Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

205. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, July 18, 1980

SUBJECT

• Significant Actions, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense (July 12–18, 1980)

FY 82 Defense Program: We are well underway in examining individual Service submissions for the FY 82 Defense Budget and the FY 82–86 program, and devising alternative policy and program options. Graham Claytor is chairing, with OMB participation at a senior level, the Defense Resources Board (DRB) review. The DRB objective is to develop an integrated DoD five-year program centering on the 5-year funding profile, provided by OMB, but with a reasonable range of alternative levels in either direction. I will have their recommendations shortly, and by the end of the month I will have made my tentative decisions, subject to my reconsideration soon thereafter in the light of comments from the Service Secretaries and JCS. This timing and that of the OMB “Spring” Review this year would make your consideration of the kinds of defense issues usually presented at OMB Spring Review an unproductive use of your time. Therefore I am working with John White of OMB to structure an alternative approach. It would present a brief written summary of the competing needs of readiness, personnel costs, and hardware within various defense funding levels as constrained by the overall economic and budget forecasts. Before our decisions on programs and budget details are made later this year, I believe we should have a meeting with the JCS to hear their views, and an NSC meeting to address the broad national security issues.² (U)

Soviet AWACS Testing: A recent DIA intelligence report³ describes unusual flight tests of what may well be a new Soviet CANDID (IL–76) AWACS. Insufficient hard evidence makes a confident assessment difficult, but—given the obvious Soviet incentive to develop an AWACS—I believe that the flight tests indicate a Russian attempt to detect low-flying aircraft and direct interceptors to those aircraft. Such a step on their part would be consistent with the evolution of Soviet strategic air defenses we anticipated when the B–1 program was cancelled in 1977.

If this is in fact an AWACS test program, the Soviet Union could have a force of 20 CANDID aircraft operational by 1985. We also project at that time a deployment of 400 modified FOXBAT interceptors and the beginning of the new Sukhoi and Mikoyan fighter deployments; these three aircraft can be expected to have a look-down/shoot-down capability. This Soviet force of interceptors and AWACS would be quite effective against penetrating bombers of the B–1 type, but would have limited capability against our ALCMs.

Given the problems of attacking ALCMs, the Soviets are more likely to extend their defense coverage beyond their borders to attack the missile-launching aircraft. Forward defenses, including extended range (1000 nautical mile) interceptors and a force of 50–75 CANDID aircraft, could be expected in the 1990s and would offer significant capability against the B–52 ALCM carrier.

Our most promising response to that Soviet approach is to extend the ALCM range, thereby allowing the carrier to stand off even from extended range interceptors. We have two relevant R&D programs; first, an improved engine that would give the first generation cruise missile 35 percent more range; and second, an improved cruise missile design that achieves greater range by operating at more efficient altitudes. Both improvements could be operational in time to meet this threat if it develops. I will keep you advised as more information on Soviet testing is received and analyzed. (TS)

Legislative Issues: The conference committee on the FY 81 Defense Authorization Bill is scheduled to convene next week. I have already had preliminary discussions with both John Stennis and Mel Price, and will meet with each next week. I will write the conference committee a letter strongly objecting to a number of the proposed add-ons, and pointing out the imbalance created by those and by several of the deletions made either in the Senate or House. I will also meet with Joe Addabbo and Jack Edwards next Tuesday⁴ before their Subcommittee begins its markup of the FY 81 Appropriations Bill. I intend to make a particularly strong plea to them against funding the refitting of the NEW JERSEY and the ORISKANY. (U)

Rapid Solidification Technology (RST): In November 1978 I sent you a memorandum⁵ describing the RST metallurgical process and outlining potential military applications for the late 1980s. Since then we have expanded our program and are encouraged by progress in developing new alloys. In addition, both U.S. and foreign industry have begun aggressive in-house research and development programs. I believe that this emerging U.S. industrial base must be stimulated and encouraged by the government. The DoD program will partially fill this need, but additional government investment in or underwriting of the civil sector would be useful—and contribute substantially to the overall health of the economy. Under Secretary Bill Perry will work with Frank Press to develop an integrated plan of action. (U)

Overseas Medical Research Laboratories: During preparation of the FY 81 budget, OMB directed the closure, or conversion to contract operations, of our eight overseas laboratories. With the assistance of distinguished civilian scientists from industry and academia, we subsequently completed a study that confirms the clear military need for these units. The study⁶ also documents strong U.S. embassy and host government support for current operations, and the infeasibility of contracting for like services. These efforts are a U.S. activity that brings political benefits (on a smaller scale) like those accruing to Cuba from its provision of teachers and physicians in developing countries. I believe the laboratories provide a unique military, scientific, and political return far in excess of their cost, and have asked Jim McIntyre to reconsider the decision in light of current information. (U)

Mobilization and Deployment Exercises: We have now completed an unclassified study of NIFTY NUGGET-78 and REX-78,⁷ the two ambitious mobilization exercises we held in late 1978. There was substantial media interest in the exercises, and we expect considerable interest in the unclassified study. The study contains some very frank and critical comments on our mobilization capabilities as they existed two years ago.⁸ To try to reduce misunderstanding of these comments, the report will be released following a background briefing to explain that this Administration was the first ever to conduct such a test of our mobilization procedures, and that we have remedial efforts underway to correct the deficiencies observed during the exercises. (U)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to national security policy.]

Exercise GLOBAL SHIELD: The Strategic Air Command recently completed the largest and most comprehensive Air Force strategic readiness exercise ever conducted. During the nine-day schedule, every facet of SAC’s Emergency War Order was realistically tested: [number not declassified] missiles and [number not declassified] aircraft were brought to maximum readiness levels, over [number not declassified] sorties were flown, and an ICBM was launched from Vandenberg AFB, California. The exercise highlighted our ability to generate and maintain strategic weapons systems at heightened alert levels. (S)

Harold Brown

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 64, Brown’s Weekly Report: 1980. Top Secret. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: “cc Harold. J.”
2. Carter wrote in the left margin next to this paragraph: “ok, if satisfactory to McIntyre.”
3. Not found.
4. July 22.
5. Not found.
6. Not found.
7. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, An Evaluation Report of Mobilization and Deployment Capability Based on Exercises NIFTY NUGGET-78 and REX-78. (Washington: Department of Defense, 1980)
8. Carter underlined “as they existed two years ago” and wrote in the left margin next to it: “Emphasize this.”