Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

189. Memorandum From the President’s Science and Technology Adviser (Press) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 6, 1980

SUBJECT

• Activities Report concerning Presidential Directive/NSC–24; Telecommunications Protection Policy (U)

PD/NSC–24² was issued to establish a national policy to guide the conduct of U.S. Government activities in and related to the security and/or protection of telecommunications. Attached is the 1979 report of activities required by PD/NSC–24. (U)

The Soviet Union continues to intercept U.S. domestic microwave telecommunications systems from their Embassy and other diplomatically immune locations in Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and New York City. We are also seriously concerned about their intercept activities of U.S. Domestic satellites from their collection site in Cuba and from vessels off each of our coasts operating in international waters. (TS)

You may recall that the U.S. Government instituted a program called DUCKPINS which moved selected leased government circuits from microwave to underground cable facilities. When these targets dried up, [less than 1 line not declassified] reported the movement of Soviet targeting to other government agencies, economic targets and Defense contractors. The DOD was alerted and they began looking at possible solutions. (TS)

The fact that Defense contractors were now a prime Soviet target was verified in the 1979 Threat Assessment I asked Stan Turner to conduct,³ the specifics of which were briefed to the subcommittee by Admiral Inman in July 1979.⁴ Defense gave an initial briefing to the subcommittee in August concerning how they would approach a countermeasures program. They very candidly advised that this area would require considerable time and study since a more complex dimension was now added to our protection concerns. I expect Defense to have their protection strategy plan available for review by mid-July and will convene the PD/NSC–24 Subcommittee to hear their briefing soon thereafter. After your review of the attached report I recommend you forward the Executive Summary to the President and you authorize distribution to all Subcommittee members. (TS)

Frank Press

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Office of Science and Technology Policy⁵

Washington, April 15, 1980

[Omitted here is the title page and table of contents.]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Soviet Union is intercepting U.S. domestic microwave telecommunications from diplomatically immune locations in Washington, D.C., New York City and San Francisco. Exploitation of U.S. common carrier domestic satellite communications is also of serious concern. Presidential Directive PD/NSC–24 was issued with the objective of enhancing the protection of United States communications, the intercept and exploitation of which may be useful to a foreign adversary. Primary emphasis was placed on protecting government information of value to the USSR. (TS)

The Presidential Directive assigned Executive Agent responsibilities to the Departments of Defense and Commerce. The Secretary of Defense is the Executive Agent for Communications Security (COMSEC) to protect government-derived classified information and government-derived unclassified information which relates to national security. The Secretary of Commerce is the Executive Agent for the protection of government-derived information not related to national security and for dealing with the commercial and private sector to enhance their communications protection and privacy capabilities. The State Department, the Manager, National Communications System (NCS), and the General Services Administration (GSA), were also given specific on-going responsibilities. Revised guidance was given to the Executive Agents in a November 26, 1979 Implementation Decision Memorandum to clarify their role relationships.⁶ (U)

MAJOR ACTIVITIES IN 1979

—PROJECT DUCKPINS—A government program to minimize Soviet interception of telephone conversation over domestic microwave radio by transferring selected U.S. government voice circuits from microwave to underground cable facilities in Washington, D.C., New York City and San Francisco. Circuits actually under this protection number 17,347 with another 1,067 on order. A third phase has been initiated by DOD which is responsive to both this program and the SCC–CI guidance of October 22, 1979.⁷ The National Security Agency proposed a cable fix for 22 high priority defense contractors which were designated as “Most Sensitive.” Defense plans to route all of these leased circuits, which carry information of value to an adversary, by cable in the three Protected Communications Zones (PCZs), by the end of 1980. The Agency has also been tasked to brief these high priority contractors on the domestic intercept threat, and provide the Manager, NCS, assistance in circuit identification and selection, necessary for the implementation of protective cable routing. These contractors, however, represent only a fraction of the total problem. In addition to proposing Defense Contractor protection fixes, an overall DOD plan, still in the formative stages, will be forwarded to the Special Subcommittee, for decision and will include a broader, system-wide series of proposals which will in large part deny the Soviets the information they are targeting. (S)

—EXECUTIVE SECURE VOICE NETWORK (ESVN)—The Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I declared the ESVN fully operational. This network was subsequently renamed the Federal Secure Telephone Service; its capability and electronic cryptographic key distribution was expanded as well as additional secure voice terminals being installed. There are now 249 operational terminals as compared to 90 reported last year. (C)

