Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

170. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, December 10, 1979

SUBJECT

• Taking Stock of the Defense Program

As we approach the final quarter of the Administration’s first term, I would like to take stock of the major developments in the Department of Defense during the past three years. Though we face severe challenges in the form of military capabilities of potential adversaries, there have been tremendous accomplishments, of which we, our military leadership, and the Nation can be proud. I have summarized some of the most significant of these below.

I

Four general developments, which will be remembered long after the individual decisions are forgotten, stand out from a review of this period in the Department’s history.

First, and by far the most important, we have without question entered a new era in the establishment of a strong national defense. This is not an expression of judgment; it is a finding of fact. The defense programs of this Administration have reversed the adverse trends and the neglect characteristic of the prior decade. We have made U.S. strategic and conventional forces more modern, more ready, and more capable.

Second, forceful U.S. leadership has been instrumental in revitalizing NATO’s defense efforts. Not only have we invested heavily in upgrading our own NATO contribution, but we have brought our Allies along in making similar efforts.

The third overriding theme that emerges from a review of the past three years is that this Administration has been scrupulous in recognizing cost as an important consideration in all defense decisions, large and small. We are not buying inferior products, but we are insisting that precious tax resources only be spent for cost-effective programs.

Fourth, the last three years have been characterized by a willingness on the part of your Administration to take on the responsibility of actually managing the Department of Defense—a willingness to suggest innovative solutions to old problems and to make tough decisions about defense priorities. The result has been not only stronger defense programs, but also a renewed sense of purpose and confidence within the Department.

II

A Program for Strategic Security

When this Administration took office, our Nation’s ability to maintain the unambiguous strength of its strategic deterrent was being eroded by two alarming trends: the first was the massive buildup of Soviet strategic forces over the past fifteen years, and the second was the progressive obsolescense of our own strategic forces, most of which had been deployed in the 1960s.

Ratification of the SALT II Treaty will represent a major step forward in restraining the continued growth of Soviet strategic forces. Because SALT II reduces superpower competition in its most dangerous manifestation, this Treaty is the single most important bilateral accord of the decade.

To guarantee our strategic deterrent further, this Administration is implementing a comprehensive program to modernize all three legs of our strategic triad. Three years ago, we took a hard look at our major strategic programs, and found serious problems: the B–1 bomber was vulnerable to the new Soviet air defense systems already under test; the TRIDENT submarine program was bogged down in schedule and contract litigation problems; and the proposed design for basing the M–X missile system in closed trenches was found to be too vulnerable to single nuclear explosions. We have taken decisive action to correct these problems.

Our first major action was to substitute the air-launched cruise missile for the B–1. Not only is the cruise missile less expensive, but because of its small size and large numbers, it renders the Soviets’ new air defense system obsolete even before that system is deployed. We put the cruise missile under accelerated development, are now well into the competitive flight test program, and will begin serial production in 1980.

Our second major action was to institute management control of the TRIDENT program. We settled the contract dispute, and the program is now back on track. The first submarine was launched this year, and six more are under construction. The TRIDENT I missile is on schedule and is now being backfitted on POSEIDON submarines.

Our third major action was the design of a basing mode for the M–X that would survive a surprise attack by Soviet ICBMs, be adequately verifiable under SALT II, and have a minimal impact on the environment. After intensive study of alternatives, a mobile M–X based in a complex of horizontal shelters was selected. The M–X missile is designed to have military capability equal to that of the Soviets’ SS–18, even though it is half the size. Full scale development of the missile and basing system began this year.

In the aggregate, these programs will double the spending on strategic systems compared to the early ’70s, but will still be far less than we spent in the early ’60s. In fact, improved technology will allow us to build the new missiles at less cost (in constant dollars) than the systems they are replacing.

These strategic programs have also contributed to the development of two new weapons to strengthen our theater nuclear forces. The ground-launched cruise missile is a derivative of one of the competing air-launched cruise missile designs. It will be deployed one year later than the ALCM. The PERSHING II missile uses the same solid fuel technology developed for the TRIDENT I missile, which allows each of them to have greater range than their predecessors. The PERSHING uses advanced technology terminal guidance systems, which improves accuracy ten-fold over previous systems.

Our new systems will enable U.S. strategic forces to maintain their equivalence in the face of the mounting Soviet challenge. Even more important, all of these systems have been designed to have high inherent survivability, thus discouraging any hopes the Soviets might have for a successful disarming surprise attack. In addition, the high survivability of these new systems will make it possible for us to reduce significantly the total number of nuclear weapons in our force, while preserving national security interests, if the Soviet Union can be persuaded to make similar reductions in SALT III.

III

Leading the NATO Alliance

From its very outset, this Administration launched several major initiatives to strengthen NATO’s deterrent and defense capabilities, which had languished during and after the Vietnam conflict. At the May 1977 NATO Summit in London, you called for a stepped-up long term effort, implementation of selected short term readiness measures, and greater armaments collaboration.

