becoming unsatisfactory and that the B–1 is the right answer.

Harold continues by arguing that the bomber force plays an important role by hedging against possible reductions in the effectiveness of our ballistic missile forces, and by creating severe planning problems that can frustrate Soviet attempts to destroy both our bombers and ICBMs at the same time. Further, while the B–52 force is currently estimated to be very effective, the improvements projected for Soviet air defense by the mid to late 1980’s are likely to reduce its effectiveness significantly. Thus, a significant improvement over the current B–52 force is probably required. I agree.

Examination of the backup study supporting Harold’s memo indicates that arming the B–52 force with cruise missiles would significantly improve it.⁴ In particular, it would extend the period during which the B–52 can be expected to remain effective against projected Soviet air defenses. In addition, since all of the study’s preferred alternatives for modernizing the bomber force include arming at least some portion of the B–52 force with cruise missiles, I conclude that we should extend the B–52’s usefulness in this way whether or not we proceed with the B–1.

The result, however, is to also extend the period available for the production of the B–1 or the development and production of a different system. Thus, unless you believe there is a pressing need to buy the B–1 in order to improve perceptions, there is no argument forcing your hand; your decision can be made on the basis of the relative economic and political costs of the alternatives.

If you are reasonably certain that we are eventually going to build a significant force of 150 or more B–1’s, the smallest political costs would probably be realized by going ahead now and building up to a production rate of two aircraft per month.

On the other hand, if you have doubts about whether or not we will eventually build a significant force of B–1’s, you should probably accept the short-term penalties involved in choosing a delay. Clearly the political and economic losses involved will be much larger if we proceed with production only to discover that the B–1 will not handle the threat or that another alternative would have met our needs at considerably less cost.

Dealing with the Uncertainties

Obviously, there are large uncertainties on both scores, and a delay of several years could provide an opportunity to resolve some of them. Moreover, it is more likely than not that we will find during such a delay that building the B–1 is not a good idea.

—Specifically, we will know more about how the strategic balance, SALT, and Soviet air defenses are going to evolve. A slowdown in the evolution of the Soviet threat would militate against the B–1.

—We can also have a better idea of whether the electronic countermeasures—(ECM) that the B–1 is crucially dependent on—will work. I have reason to believe that the Soviets can build air defense systems that ECM cannot beat.⁵ At the least, we should test the B–1’s ECM systems (which will be available in the fall of 1979) against our own AWAC’s and look-down/shoot-down fighters, as well as against our best low altitude SAM systems.

—We can also get a better idea of how well our current cruise missiles might stand up against future Soviet air defense by testing them against our best air defense systems.

—Finally, we will know whether or not a promising new Air Force concept for building essentially invisible aircraft or cruise missiles will work.⁶ If it does, the arguments in favor of penetrating bombers may also disappear.

SALT

Another issue bearing on this decision is how it interacts with SALT, and clearly we have recognized an interaction in our efforts to preserve the option for a 2500 km ALCM. If you decide to deploy this system, we should make every effort to avoid having to count heavy bombers with long range ALCM’s as MIRV’s. Further, if we want to be able to eventually build a new long range cruise missile carrier, we must make certain that we have the right to define the new aircraft as a heavy bomber.

The announcement of your decision could conceivably impact on the ongoing SALT negotiations. However, the Soviets seem to have accommodated their thinking to the deployment of a long range ALCM or the B–1. Thus, unless your decision is accompanied by a claim that its purpose is to allow us to significantly raise our overall strategic capability, it probably won’t have much impact on SALT.

A third conceivable interaction involves the Senate. Specifically a delay in B–1 production could raise further problems for ratification of a new SALT treaty. On the other hand, Senator Jackson recognizes that Boeing has a very good chance of winning a contract to produce cruise missiles and/or the replacement for the B–1. (He came close to opposing the B–1 during the campaign.)

One final point concerns costs. In particular, will delay of the B–1 program significantly increase its costs if we do end up building it? Harold’s study suggests otherwise by showing that it is cheaper to delay production a year and then catch up by building four aircraft per month, than it is to start now and build at a rate of two aircraft per month. Further, if during a delay we do find that the B–1 is not the right choice, we may avoid a 25 billion dollar mistake. A sum of this magnitude could go a long way toward buying a new Navy, or dramatically strengthening our conventional capabilities in Europe and thus reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons.

While Harold does not make a definite recommendation, he has favored the B–1 in the past, and his analysis points toward continuing with B–1 production. In view of the considerations I have outlined above, I believe that a delay in the production of the B–1 deserves the most careful evaluation.

The analysis relating to the ECM and the invisible cruise missile given at Tabs A and B is not included in Harold’s memo.

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 17, B–1 Bomber, President’s File, 5–6/77. Secret; Sensitive. Special Access Required. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the first page of the memorandum: “Susan hold. J.” Reference is to Susan Clough, Carter’s personal secretary.
2. Brown’s draft memorandum to Carter, June 1, is in Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 6, B–1: 6/1–10/77.
3. Carter wrote “?” in the left margin next to this paragraph.
4. Not found attached.
5. See Tab A. [Footnote is in the original. Tab A, an undated one-page evaluation of Soviet air defense capabilities against the B–1’s electronic counter measures, is attached but not printed.]
6. See Tab B. [Footnote is in the original. Tab B, an undated one-and-one-half page description of stealth cruise missiles along with an artist’s rendering and a graph, is attached but not printed.]