Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

192. Memorandum From Jasper Welch of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, June 12, 1980

SUBJECT

• SASC Action on FY–81 Strategic Programs Budget

In committee action yesterday, the Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC) made several significant changes in the strategic forces portion FY–81 defense budget. These were:

— Authorizing deployment of 100 existing MINUTEMAN III missiles in MINUTEMAN II silos.²

— Authorized starting the FB–111 stretch program.³

— Restrictive M–X language: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the initial phase of construction shall be limited to 2300 protective shelters for the M–X missile in the initial deployment area.”⁴

Comments

If we go forward with deployment of the additional 100 MINUTEMAN III missiles, our MIRVed missile launcher total will reach the SALT II ceiling of 1200 in the spring of 1982 when the third TRIDENT SSBN goes on sea trials (vice December 1984 and the seventh TRIDENT if the MINUTEMAN III level is kept at 550). If the SALT II Treaty is in force at that time, we most probably would choose to remove MINUTEMAN III launchers to stay within the 1200 limit. While in principle this could be done by reconverting them to MINUTEMAN II launchers, there is virtually no possibility that the SCC procedures for converting MIRVed to unMIRVed launchers would permit MINUTEMAN III to II conversions without major changes to the launchers (if this is permitted at all). As a consequence we would almost certainly end up dismantling the MINUTEMAN III launchers. Thus, under SALT II, the net effect of the deployment of 100 additional MINUTEMAN III would be (by 1985) the loss of 100 “perfectly good” MINUTEMAN IIs—and an unfortunate loss of 100 in the overall US aggregate at a point when we won’t even be near the 2250 level in terms of operational⁵ systems. While early 1981 action on the SALT II Treaty could reverse the SASC action, it will produce one more argument for the anti-SALT forces in the Senate.

The Senate action promoting FB–111 stretch and the House action promoting B–1 derivatives seems unlikely to produce a conference compromise which would be acceptable to the Administration.

The restrictive M–X language is in fact quite vacuous in content and is not a bad outcome considering what we might have been stuck with. Incidently, we have the Air Force to thank for continuing to oppose restrictive language and eventually obtaining this thoroughly watered-down version. It is said that OSD was prepared to give up much earlier.

Conclusion

Unless the MINUTEMAN and FB–111 changes are later overturned on the Senate floor or in conference, the Administration is going to be faced with a very tough decision on the DOD Authorization Bill.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 43, Missiles: 4–9/80. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Albright and Assistant to the Office of Management and Budget Hubert Harris. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right corner: “DA, note. ZB.” And unknown hand wrote below Brzezinski’s note: “6/13/80.”
2. Aaron underlined “100 existing MINUTEMAN III,” drew an arc in the margin to the left of this sentence, and wrote: “Do we have to?” An unknown hand wrote below Aaron’s note: “(D.A. 7/16/80).”
3. Aaron underlined “FB–111 stretch program.”
4. Aaron underlined “2300 protective shelters for the M–X missile in the initial deployment area.”
5. Aaron underlined “the 2250 level in terms of operational.” An unknown hand wrote “7/17/80” below the underlined phrase.