—GSA BULK PROTECTION PROGRAM—With the assistance and approval of the NSA the General Services Administration has: Closed bids for proposals for FTS voice service to Alaska, Seattle-Anchorage, 72 circuits, Seattle-Juneau, 24 circuits and San Francisco and Washington, D.C., 192 circuits. The initial implementation plan uses the DOD developed CY–104 systems which bulk encrypts in 24 channel increments. Contract awards on the procurements are planned to begin the second quarter of 1980. Since September 1979, GSA has been using 19 of 24 bulk protected voice channels of the DOD satellite system between Hawaii and California. In addition to the protection, this sharing reduces costs for the circuits by approximately sixty thousand dollars a year. With the cooperation of various international carriers GSA moved 12 circuits normally routed over unprotected satellites between Hawaii and Puerto Rico to the U.S. Mainland to less vulnerable cable routes. (C)

—BRIEFING PROGRAM—Telecommunications carriers and government contractors were to be briefed on the nature of the threat. The National Security Agency has thus far briefed a total of 33 Defense contractors on the domestic intercept threat—sixteen briefings were done in 1979 with additional ones planned for the January–March 1980 time frame. The NTIA conducted a series of unclassified briefings with 12 of the major common carriers. (C)

—SOVIET TARGETING OF U.S. CITIZENS—The 1979 Threat Assessment contained no evidence to suggest that private citizens have become targets. (S)

—REAL ESTATE ACQUISITION BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES—The Real Property Committee, an interagency group chaired by State was established by PD–24 to review and if necessary deny Soviet and communist bloc property acquisitions that present a serious potential threat to U.S. telecommunications security. The committee met seven times; initially in February with Ambassador Leonard of the USUN to ensure that he was fully cognizant of the technical and political background concerning the Soviet interests in New York property acquisitions. On the advice of the FBI and NSA, the Committee interposed no objection to a possible Bulgarian purchase of property for a chancery at the International Center on Connecticut Avenue and Van Ness Street. Since 1973 the State Department had been encouraging the PRC to acquire properties in the open marketplace without a requirement for prior Department approval. On May 10 the Committee discussed a building which the FBI had learned that the PRC planned to acquire, and considered again the question of requiring the PRC to obtain State Department approval before buying.⁸ The Committee concluded that it was insufficiently instructed to make decisions on either the specific building in question or on its future role in the broader question of bringing PRC property acquisitions under U.S. control. Based on this circumstance the PRC Embassy in Washington was advised that the State Department should be kept informed of PRC plans to acquire property. This was reiterated in a diplomatic note of October 26 which stated the necessity to obtain the Department’s approval prior to the acquisition or occupancy of diplomatic, consular, or other property in the United States.⁹ The Chinese have advised that in the future it will comply with the request. (TS)

—NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY COMMITTEE—The publication of NSC/PD–24 rescinded the 1968 NSC United States Communications Security Board (USCSB) directive¹⁰ and necessitated the construction of a supporting interagency advisory committee to replace the former USCSB. The National Communications Security Directive, established the National COMSEC Committee (NCSC) to advise and assist the Executive Agent in formulating and implementing policy and was signed by the Secretary of Defense on June 20, 1979.¹¹ This directive delineates, under the Secretary of Defense, the COMSEC responsibilities of the NCSC, the Director, NSA, and department and agency heads. (U)

—INFORMATION ASSESSMENT (GOVERNMENT)—A series of information assessments were conducted in 1979. Among others, the National Security Agency (NSA) completed a COMSEC threat report for Federal Reserve and Treasury International Communications with Foreign officials. The study was undertaken by the NSA following a formal request from the Federal Reserve Systems Board of Governors. They evaluated the specific threat to the security of voice and printed (TELEX) communications between either the Federal Reserve or Treasury on one hand and foreign governments or central banks on the other. Treasury has initiated several thorough investigations to assess the value of information processed by the department which could benefit an adversary. Vulnerabilities, thought to be non-existent, have been identified, and personnel involved have reacted positively. The level of awareness has been raised significantly. As a direct result of one survey concerning the Bureau of Government Financial Operations, Treasury Financial Communications System they are now in the process of encrypting the system with Data Encryption Standard (DES) based equipment. The Special Project Office of NTIA completed five telecommunications and information vulnerability surveys in the Federal civil sector and had three more in progress. Each survey performed by NTIA documents specific findings and offers NTIA’s recommendations for corrective action. The eight survey projects involved a range of Federal civil governmental activities including agencies specializing in socioeconomic matters, transportation, scientific matters, law enforcement, a regulatory agency, and an organization involved with national financial activities. Each was an in-depth study of agency telecommunications resources and included interviews with operations, telecommunications, and management personnel. Agencies who have participated in this project have given NTIA “high marks” for their thoroughness, professionalism and excellence of the survey findings and recommendations. (U)

