Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

1. Notes of a Meeting¹

July 26, 1976, 3–6:30 p.m.

Present

• Governor Jimmy Carter, Senator Walter Mondale; Barry Blechman, Harold Brown, Lynn Davis, Paul Nitze, Walter Slocombe, Paul Warnke, James Woolsey, and Cyrus Vance; David Aaron, Stuart Eisenstadt, Richard Holbrooke, Jack Watson, and other staff members.

1. Summary. The meeting began at about 3:00 P.M. and adjourned at about 6:30 P.M. The discussion focused first on strategic forces, secondly on general purpose forces, thirdly on questions of efficiency in the utilization of manpower, and finally on the overall size of the defense budget. There was also a brief discussion of the benefits and risks of arms transfers.

2. Strategic forces. Mr. Vance spoke first. He said that all the advisors present at the meeting agreed that there was rough equivalence between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces at present. The Soviets have advantages in some measures of strategic capabilities (e.g., throw-weight), while the United States has advantages in other measures (warheads, for example). He noted, however, that there was disagreement among the group as to where present trends in strategic deployment programs were leading, and what the United States should do about those trends. He concluded by briefly reviewing recent developments in Soviet strategic capabilities.

Mr. Brown spoke next. He noted his agreement with what Mr. Vance had said and emphasized that the key question is what would happen if present trends continued into the future. He then discussed specific changes which might be made to U.S. strategic programs in response to trends in relative strategic capabilities. He particularly emphasized modernization of the bomber force as an important program, and discussed criteria which would affect evaluations of possible follow-ons to Minuteman ICBMs.

Mr. Blechman spoke next. He emphasized the difficulty of comparing U.S. and Soviet military forces, and in particular strategic forces.

Mr. Warnke stressed that the present situation is not too bad from the United States’ perspective; that the question was how to avoid a deterioration in the present strategic balance. Warnke emphasized, however, that avoiding a deterioration meant reaching further SALT agreements, not responding to Soviet strategic programs with step-ups in U.S. strategic programs. He noted that in the absence of strategic arms limitation agreements, differences in relative U.S. and Soviet strategic capabilities would lead to political pressures for step-ups—both domestically and from allies, even though they would not mean anything in military terms. Consequently, if further SALT agreements were not reached, the United States would be forced to compete.

Lynn Davis spoke next and emphasized that one needed to look at the full range of strategic forces and compare aggregate capabilities, rather than focusing on one specific component of the strategic forces. She also emphasized that the statements of U.S. decision-makers had perhaps the major effect on perceptions of the strategic balance in the Soviet Union, in third nations, and in the United States.

Walter Slocombe spoke next emphasizing that it was very difficult to understand what the Soviets were doing; that is, what their strategic objectives were. The characteristics, or the numbers of weapons, or the rate of weapon deployments simply do not lead to clear indications of strategic policy. He strengthened this point by illustrating what one might make of U.S. strategic policy if one just viewed actual U.S. weapon deployments.

Mr. Nitze spoke next. He noted his disagreement with much of what had been said so far. In particular, he emphasized that he was more pessimistic than most of the other people in the room, that he thought that the existing trends were extremely negative. More specifically, he stated that if the trends were not reversed quickly, that within ten years the ratios of U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic capabilities that would survive a counter-force exchange would be most unfavorable from the U.S. perspective. He cited a recent study² in which calculations showed that following a Soviet counterforce attack on the United States in the mid-1980s, surviving U.S. retaliatory forces would be able to kill only 4.5 percent of the Soviet population. On the other hand, the study concluded, Soviet forces surviving a U.S. counterforce attack, under present plans, would be able to destroy a much larger proportion of the U.S. population. Mr. Nitze summarized his key point as follows: the assumptions underlying statements made by the majority of the group were not supportable by the data—that, in fact, the data showed that in the future the Soviet Union would be able to survive a nuclear exchange but that the United States would not; and that, in his view, if such a situation were to develop, it would have a major impact on the two nations’ respective behavior.

A discussion ensued among the advisors. Other members of the group, particularly Mr. Vance and Mr. Brown, emphasized that the calculations cited above were dependent upon assumptions such as the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense preparations and U.S. targeting policy, which would be questionable to most observers. In effect, they argued that the calculations presented a “worst” case for the U.S. and a “best” case for the U.S.S.R., both of which were unrealistic. They believed that Mr. Nitze’s scenario was biased toward the Soviets, and that a more even handed approach would yield different results. Other members of the group questioned the implications of the calculations advanced by Mr. Nitze.

There was general agreement that the question was a critical one, and that there should be a thorough study aimed at testing the hypothesis advanced by Mr. Nitze.