Within a year, NATO heads of government personally endorsed at a May 1978 Washington Summit a bold Long Term Defense Program backed up by pledges of 3% real annual growth in defense spending. This far-reaching step reflected common Allied recognition that only through greater cooperation and mutual burdensharing could NATO meet the security challenges of the 1980s.

Our efforts are also breathing new life into collaborative design and production of new weapons such as the F–16, ROLAND, 120 mm tank gun, and the Multiple Launch Rocket System. The December 1978 agreement on joint funding and operation of a $2 billion NATO airborne early warning fleet is especially noteworthy. The U.S. has also proposed an innovative concept of jointly developing “families” of new systems, where Europe would take the lead in some and North America in others.

Under U.S. leadership, the Alliance is spurring the modernization of NATO’s theater nuclear forces, through a proposed force of longer range theater ballistic and cruise missiles. Adoption of this program by NATO will close an emerging and serious gap in the Alliance’s spectrum of deterrence.

In addition, the U.S. is greatly accelerating its ability to reinforce Western Europe with massive ground and air forces in a crisis. We are prepositioning additional U.S. equipment, but counting on our European allies to provide adequate facilities and host nation logistic support, as well as the bulk of the ground and air forces that would engage in a conflict in Europe. This “transatlantic bargain” will markedly enhance NATO’s military posture.

IV

Confidence in Our Conventional Forces

Your Administration has taken vigorous measures to modernize our conventional forces, which experienced a severe decline in capabilities during the prior decade. We have laid particular stress upon achieving a higher state of readiness, largely through overcoming maintenance backlogs and increasing initial supply stocks.

Rapid Deployment Forces. We are systematically enhancing our ability to respond rapidly to non-NATO contingencies wherever required by our treaty commitments, or in response to requests from friends and allies. These rapid deployment forces can range in size from a few ships or air squadrons to formations as large as 100,000 men, together with their support. We are giving priority at present to the Middle East and Persian Gulf contingencies, but our forces stand ready for rapid deployment to any region of strategic significance, like the Caribbean.

We are taking two specific initiatives to help us respond in a crisis outside of Europe. The first is the development and production of a new fleet of large cargo aircraft with intercontinental range; the second is the design and procurement of a force of Maritime Prepositioning Ships that will carry heavy equipment and supplies for three Marine Corps brigades. These aircraft and ships will permit us to move combat forces over vast distances quickly enough to deter conflict or, failing that, to turn the tide of battle in our favor.

Ground Forces. We have substantially increased our ability to reinforce NATO. Primarily by prepositioning equipment, we will be able by 1984 to double our ground forces in Europe, and triple our air forces, in less than two weeks. Our ground forces now include more tank and infantry battalions, and more artillery tubes—an augmentation that will continue through the next several years.

We have enhanced readiness and combat endurance by improving the Reserve Components. Some reserve personnel are now equipped with new equipment and all reservists are assigned to units structured to complement and provide needed depth to our active forces.

The opening of a new National Training Center by the Army, and the introduction of new equipment—XM–1 tanks, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, and better artillery and air defense weapons—have, together with the contributions of our allies, strengthened our ability to meet any threat.

Naval Forces. We are emphasizing U.S. naval forces that are able to maintain the sea lanes to Europe, protect other essential sea lines of communications, project force ashore, and support allied forces on the flanks of Europe, in the Western Pacific, and elsewhere—in the face of Soviet challenge. To accomplish these missions we have procured modern, guided-missile equipped surface ships, such as the DDG–47 class; we have begun deployment of ship-, air- and submarine-launched HARPOON cruise missiles; and we have continued improvement of our anti-submarine warfare capability with actions such as procurement of new towed array sonar ships and development of a new class of attack submarines. Equally important to our strength at sea have been our success in reducing the chronic backlog of ship overhauls, and our resolution of $2.7 billion in long-standing shipbuilding claim disputes, some dating as far back as the 1960s.

Air Forces. Our program for the FY 80–84 period will field an active Air Force of 26 fighter and attack wings and will modernize—and in some cases enlarge—the active and reserve components of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps tactical aviation. This constitutes the first full-scale modernization of U.S. tactical air forces since the 1960s.

Over the next few years we will procure about 1700 fighter, attack, electronic warfare, surveillance and support aircraft. This will include the first KC–10s, which will be delivered in 1981, and allow very long range deployments of tactical air forces.

We have maximized the cost/effectiveness of our aircraft procurement programs by using a mix of high and low cost aircraft—each possessing good mission performance characteristics. Procurement of lower cost alternatives such as the A–10 and F–16 allows our force modernization to proceed, while purchase of F–15s, F–14s, dual purpose F/A–18s, and E–3As improves our capability to maintain air superiority.

