Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

2. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council¹

Washington, January 27, 1977, 10–10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Defense Issues

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
• Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. George S. Brown
• Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Enno Knoche
• Mr. W. Bowman Cutter, Office of Management and Budget

OTHER ATTENDEES

• DOD

  • Jack Quetsch, Principal Deputy Comptroller

• White House

  • Stuart Eizenstat
  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Jack Watson
  • William G. Hyland

• NSC Staff

  • Edward R. Jayne
  • Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

—It was agreed to hold a four to five hour detailed session on the defense budget the following week with the President, members of the NSC and OMB Director Lance.

—The President asked for a written presentation prior to the meeting.

(The meeting began without General Brown)

President Carter: The purpose of this meeting is to consider changes in the FY 1978 defense budget. It should be interpreted as purely an exploratory discussion. We need to know what the issues are. I will want to get involved in the details at an appropriate time. We can set aside a Saturday or a Sunday afternoon for a detailed discussion. I realize the urgency of assimilating your recommendations. Bert Lance isn’t here?

Mr. Cutter: He is on the Hill.

President Carter: Harold (Brown), why don’t you go ahead.

Secretary Brown: With regard to your comment about getting into things, I would applaud your deep participation at any time. I have made it clear both publicly and privately that these are very preliminary proposals. I need to get further reactions in my building. Unfortunately they have gotten out, but they are certainly subject to further discussion. Input from the President and from other NSC members will have a substantial effect. I am not shooting at any particular number, but I wanted to show a decrease. I have tried to find things that were being done too fast or that should not be done at all. As you know, the cut amounts to about $2.5 billion. At the moment, of course, we are cutting the wrong things. I would expect to get most of the money from base closings and manpower adjustments, but that takes much longer. In these first few weeks, in order to get reductions, I have had to hit the procurement programs harder than I would choose to in the longer run.

President Carter: This is my first experience in a Departmental Budget and I want to learn all I can about it. I would like OMB to make a critical analysis of all expenditures. Then I want a thorough analysis of ongoing programs. There is a tendency to consider them all sacrosanct in the absence of such an assessment. I need some understanding of the manpower problems. Possibly we need more rigid entrance standards. Within a few months or a year we will have to decide whether to have some kind of conscription or even an all-out draft. Also, the ratio of combat to non-combat troops concerns me. Jim Schlesinger told me that when he was in Defense he set an overall personnel level then told the forces to increase by two combat units in their own way.

I will, of course, need and will respect your advice. But on the matter of new weapons systems—the B–1, M–X—I will have to make the decision myself. Before I make the final decision, I hope we will have some means to assess the Soviet attitude on global force reductions.

(General Brown arrived.)

President Carter: I assume NSC meetings are confidential. Cy (Vance) has an indication from Dobrynin that the Soviets would like to see mobile missiles banned in SALT. If we could get an agreement, that would be a major factor. Some elements might be decided by external events. Let’s proceed with a detailed presentation to me by OMB and Dr. Brzezinski. I want to be involved in this assessment with you. There’s a question at what point we bring in DOD and the JCS. In Georgia, I did an independent analysis with the budget people, then I met with the Department leaders. But I have no preconceived notion on this. I will defer to the Defense Department’s judgement.

Secretary Brown: I believe our existing process works well. Most of the detailed information has to come from Defense. Our Comptroller, through me, works with OMB and the NSC staff to produce the analysis. The recommendations you get from your staff may be contrary to our recommendations, but the facts are assembled together. As a practical matter, it qualifies pretty well as zero based budgeting. I believe the Defense Department process is clearer and more along the lines you indicated than that of the other departments.

President Carter: I want the OMB budget process to be quite incisive and intrusive.

Secretary Brown: We have been through the figures with OMB and there are a few items still disagreed. At the present time, the fights between Defense and OMB have gone on before the President gets into it. If you want to enter the process earlier, we could fight better because we would have an idea of your views.

Mr. Cutter: There were 45 issues, and OMB, Defense and the Transition staffs in the two agencies each had a position on each. OMB wrote a letter to Defense defending the OMB position.

President Carter: At what point has the President been involved?

Secretary Vance: We would wrestle the issues with OMB. There would still be some unagreed issues. Then the President would sit down with OMB, Defense and JCS and make his decisions.

Secretary Brown: That should still be the case except that we would have an earlier input from the President.

Dr. Brzezinski: Both State and the NSC should have an opportunity to review the budget for political implications.

Secretary Brown: With regard to these particular budget amendments, that review will happen after the fact. In the future, it will happen in the course of developing the budget. I wanted to delay my recommendations to very near the time for decision so as to minimize the political flack. However, they began to leak, and we are already getting some flack from the Congress, and we will be hearing from some foreign countries. The longer the lapse between recommendations and decisions, the worse the effect will be.

