Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

18. Memorandum From Samuel Huntington of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 9, 1977

SUBJECT

• Political-Strategic Consequences of US Adoption of No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons Posture

This is in response to your request for my comments on this topic by COB today.

The U.S. could assume a no-first-use of nuclear weapons posture either unilaterally or bilaterally.² A posture may also be either general or qualified. The following comments are directed to four possible postures (one general, three qualified) in first their unilateral and then their bilateral versions.

A. Unilateral Postures

A1. General No-First-Use

The importance of declaratory policies and the consequences of changing them are often overemphasized. This could be true in this case. It is conceivable that a general US renunciation of first-use of nuclear weapons would not have much affect, for good or evil, on the actions of men and governments. Yet such a renunciation would clearly be the extreme instance of underlining the unimportance of declaratory policy. It is much more likely that US adoption of a general no-first-use posture would have significant political-strategic consequences. Presumably there would be some benefit in terms of a somewhat nebulous world public opinion concern with nuclear dangers. The principal consequences of such a posture, however, would be overwhelmingly undesirable.

(1) It would erode the credibility of the US deterrent posture in Europe and East Asia, which now benefits from benign ambiguity as to whether the US would or would not use nuclear weapons in response to major attacks on its allies.

(2) As a result, it could encourage and it certainly would do nothing to dissuade the Soviets and the North Koreans from pushing out.

(3) It could well lead to an increase in U.S. general purpose forces and a skyrocketing military budget as a result.

(4) It would produce a most unsettling “Carter-shock” for our European allies and Japan, confronting them directly with the hard choice which they have been so desperate to avoid of:

(a) engaging in a major strengthening of their conventional forces;

(b) modernizing (UK, France) or developing (FRG, Japan, ROK, ROC) their own nuclear weapons capabilities; or

(c) accommodating to the Soviet Union; or

(d) engaging in some combination of the above.

(5) It would raise doubts in the minds of PRC leaders as to U.S. willingness to oppose the Soviets in the crunch.

(6) It would generally encourage countries throughout the world to consider more seriously the development of their own nuclear capabilities.

(7) It would, presumably, remove any option for limited nuclear strikes against military targets in the context of a European conflict or otherwise.

(8) It would encourage the political forces in the US and among our allies who wish the US to take the unilateral initiative in reducing our nuclear capabilities to a minimum deterrence level. (If we’re not going to use them—except in retaliation, why do we need so much?)

All-in-all, in short, a unilateral, general no-first-use pledge would encourage our enemies, frighten our friends, and frustrate our purposes.

A2. No-First-Use of Strategic Weapons

The US could, conceivably, declare that it would never be the first to initiate use of strategic nuclear weapons. This would require weaving into the declaration a careful definition, contrived to fit our policy, of what systems or targets are “strategic” rather than tactical.

Such a posture could have certain advantages in terms of propaganda value. It would show that the U.S. is “responsible,” sees a middle ground between capitulation in conventional war and apocalyptic conflagration, and realizes what many believe has become obvious in the last decade: the coupling of the US strategic deterrent to European defense, when exercising it would entail the otherwise avoidable utter destruction of American society, has indeed lost much of its credibility.

The disadvantages of such a posture are, however, still major.

(1) It detracts from deterrence. By making explicit and official that the US recognizes the incredibility of strategic coupling, it gives away the advantage of the “irrationality” factor, i.e. the disincentive for a Soviet attack which flows from the possibility that the US might indeed respond to such an attack spasmodically or suicidally.

(2) It would preclude use of LNOs to counter limited conventional initiatives ([less than 1 line not declassified]). To define away such strikes as “unstrategic” would be unconvincing.

(3) Our allies and friends would still be greatly alarmed. NATO allies continue to prefer the coupling of the strategic deterrent to European defense and place substantial weight on retention of the US “irrationality” factor in deterrence. Moreover, the PRC might see such a pledge as weakness in American will, or a gratuitous gift to Soviet planners.

(4) The disadvantageous effects on our nuclear force-posture would be comparable to those of a general no-first-use posture.

