Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

218. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, December 2, 1980, 2–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Defense Budget

PARTICIPANT

• State

  • Secretary Edmund Muskie
  • Reginald Bartholomew, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

• OSD

  • Secretary Harold Brown (Chairman)
  • Dep. Sec. W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
  • Amb Robert Komer Under Secretary for Policy
  • Russell Murray, Asst. Sec. for Program Analysis and Evaluation

• JCS

  • General David Jones

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • John Koehler, Dep. to the Director for Resource Management

• OMB

  • James McIntyre
  • Edward Sanders, Assoc. Dir. for National Security and International Affairs

• ACDA

  • Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy
  • William Ashworth, Asst. Dir., Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau

• OSTP

  • Benjamin Huberman
  • John Marcum

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

• NSC

  • General Jasper Welch
  • General William Odom
  • Victor Utgoff

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Harold Brown, as Chairman, asked that the group comment on the Defense paper that provided an estimate of the size and scope of the collective Defense program facing the free world and the United States, as its leader, if current national security guidance is to be followed and its goals achieved.² Brown explained that the purpose of the paper was to set the context for consideration of the Defense budget. (C)

The paper developed estimates of what it will take in ground, air, and naval forces of the U.S. and allies to produce various force level ratios between them and the Pact in critical geographical and functional areas. This also describes what these forces will cost the U.S. and its allies in money and manpower to implement current national security policy. The quantitative estimates are developed for two levels of assurance that the free world’s forces are adequate; for two dates, 1987 and 1995, for achieving either level of assurance; and for two levels of contributions by the rest of the free world—one reflecting more equitable sharing of burdens by all nations, and an alternative where other nations continue on their current course. [4 lines not declassified] (C)

Brown first asked Stan Turner for an estimate of Soviet reactions to the various free world build-ups presented. Turner replied specifically with regard to the chart on strategic balance indicators that showed a steady and substantial Soviet advantage from ’75 to ’81, followed by a significant erosion of that Soviet advantage from ’81 to ’87. (The indicator in question presented the ratio of residual forces following a Soviet first-strike counterforce and a U.S. retaliation counterforce.) Turner noted that this particular indicator showed a much earlier and more dramatic erosion of the Soviet advantage than other analyses with which he was more familiar. Others agreed with this observation. (S)

Brown replied that this particular indicator is merely one measure. It emphasizes the effects of U.S. advantages, particularly in cruise missiles and SLBMs, and perhaps overemphasizes them. [9 lines not declassified] (S)

General Jones thought the paper useful as a whole but thought that it understated our difficulties in the strategic balance. In particular he thought that looking only at ratios of residual strategic force obscured the heavier weight of the Soviet attack in megatons, assumed away current deficiencies in C3, and assumed that the U.S. five-year program would continue on schedule contrary to what has happened in the past. Russ Murray said that some monies were added in the financial accounting to cover C3 improvements and other modernization, and that needed readiness improvements were funded before force structure growth. General Jones replied that in his view the analysis underestimated the resources needed to correct C3 deficiencies and readiness shortfalls. (C)

Harold Brown and Jim McIntyre both noted that difficulties in increasing U.S. military manpower will eventually constrain force structure increases. Russ Murray indicated that the analysis recognized this difficulty and chose programs which minimized the need for additional military manpower. Much of the increase in armored division equivalents, for example, was obtained through modernization rather than increases in numbers of divisions per se. Brown and McIntyre expressed skepticism as to whether further increases in pay could attract commensurate increases in recruits. (U)

In Brown’s opinion the key issue raised by the paper is the role of the other free world countries—what can we expect they will do, how should we proceed to encourage them to do more, and what should we do if they fail to respond as we would want them to. [5 lines not declassified] (S)

Jim McIntyre thought the FRG was more apt to react in a way best calculated to protect its East European trade. [7 lines not declassified] (S)

Muskie then asked what we were to do if the Allies in fact do not make an increased contribution. Brown replied that was indeed the crucial question and that in his judgement [11 lines not declassified] (S)

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

(Secretary Muskie left at this point.)

[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

[1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]

Brown then turned to the Nuclear Land Attack Tomahawk program. There is concern that moving to procurement in this program in FY–82 could complicate implementation of NATO’s LRTNF program. Brown proposed that by retaining $3–4 million in RDT&E we could protect a FY–84 IOC and minimize any potential difficulty. This was agreed by all. (S)

Brown raised the question of the proper level of military construction in Southwest Asia for FY–82. Bartholomew voiced concern that the currently proposed levels are systematically below those that we have previously announced to Oman, Somalia, Kenya, and to the United Kingdom for Diego Garcia. Brown replied that the levels proposed were chosen in light of a judgment that the Congress would only finance a limited amount of military construction in Southwest Asia and the reductions from previous goals elsewhere were needed to fund the Ras Banas construction in Egypt. Bartholomew, in response to a question from Brown, expressed confidence that we could have an access agreement for Ras Banas with Egypt in time for Congressional action in the spring. Welch expressed concern that there was disconnect between what was needed in facilities and what appeared feasible to get Congress to fund. Brown agreed but said we cannot get out of the game and must proceed as best we can. (S)

Brown raised the general issue of funding for joint programs with our European allies, the problem being that we will not be able to provide funds for these programs as expected in all cases. In particular, for Roland he proposed that we request only $65 million in FY–82 vice the $355 million planned and defer the rest of the planned program into the out years. It appears as though the FRG may also fall out of the Roland program due to the need to finance cost growth in the Toronado fighter bomber. This proposal was accepted. (S)

Brown pointed out that POMCUS set 7 was being delayed because of a lack of sufficient equipment and that the siting of set 6 was not yet firm, raising the possibility of a delay in that set also. Brown asked whether State was agreeable to defer POMCUS set (pre-positioned Army unit equipment) 7. Bartholomew agreed, stating that that was consistent with the general decision to let capability shortfalls appear in NATO. (S)

With respect to the security assistance enhancement package for Southwest Asia previously recommended by the SCC, it was noted that State has filed its formal support with OMB. McIntyre suggested that OMB chair an inter-agency group to review this issue in detail prior to the scheduled 8 December meeting with the President on the defense and foreign affairs budget. This was agreed. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Welch, Box 210, Chron: 12/1–7/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting were found.
2. See the attachment to Document 214.