Senator Mondale asked why the United States, after having built and deployed large missiles early in the 1960s, moved to smaller and more accurate missiles? Mr. Brown responded that the U.S. believed that the diversity and flexibility of its strategic forces was more important than sheer force. It felt that throw-weight could easily be re-built if that appeared to be necessary, but that building a lot of throw-weight into fixed-site ICBMs did not make sense because of the vulnerability problem. He also stated that mobile land-based missiles implied high costs and political problems.

The discussion continued with Mr. Woolsey, who noted that in discussing these issues it should always be kept in mind that we are not really talking about nuclear war, but about Soviet perceptions of the risks of nuclear war and its likely outcome. He then discussed the ambivalence of weapon systems, and the difficulty of inferring policy from the characteristics of weapons.

Governor Carter asked three questions. First, what is the Soviet attitude toward limited nuclear war? Second, what is the U.S. attitude? And third, what U.S. programs exist now to build-up strategic forces and what are the Soviets doing?

In response to the first two questions, there was a long discussion the upshot of which was that Soviet attitudes were mixed, that one had to discriminate between tactical nuclear wars and strategic nuclear wars, and that it was very difficult to assess what the Soviet attitude was. Moreover, there was general agreement that the Soviet attitude was likely evolving from a point where they believed that limited nuclear war was impossible, to one where at least some Soviet decision-makers might consider it possible to control a nuclear exchange. It was also noted that the U.S. policy always has been that tactical nuclear war was possible, and indeed, that the United States might make first-use of nuclear weapons if it were losing a conventional conflict in Europe or Korea.

In response to Governor Carter’s third question, Mr. Blechman reviewed current U.S. strategic programs and developments in Soviet strategic capabilities. Other members of the group supplemented the discussion.

Following a short recess, Governor Carter asked for a five minute brief on the SALT talks. Mr. Brown noted that the purpose of the talks was to achieve equivalence without building new weapons and that SALT I had resulted in an ABM Treaty and an Interim Agreement on offensive weapons; each of which he described in detail. Mr. Brown then discussed the Vladivostok Agreement³ and described the present impasse in negotiations toward implementing that agreement.

Governor Carter asked if the Soviets really wanted an agreement. The consensus of the group was that indeed they did, but only on favorable terms. Mr. Slocombe emphasized that questions of verification, especially for cruise missiles, were very important ones.

3. General Purpose Forces. This portion of the discussion was introduced by Mr. Vance. He emphasized that questions of the general purpose force structure involved a basic assessment of the purposes of U.S. foreign policy, of the roles the armed forces served in support of that policy, and of the nation’s vital interests. He highlighted the following areas:

a) Europe—the key question is what kind of war, particularly what duration of war, NATO should plan to fight.

b) The Middle East—because contingency planning for what the United States might have to do in defense of Israel was not well advanced, this was an area that needed concerted planning effort. The questions are what kinds of forces would be needed to help defend Israel, and to what extent those forces would have to be additional to forces already maintained for European requirements.

c) Asia—Mr. Vance noted that there was no question that the United States must maintain close ties with Japan, but that the U.S. commitment to Korea, and the forces necessary to maintain that commitment, were more questionable.

[Omitted here are discussions of the bilateral military relationships between the United States and Korea, and the United States and Israel.]

There was further discussion of relative U.S. and Soviet positions in the Middle East, which emphasized relative capabilities to project and sustain military power in the region. Mr. Blechman noted that although the Soviet Union was located geographically closer to the Middle East, the United States had far greater capabilities to project power into the region.

Mr. Woolsey noted his view that the links between foreign policy and force structure decisions was weaker than that implied by the previous discussion. He stated that foreign policy has much less an effect on the overall size of the defense budget than decisions on the way defense resources are utilized.

Mr. Vance disagreed with Mr. Woolsey in this regard emphasizing that even if the latter’s assessment was correct, the administration should still focus on the purpose of the armed forces—that is, on the link between the military and foreign policy, and that the rest was relatively unimportant.

Mr. Brown stated that it was necessary to look at both the purposes of the armed forces and the efficiency with which resources were utilized.

Mr. Slocombe returned the discussion to NATO, emphasizing that requirements for European wars were the most important factors in decisions on the U.S. force structure. There was then a discussion of the balance in Europe, and of the European contribution to NATO defense. Mr. Blechman indicated that over the past twelve years, the states of Western Europe had increased, in real terms, the amount they spent on defense by 20 percent, and that they had kept military manpower levels roughly constant. There was some disagreement as to how well NATO would do in the event of a conventional war in Europe. Generally, Mr. Nitze took a more pessimistic view of the situation than did the other members of the group.