President Carter: I want a fairly definitive presentation to me quite early. I will set out as much time as we need. I want you to explain to me how you arrived at the 45 items. Let’s have a multi-hour session within the next week where I can ask questions. I don’t have an adequate basis on which to reach conclusions. I don’t want to interfere, but the final decision is mine. I don’t like to be presented with a final product without having a more complete presentation. I may be able to help. The more I am involved, the more you will have my imprimatur and my support. There might be disagreements, but I don’t look on this process as two contending forces. You all work out a time for a lengthy session. Do it quickly. Harold (Brown), do you want to outline what you are doing?

Dr. Brzezinski: How much time do you have this morning?

President Carter: About 15–20 minutes. In a way we are really wasting this meeting, but I wanted to let you know how I viewed this.

Secretary Brown: I can summarize the proposed changes quickly. I have placed greater emphasis on combat readiness while continuing essential modernization. I have slowed down some things that I thought were going too fast.

In strategic forces, on the B–1, I have reduced the rate of production and have deferred the decision as to whether to continue the program until FY 1979. On the M–X, I have slowed major development to its original (1977 budget) pace, but have left the final question open. Developments in SALT might preclude further development of the M–X. I have left cruise missiles at their present level, but have reorganized what gets done under the program. The cruise missiles are not so far along as the B–1, but are farther than the M–X. We can’t really tamper with these until we know where we are going. I’m not foreclosing any options, and we will want an in-depth review in the spring.

President Carter: We need to know how far along we are in each instance, and what would be the consequences of slowing down and trimming the programs.

Secretary Brown: On land and tactical air and mobility forces, I am changing the mix of F–15s and F–16s. We will reduce the number of high-performance aircraft and keep five wings. I would terminate A–7E production. This program is largely political. They have knocked it out every year and Congress, under pressure from the aircraft industry, puts it back.

On land forces, I am substituting two Reserve Component brigades for two late-deploying active Army brigades. I recognize there are foreign policy issues here. Also, I have stopped the non-nuclear Lance procurement. I don’t think it’s efficient. The Army disagrees. I suspect they may have sold its value to other countries.

On NATO and mobility forces, I have added shelters for additional aircraft and additional storage capacity and have increased the heavy-lift capacity by modifying aircraft in the civilian fleet. Congress keeps turning this program down. Naturally, the aircraft industry wants us to buy new planes rather than modify old ones.

On ship construction, we had six programs last year—I think four came from the Pentagon and two from the Hill. Except for the nuclear powered strike cruiser, which will cost over a billion dollars, the shipyards are so jammed that adding additional money doesn’t get us any more ships. I would defer one attack submarine and two patrol frigates. And I would cut back on some experimental ships.

Dr. Brzezinski: There are political reasons for continuing with the attack submarine.

Secretary Brown: In a number of cases, the political and the management/efficiency factors are on opposite sides. In this first cut, I have proceeded only on management grounds. We will get the political input later.

President Carter: I would like to make our decisions on a non-political basis, but I’m not naive. The question is how to give the nation maximum security on X number of dollars—that should be our constant, single criterion. If domestic or international political interests are involved, we need to understand when we are yielding on a political basis. That is my realm. If we yield to the Congress or to a foreign country, I need to know what the trade-off is. Let me be the one to say we can cut defense capacity on political grounds. Of course, I may have to do it.

Secretary Brown: That’s why I did it this way.

President Carter: Good.

Secretary Vance: With regard to the B–1, the arms control decisions can make the case. You should look at the other alternatives before making any decision.

President Carter: That’s why I need to understand the consequences of procurement, deferral or slow-down. As we talk to the Soviets, their understanding that the B–1 is still alive is a major factor. The Soviets perceive the B–1 and cruise missiles as a real threat. A commitment to the B–1 would indicate to the Soviets that we are still committed to the triple method. If I were Brezhnev, I would want to understand the ultimate intentions of the US. I plan to put all possible pressure on the Soviets this spring and summer to get substantial mutual reductions. We should keep the option on the B–1 open as long as we can. I don’t know the advantages and disadvantages yet.

Secretary Vance: On cruise missiles, we are making a major commitment to go ahead.

Secretary Brown: There are 250 in the total R&D program. We are committed to developing some kind of cruise missile. But we can shift from one to another—from air to land to sea. All options can be kept open.

President Carter: Also nuclear and non-nuclear.

Secretary Brown: The non-nuclear missile is much further off. There are tougher guidance programs. We are committed to develop some but not necessarily deploy them. And we’re not committed to one or another developed use. They’re not unique now.

Dr. Brzezinski: And we still have the option of pulling back if there are reductions.

Secretary Brown: Yes.

Secretary Vance: What about our allies? They will expect a piece of the action—that we will provide them with these systems.

Secretary Brown: We are now supplying them with quick reaction land-based missiles. It’s better to give them cruise missiles than aircraft. Aircraft are being diverted for other missions. They would be concerned if they thought we would pull out.

President Carter: Aren’t our cruise missiles superior to the Russians in airframe, engine and electronic control?

Secretary Brown: Yes.

President Carter: I want to learn the details on this.

