Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

191. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 9, 1980

SUBJECT

• Missile Attack Warning System Deficiencies (S)

As you noted on Saturday,² this latest erroneous attack warning by the NORAD–SAC computer system is creating not only operational problems for us but also public perception and political problems.³ I recommend a number of steps for preempting some of the adverse criticism and also for getting some important things done. (S)

First, a commission to investigate must be set up at once. The JCS and SAC cannot be left to review the problems alone. The Defense Science Board might provide the umbrella. To be compelling to public critics, it cannot be Harold Brown’s in-house review. You might consider Schlesinger to head the review. That appointment could achieve two things at once. First, Schlesinger’s prestige and Republican background could help turn the matter into a bi-partisan affair. Second, it could take Schlesinger out of the public debate the remainder of the summer. He can be expected to become more vocal against the Administration. (S)

Second, [2 lines not declassified] I am attaching a memo (Tab A)⁴ in which I made the case against this option. [1 line not declassified] Brown, for some reason, [4 lines not declassified] if he knew that we have an [less than 1 line not declassified] option [less than 1 line not declassified] he would give the President fits. He also promised that the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) would be looking into the matter. [1 line not declassified]

Third, the President should sign the targeting PD⁵ [less than 1 line not declassified] soon. [1 line not declassified] The PD, properly backgrounded to the press, should help diffuse the NORAD issue. You will recall that I have frequently referred to the SIOP and the NORAD–SAC plan for war as having many of the characteristics of the German and Russian war plans of 1914. They were based on the assumption that the war would be short. They could not be reversed once commenced. They set in motion enormous forces and actions, the consequences of which planners had only the vaguest notion. And they were not related to the war aims of any party involved. Although we cannot dismantle the SIOP system, we can surely begin serious problems to give us less cataclysmic options. (TS)

Fourth, the SCC on COG/C3I, scheduled for this week, can be both politically and operationally useful in this present situation. Any investigation by an outside commission will soon determine that NCA survivability is doubtful if the present system is stressed by a Soviet strike at our C3I. The COG/C3I study recommendations would launch the first serious program to increase NCA survivability since the 1950s. (TS)

In summary, the President can, in the next ten days, take four significant steps.

— Set up a commission to investigate the NORAD system.

— [1 line not declassified]

— Sign the targeting PD and begin the backgrounders on the general direction away from a short-warning response to more flexibility.

— Get out a PD on COG/C3I which will expedite programs that will make us able to ride out very large attacks and C3I attacks, and still respond in a coordinated fashion under Presidential control at a time of our choosing, not in the five or ten minutes provided by NORAD. (TS)

If you like this general approach, then we should arrange for Brown to brief the President on the PD by Wednesday at the latest.⁶ [1 line not declassified] The COG/C3I is on track. The investigating commission should be raised with Brown today, and a decision can be taken on how to proceed by Wednesday when the PD is discussed. (TS)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79–8/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. Sent for information. A stamped notation indicates Brzezinski saw the memorandum. Brzezinski drew a line from Odom’s initials in the heading to the right margin of the memorandum and wrote: “WO, Speak to me. ZB.”
2. June 7.
3. See Documents 189 and 190.
4. Not found attached.
5. See Document 208.
6. Denend drew a vertical line to the left of this sentence, extended the line to the bottom of the page, and wrote on June 6: “ZB, I have not heard back from Phil Wise on a briefing time. The P’s schedule is really tight this week. Les.”