A3. No-First-Use Except in Defense of Self and Allies

The US could declare that it would never use nuclear weapons first unless the territory or forces of the US or its allies were attacked.

This has several advantages.

(1) Who could object? Only those who seek more limitations on first-use, and this would make them no more unhappy than the present US stance.

(2) It would counter some of the propaganda advantage that accrues to the Soviets from their requests for a no-first-use pledge, and their portrayal of the US as more trigger-happy than they.

(3) It puts the onus on our adversaries. By making clear that we would initiate use of nuclear weapons only for defensive purposes, it highlights the fact that only Soviet (or North Korean or Chinese) aggression could ignite the nuclear powder keg. By giving our adversaries the “last clear chance,” it throws the burden of nuclear responsibility onto them.

(4) It does not detract from deterrence. Such a declaratory strategy does not constitute any concession that could be exploited in scenarios of crisis or escalation, since it does not really differ from our action policy, and because there are no plausible scenarios left uncovered in which we would want to use nuclear weapons first.

Its major disadvantage is that it doesn’t mean much. Precisely because of the last point, the pledge would seem to signify no change or compromise in our policy. Thus it could be beneficial in terms of the reactions of the uninformed, but to others it might seem to be empty rhetoric, at best, and a cynical ploy at worst.

A4. No-First-(or otherwise) Use Against Non-Nuclear Weapons States

The US could adopt the position that it would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. This would maintain the deterrent against the SU and China and hence not upset our major allies. It might give some encouragement to Kim Il Song to be nasty and to President Park to wonder about his own nuclear needs. But presumably the likelihood of our actually ever using nuclear weapons in Korea has never been all that great. As our current policy [1 line not declassified] to defend South Korea against North Korea without recourse to nuclear weapons. A pledge of this sort would also reap certain public relations advantage. In addition, of course, it would in general tend to bolster rather than to undermine our efforts to discourage nuclear proliferation. On the other hand, the probability that we would again use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state has not been very great for many years, and consequently this option also suffers the disadvantages of the previous one in being seen as a somewhat crude public relations ploy.

In general, no-first-use declarations if meaningful are undesirable and if desirable are not meaningful.

B. Bilateral Versions of the Above

Conceivably the US and the SU could jointly adopt one of the postures identified above. Since the adoption of any no-first-use posture involves some self-imposition of restraints, the benefits to the US of adopting any particular posture on a bilateral basis with the SU would generally be greater than going it alone. In addition, the bilateral adoption of a particular posture would furnish a commendable example of declaratory restraint on the part of the superpowers and would be viewed as a commendable sign of improvement in SU–US relations. A bilateral approach does not, however, necessarily override the disadvantages inherent in particular no-first-use postures.

B1. A bilateral general no-first-use posture would still pose virtually all the problems for the US of a unilateral statement in terms of deterrent credibility, reassurance of allies, and nuclear proliferation. It would in fact be and would be viewed as a highly asymmetrical concession on the part of the US.

B2. A bilateral no-first-use of strategic weapons would be impossible to negotiate given the difficulties of defining what a strategic weapon is.

B3. A bilateral no-first-use except to defend self and allies would not have serious disadvantages from the US point of view, but it might give the Soviets the occasion to extend nuclear protection to other countries (e.g., Cuba, Mozambique, Iraq, Libya) thereby raising the possibility of a Soviet escalatory response if these countries were subject to conventional attack by the US or by other powers.

B4. A bilateral no-first-use against non-nuclear weapons states would be generally harmless and could represent a significant joint effort by the US and the SU to reduce incentives towards nuclear proliferation.

Recommendation: That only options A3, A4, and B4 above be seriously considered as possible alternatives to current US constructive reticence on this subject.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 47, Nuclear War Doctrine: Limited Nuclear Options (LNO) and Regional Nuclear Options (RNO): 3/77–1/80. Top Secret. According to a typed notation on the memorandum, Richard Betts of the National Security Council Staff contributed to the memorandum.
2. In theory there could be a multilateral assumption of such a posture involving the US, SU, and one or more other nuclear powers, but that does seem too far-fetched to discuss. [Footnote is in the original.]