General Brown: On the point of our allies, the Germans have stressed repeatedly to us that what may be tactical to us is strategic to them. They look for deployment of land-based cruise missiles in Central Europe. But use of cruise missiles makes verification most difficult. For tactical use, whether armed or un-armed, the situation is very fuzzy.

Secretary Brown: That argues for going slowly.

General Brown: When we think about cruise missiles we tend to think too much about offense. We also have to face the challenges of defense. They would be a decided threat to the US if they are not covered by SALT.

President Carter: Our advanced stage of development is a major advantage over the Soviets. We can continue procurement and keep the advantage or reduce it as leverage.

General Brown: The same is true of the B–1.

Secretary Brown: There is one specific thing about cruise missiles with regard to SALT. The Backfire corresponds to land-based cruise missiles in Europe. They are tactical. Let the Russians know that they are something we may want to deploy if the Backfire is not take care of.

General Brown: The SS–X–20 concerns the Europeans, too. It’s mobile.

President Carter: It concerns China too.

Dr. Brzezinski: Any cut-back would send the wrong signal to both the Europeans and the Chinese.

President Carter: Without cutting back, the actual numbers are not very high.

Secretary Vance: On the shipbuilding program, the Germans are very much interested in the hydrofoil program. They will take this as a signal that we are not really interested in standardization. On the heels of the Vice President’s statements in support of NATO,² we would be giving the wrong signal. The same thing would be true if we substituted two reserve brigades for active brigades. When we look at our active forces and pull out two from NATO, it will raise questions.

Secretary Brown: Your points are well taken, but they are superrogatory. They go beyond the question of what we really need.

Secretary Vance: You’re degrading readiness. The reserves can’t do the job.

Secretary Brown: These are late-deploying units, primarily infantry. They’re relatively unimportant in NATO. It would not mean a substantial reduction in capacity. This is a separate problem from what others see.

Dr. Brzezinski: I agree with Cy (Vance) on the active brigades. Wait until our world-wide review is finished.³

Secretary Brown: You’re talking about perceptions.

Dr. Brzezinski: Politics is perception.

Secretary Brown: They’re two separate things.

Dr. Brzezinski: You have provided the military considerations; we will add the political. On the nuclear submarine and AWACS, we need to look at the European reaction. If we reduce our effort, they will reduce theirs.

Secretary Brown: That’s an appropriate issue. If we buy more, they won’t have to.

Dr. Brzezinski: We should develop a package on manpower, including base closings.

Secretary Brown: That’s a good idea, but it’s not new. Nothing can be done by February 15. If we made manpower cuts it should be in the tail, not in the teeth. We have been talking to Congress about this.

Dr. Brzezinski: We should get an interagency group together.

Secretary Brown: We don’t need it for base closings. (to Dr. Brzezinski) I’ll discuss it with you. Do you know it takes at least two years to close a base. It takes one year for Congressional consideration and another year for the environmental impact study. We started to close the Franklin Arsenal in 1965 and are still getting complaints about it.

President Carter: That’s Fritz’ (Vice President Mondale) favorite.

Secretary Brown: I strongly agree on manpower reductions, but the package has to be large enough so that both the fiscal conservatives and the doves will get behind it and push it.

Secretary Vance: On the Lance, I’m for dropping it, but do we have enough spares to continue our support to our allies?

Secretary Brown: I’ll check.

General Brown: I know we’re not here to debate the issues now, but I do want to make two points. Secretary Vance has made a very important point about the perceptions of our allies. We have been very critical of the British defense posture decisions for the last two years. We have confirmed our support for NATO and the Vice President has given them assurances. If we replace two active brigades with reserves, we will be acting just like the British. We have reached the point in trying to sustain our reserve forces where our recruitment objectives are based on what we can get, not what we need. I don’t know how we would man two additional reserve brigades.

President Carter: Zbig, how soon can we get four to five hours on this? I will want a written presentation first.

Dr. Brzezinski: We’ll do it next week.

President Carter: Possibly on Saturday afternoon.⁴ You can have supper with me, and we could continue in the evening.

Dr. Brzezinski: You would want (OMB Director) Lance there.

President Carter: Yes; he and I both need educating. I have no idea of excluding anyone. Set up an adequate amount of time so that I can learn and share my thoughts with you.

Dr. Brzezinski: And we will get into political issues?

President Carter: Yes. This has been a productive meeting.

Dr. Brzezinski: The press is going to want to know the subject of this meeting. I don’t think we need always necessarily tell them what NSC meetings are about. I’m a little reluctant to say it was on the defense budget.

President Carter: Just tell them it was on budget issues, not defense.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 1, NSC Meeting: #2 Held 1/27/77. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House.
2. For Mondale’s January 24 Brussels address, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 16.
3. Reference is to PRM/NSC–10, printed as Document 4.
4. Reference is either to Saturday, January 29, or Saturday, February 5. No record of a meeting on either date was found. On January 31, Carter met with his advisors in the Cabinet Room from 4:30 to 6:30 p.m. to discuss the FY 1978 defense budget. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes of the conversation were found.