V

Managing the Department and its Resources

Departmental Reorganization and Resource Management. Upon assuming office, I concluded there were significant obstructions to efficient management of the Department: headquarters were too large, lines of authority were confused, and there was a clear need to integrate better some activities. To correct these problems, we initiated a number of structural changes, which have:

— Eliminated, since January 1977, five Assistant Secretary and approximately 31,000 other civilian positions, reduced the size of Departmental headquarters staffs by approximately 20%, and closed or substantially reduced operations at a number of installations. Estimated annual savings from these actions alone are over $375 million.

— Strengthened policy and planning functions (through, for example, the creation of an Under Secretary for Policy) to insure that individual, detailed decisions on force structure and weapons will support our overall national security objectives.

— Consolidated support-related activities (under a single Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) to provide integrated direction of DoD manpower and material resources.

— Strengthened the programming and budgeting process (through, among other innovations, the establishment of the Defense Resources Board) to provide a more integrated approach to resource allocation decisions and to streamline the budget decision process.

Weapons Acquisition Management. Procedures have been revised to insure consideration of logistic and manpower planning requirements at the same time that performance objectives are addressed. As a result, some high-rate production decisions have been deferred until support questions have been resolved—resulting in substantial cost savings. We have also required a more precise understanding of manpower and skill-level requirements related to the introduction of new systems—resulting in additional economies. This increased attention to support problems before a system is fully operational is helping avoid readiness and manning problems like those experienced during the 1960s.

In related actions, to assure the highest return for each dollar spent, we are also pursuing such actions as: increased contracting out, wage board pay reform, improved depot-level maintenance efficiency, realignment of the material distribution system, and increased procurement of commercial products (where these are less expensive than, and as suitable as, those built to military specification).

Combatting Fraud and Waste. The Department’s steering group on combatting fraud, waste, and mismanagement has programs under active review to avoid computer fraud, provide audit and inspection safeguards, and investigate allegations of fraud. Project teams are addressing other areas that need improvement, such as property accountability, and auditor and investigator training.

Energy Conservation. The Department of Defense has aggressively pursued energy conservation through a restructured energy management program. Since the base year of 1975, energy use has been reduced almost nine percent; in FY 78 alone, DoD’s energy consumption was 2.2 percent less than the year before. To maintain combat readiness, we are making greater use of simulators and increasing the fuel efficiency of our weapons systems. To provide for future needs, we are arranging to procure more than 500,000 barrels of shale oil for testing in military equipment, and carefully examining in cooperation with DoE the use and supply of synthetic fuels.

Personnel Resources. A major accomplishment of the Department of Defense since 1977 has been the increased use of women in the uniformed services, both in terms of numbers of women serving and in the expanded occupational fields and career opportunities open to women. In FY 76 women constituted 5% of total military strength. Women today are 7% of our uniformed workforce and, as a direct result of our policy initiatives, will be 11% of our military population in FY 83. Parallel successes have been achieved in the civilian workforce.

As one example of our commitment to assuring equal opportunity, we have revitalized the Department’s equal opportunity management training program for race relations instructors. We are now providing the kind of equal opportunity specialists that our civilian managers and military commanders need to pursue dynamic, successful programs.

VI

Planning for the Future

It is clear that 1980 will be a watershed year for U.S. national security programs. Stimulated by the national debate on SALT II and by events abroad, Americans are recognizing that we must pay greater attention to our military capabilities if we are to play a constructive and stabilizing role in the international arena. The FY 1981 defense budget and the five year program for FY 81–85 have been carefully developed to accomplish this. Generally, the program has been designed to assure four major objectives:

— That our strategic nuclear forces will be essentially equivalent to those of the Soviet Union.

— That the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact will continue to deter the outbreak of war—conventional or nuclear—in Europe.

— That our ability to come quickly to the aid of friends and allies around the globe will be clear.

— That our Navy will continue to be the most powerful on the seas.

Since taking office, this Administration has deliberately and steadily achieved increases in defense resources. But three years is not sufficient time to arrest and reverse the cumulative result of fifteen years of intense Soviet investment in military capability, during a period that American investment declined. The budget and five year defense program we will submit to the Congress next January will provide for a real and substantial growth in defense capabilities over a sustained period. It will deal directly and effectively with a problem that the Nation has put off for over a decade.

VII

I have summarized above some of the most significant initiatives we have undertaken in the Department of Defense during your first term. The list by no means includes all of the important developments, but is intended to identify the general areas where we have focused our attention and the successes we have achieved thus far.

The Department of Defense has shown measured and impressive progress during the past three years. Our management reforms have resulted in a more efficient organization that is more responsive to our Nation’s defense needs. We have begun a thorough modernization of our strategic and conventional programs, which has already led to a demonstrable increase in the military strength of the U.S.

I look forward to building on this solid foundation.

Harold Brown

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 6, Defense Department: 12/79. No classification marking. Brzezinski sent the memorandum to Carter under cover of a December 18 memorandum in which he wrote: “The memorandum is unclassified and provides a very useful recapitulation of an impressive record, which you initiated with your PD–18 of August 1977, and which we have strongly backed from here.” (Ibid.)