193. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Actions Taken to Correct Errors Identified by the False Missile Warnings
This memorandum is an update on our actions to identify and correct the false missile alert problem.
[Page 834]As you are aware, the false indications that led to the precautionary measures taken at SAC on June 3 and 6 resulted from a computer malfunction. These false indications were immediately identified by duty officers, who exercised the planned safeguards designed for such a contingency. The corrective actions taken thus far include procedures to strengthen human safeguards as well as technical measures to repair the immediate problem in the computer. The following are specific actions which have been taken in these two categories:
Operational and Procedural Actions
Emergency action procedures have been modified so that any command center can request a Missile Display Conference (MDC). This is the lowest of three levels of conference: Missile Display; Threat Assessment; and Missile Attack. Any potentially threatening warning indication will result in an MDC, and MDCs will be conducted on dedicated secure voice circuits. If any delay occurs, non-secure voice circuits will be used.
Amendments have been made in SAC missile warning procedures on an interim basis pending a complete review of all relevant procedures. No posture change will be made in SAC forces unless confirmed by a NORAD system confidence of “medium” or “high,” or the receipt by SAC of sensor data indicating a potential missile attack directly from either our infrared-sensing satellites or our new SLBM warning radar.
The Chairman of the JCS has discussed with me, and then approved, a revised Situation Action display. The revision adds missile count information derived from directly-connected sensor data. The display already has NORAD summary data for each sensor system. Thus, both the NORAD summary (which comes through the computer) and direct (though less detailed) data from the sensors can be compared on one display. Software program development and checkout testing will take approximately three weeks at SAC. Installation at NMCC and ANMCC will require an additional four days. Since NORAD does not have the Situation Action display, installation at NORAD will take significantly longer.
The Chairman of the JCS visited SAC Headquarters and NORAD Headquarters yesterday and today to discuss new procedures and follow-on actions.
Technical/Equipment Actions
The technical problem that generated the false displays occurred in a NOVA 840 minicomputer manufactured by Data General. The specific minicomputer that introduced the problem is four years old and is used in the Communications System Segment (CSS) at NORAD. [Page 835] NORAD is almost certain they have isolated the problem to a single chip in an interface for the high-speed data lines. Until the fault is positively isolated and corrected, the following interim precautionary measures have been taken:
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- A different and separate computer, the Mission Essential Backup (MEBU), is now the primary source of NORAD-processed data.
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- The CSS has been taken out of operation. If the MEBU should fail, a different channel of the CSS, and the low-speed teletype data lines (neither of which has experienced problems), will be activated to provide data to the command centers other than NORAD. (NORAD would use all CSS data in this case.)
A task force of highly competent and respected computer experts from the private sector, headed by Bob Evans (Vice President of IBM for Engineering, Programming, and Technology), has been assembled to conduct a thorough review of the computer and communications problems at NORAD. The task force began meeting on Tuesday2 and a preliminary report is due this weekend.
I will continue to keep you advised of our progress.