Mr. Warnke emphasized that an all-out war in Europe was most unlikely, but that more realistic contingencies, such as a Soviet incursion into Yugoslavia following Tito’s death, were more likely and that planning should focus on these limited contingencies.

Mr. Vance emphasized that we need a thorough review of NATO plans and forces—that such a review had not been undertaken since 1967, and that in view of developments in technology and Soviet capabilities, such a comprehensive review was necessary.

Governor Carter than asked what Presidential mechanisms there were to correlate defense policy with foreign policy and changes in Soviet military capabilities. There was a lengthy discussion on this point, with the general answer being that what mechanisms did exist had not been developed very far. The previous administration’s unhappy experience with the Defense Program Review Committee of the National Security Council was reviewed. Governor Carter indicated that, if necessary and desirable, he would play a direct role in causing the DoD budget to go through, a more general review process, in which both OMB and the NSC staff would play important roles.

There was then a brief discussion of the Navy and requirements for naval forces. Mr. Blechman reviewed developments in Soviet naval capabilities and problems in U.S. naval force structure and operational patterns.

4. Manpower utilization. There was a brief discussion of problems in the efficiency with which manpower was utilized by the Department of Defense. Mr. Vance emphasized that more than one-half of the budget went for manpower expenses and that there was lots of room for greater efficiency. He put particular emphasis on reforms in the structure and utilization of reserve forces. Mr. Blechman reviewed various measures that have been suggested for reducing the price of defense manpower and the number of people in the DoD workforce, both civilians and military. He noted, particularly, savings made possible by increasing the length of the average tour of duty, by using manpower more efficiently in the military training establishment, by reforming the military compensation system, by consolidating bases, and by eliminating duplication in logistics and headquarters’ units.

A discussion ensued of the political difficulties involved in making changes in manpower policies and practices. Governor Carter emphasized that members of the Defense study group should not be dissuaded by these obvious difficulties, insofar as he believed that if the President took a direct hand in the process, it would be possible to overcome many of these obstacles.

5. Overall size of the budget. There was a very brief discussion on the overall size of the defense budget and of the trend implicit in the administration’s program. The sense of the discussion was that it would be difficult to achieve the $5 to $7 billion reduction as phrased in the Democratic platform committee.⁴ The problem stemmed from the platform’s failure to note that the reduction would be one from a projected increase in the budget, that it would take time to attain such a reduction, and that the reduction would be in budget authority rather than outlays. There was a discussion of the manner in which this pledge should be treated, and of the realistic possibilities for reducing defense spending.

6. Arms transfers. Mr. Vance introduced this topic by noting his support for the Humphrey Amendment.⁵ Governor Carter noted that he too would have vetoed the Humphrey bill, insofar as he believes that it infringes on Presidential prerogatives.⁶ Mr. Vance noted the desirability of investigating the possibility of multilateral efforts to restrain arms transfers. There was a discussion on the pros and cons of selling sophisticated weapons to third world countries, with Mr. Nitze generally being less hostile to such arms sales than other members of the group.

7. Conclusion. Governor Carter concluded the meeting by noting that he would like to have follow-up sessions on specific regions and on specific types of forces with fewer people who specialized in the particular topic.

1. Source: Carter Library, Jimmy Carter Pre-Presidential Papers, 1976 Presidential Campaign Issues Office—Stuart Eizenstat, Box 9, Defense, 7/27/76–8/76. No classification marking. Drafted by Blechman, who forwarded the notes to Eizenstat under a July 29 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)
2. Not further identified.
3. Reference is to the November 1974 meeting in Vladivostok between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev, in which the two leaders outlined an agreement on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT II) to replace SALT I, set to expire in October 1977, that would last until December 31, 1985. The basic framework included a cap of 2400 aggregate launchers, of which 1320 were MIRV missiles. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Documents 83–95.
4. The 1976 Democratic Party platform stated: “Barring any major change in the international situation, with the proper management, with the proper kind of investment of defense dollars, and with the proper choice of military programs, we believe we can reduce present defense spending by about $5 billion to $7 billion.” (“Excerpts From Platform to Be Submitted to the Democratic National Convention,” New York Times, June 18, 1976, p. 12)
5. An amendment to the fiscal 1976 military assistance appropriation. [Footnote is in the original. Senator Humphrey’s amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, postponed indefinitely by the Senate on June 14, would have set restrictions on U.S. arms transfers to foreign countries.]
6. On November 2, Governor Carter defeated President Ford in the 1976 Presidential election. He took the Presidential oath of office on January 20, 1977.