PROGRAM OVERVIEW

DUCKPINS continues to be our most potent countermeasure with a limited in-place bulk encryption effort trailing behind. NSA’s bulk protection technology development progresses slowly due to a variety of national network problems which must be overcome. Lack of secure voice terminals continues to hamper fulfilling our end-to-end voice security and protection requirements. Overall progress toward implementing “fixes” to deny the Soviets information or access to information has been undeniably slow. This has been due in part to technology problems and in part to an inability to identify information requiring protection. (S)

As previously reported the difficulty of defining or accurately determining what unclassified information is, or may be useful to a foreign adversary or whether it is, or is not national security related continues to plague us and obscure executive agent responsibilities. This situation is further compounded by the recognition that classes and categories of information can be, and in many instances, are “moving targets.” That is, information can rapidly gravitate from one category to another for a host of reasons depending upon national or international conditions. One thing is clear, however, only the originator of the information operating within departmental guidelines can legitimately decide whether his or her information should be protected from interception while in transmission. (U)

The briefing programs by both Executive Agents are noteworthy and continued without abatement. Similarly the information vulnerability studies being done by the NTIA have been extremely successful. All department and agencies should avail themselves of this service. (U)

After discussions with the Director, NSA and Administrator, NTIA, an Implementation Decision Paper was issued in late 1979 in an attempt to clarify executive agent responsibilities; it has in some respects helped the situation. (U)

PLANS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 1980

— The COMSEC Threat Report program to determine and disseminate foreign SIGINT threats to U.S. telecommunications and the vulnerability analysis program of both U.S. civil and military communications will continue and will provide for the subsequent establishment of COMSEC standards and doctrine. (S)

— The remaining contractors from the list of 22 “Most Sensitive Contractors” will be briefed on the intercept threat to their communications. (S)

— Field trials of the LADNER equipment will be conducted on the terrestrial microwave systems of the Other Common Carriers (OCCs) to verify compliance with a system performance and operating requirements. (S)

— Develop a Federal policy concerning the protection requirements for leased, commercial or government-owned communications satellite circuits. (U)

— COMSEC doctrine will be developed for unclassified DES applications; however, the absence of a comprehensive data base on computer security will make progress both difficult and slow. (C)

— The Phase I PCZ Pilot Program and the FSTS will continue operation and expansion as various implementation levels are approved. (S)

— Procedures to verify compliance of commercial DES equipments with FS–1027 for unclassified national security-related applications should be finalized. (U)

— The position paper on public cryptography will be compiled, coordinated, and submitted. (U)

— The security evaluations of the six DES-based equipments for NTIA will continue and should be completed during 1980. (S)

— Complete the DUCKPINS III Program by December 1980. (S)

— Emphasis will be placed on the bulk protection of FTS circuits transmitted over satellite and terrestrial microwave systems. Commercial cryptography will be used whenever appropriate, available and cost effective. (C)

— Develop an options paper for a Federal policy which authorizes and provides for selected unclassified information which, when so marked, must be protected during electrical transmission. (U)

— Complete arrangements for the sharing satellite capacity on two or more wideband systems which will provide FTS protected service for Guam to Hawaii and Puerto Rico to the CONUS communications. (C)

— Develop a program to facilitate procurement and distribution of all appropriate department and agency secure voice equipment (STU II) which may permit the government to take advantage of large order procurements and resulting economies of scale. (C)

— Initiate procurement actions for commercial cryptographic systems to replace CY–104 systems where cost-effective and technically feasible. The National Bureau of Standards (NBS) Data Encryption Standard (DES) will be used until a certification process is established and other technologies made available. (C)

— Expand the KY–70 to KY–3 interface from two to four ports to improve intersystem communications by eliminating queing problems. Both should be operational by July 1980. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Institutional File, Box 42, INT Documents, #4200s: 7/80. Top Secret.
2. See Document 40.
3. Not found.
4. No minutes of the meeting were found.
5. Top Secret.
6. Reference is to a November 26, 1979, memorandum from Science and Technology Advisor Press to Secretary of Defense Brown and Acting Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges, copying multiple agencies, in which Press delineated lines of responsibilities between the Department of Defense and Department of Commerce in achieving policy objectives as established in PD/NSC–24. (Central Intelligence Agency Electronic Reading Room (online), Document CIA–RDP10M02313R000703930012–6)
7. Not found.
8. No minutes of the meeting were found.
9. In telegram 282182 to Beijing, October 29, 1979, the Department reported: “By Diplomatic Note dated 10/26/79, the Department approved purchase by the PRC Embassy of real estate located at 5315 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. We also called ‘The Embassy’s attention to the necessity to obtain the Department of State’s approval prior to the acquisition or occupancy of diplomatic, consular or other official property in the United States.’” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790496–0097)
10. The text of the August 28, 1968, National Security Council Communications Security Directive is at the National Security Agency website.
11. Not found.