Office of the Historian

204. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1

Washington, July 17, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Meeting with Eizenstat on WH Study of Accidental Nuclear War

You already, I believe, have heard most of the arguments on this issue. Eizenstat believes it might be helpful politically for the White House to appear in charge and on top of a study and investigation of the chances of nuclear war.2 Presumably this is in response to the NORAD false alert problem.3

Information

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DOD has already conducted a large study and several reports have gone to the President on the matter.
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Defense has briefed the press and Congress. The Congressional committee chairmen have been kept well informed from the beginning.
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Hugh Carter and Marty Beaman are strongly opposed to Eizenstat’s study proposal. Their reasons include the fact that DOD has already done one and that to initiate such a study now would be to invite political trouble for the President. It would open a Pandora’s box.
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I am unaware of any ground swell demand for such a study in the press or elsewhere. Senator Tower is being handled by DOD.

Considerations

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Thus far we have kept this matter away from the White House and in the Pentagon where it belongs. Why shift the focus to the President now?
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No study will satisfy even half its audience. It will merely invite all kinds of additional study issues and increase lack of public confidence.
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For the sophisticated Defense analyst, it could lead to debates about C3I vulnerabilities, debates we cannot win.
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The whole business of NORAD, the SIOP, etc. is a great curiosity. Mathematicians, scientists, and quacks will appear in droves to learn more, to provide copious advice, and to turn the system into a circus or analysts’ amusement park.
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There may be some good reasons for a study, but they escape me.
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I have already received a press call from Science 80 about this study. I warned Simmons that this would happen.
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79–8/80. Secret. Outside the System. Sent for information. Aaron initialed the memorandum next to the heading.↩
  2. Not found.↩
  3. See Documents 167, 190, and 193.↩