Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

169. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, December 6, 1979

SUBJECT

• Readiness, Mobilization and NIFTY NUGGET

At our meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the FY 1981 budget,² we discussed readiness, mobilization and Exercise NIFTY NUGGET. I am not sure that we were precise enough in distinguishing between the readiness of our forces and our ability to mobilize. This memorandum summarizes what we learned about the nation’s mobilization capability in NIFTY NUGGET. That exercise did not improve our insights into readiness of our units, nor was it designed to do so.

Readiness is a term the Department of Defense uses to describe a military unit’s ability to carry out its mission in military operations. The readiness of each military unit is estimated by comparing the number of people assigned to a unit, the extent of their training, and the amount of their equipment with the people, training and equipment required for that unit in wartime. The term readiness is sometimes used more broadly to include as well our ability to deploy units and to sustain them once in combat. In this latter usage readiness overlaps somewhat with mobilization but, in general, the mobilization process complements readiness.

In mobilization we would make it possible for active and reserve units to be deployed rapidly to an area of conflict, and to be sustained with trained replacements, ammunition, equipment and other supplies. During mobilization, the private sector must augment Defense resources. Commercial airlines, the shipping and trucking industries, and current Defense suppliers would be the first to be called upon. If the emergency continues, the entire nation would become involved in the mobilization effort.

The mobilization process cannot be fully tested because it involves the private sector. In Exercise NIFTY NUGGET, conducted in October 1978, we made the first attempt since World War II to test, in a combined mobilization exercise, military and civilian agency plans and procedures. Although many mobilization activities went well, there were serious shortcomings.

Recognizing the need to correct the shortcomings identified in NIFTY NUGGET, we established a DoD Mobilization and Deployment Steering Group chaired by my Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The charge to this Steering Group is to provide high-level direction and coordination throughout Defense as well as foster military-civilian cooperation.

The areas of general weakness discovered in NIFTY NUGGET and follow-up activities are:

— Mobilization Planning

— Our planning relied on an assembly of old, unconnected, and inconsistent emergency orders, policies, regulations and procedures. For example, you have statutory authority to recall Regular Army and Air Force retirees, while all other retirees cannot be recalled until after a declaration of national emergency. In addition, the existing plans were too general for decentralized execution to proceed without major blockages.

— We are now preparing a Defense Mobilization Plan that assigns responsibilities, identifies tasks and provides guidance for my staff, the Military Departments, and Defense Agencies. That planning activity will help coordinate and decentralize the mobilization process.

— Deployment Planning

— The exercise identified shortcomings in our planning to transport military units and equipment overseas. For example, we found that many Army units required more cargo airlift than plans had allocated to them. We also found that airlift was underutilized because we did not have a good mechanism for adjusting schedules.

— To improve deployment planning we created within existing manpower a Joint Deployment Agency that reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This agency is revising deployment planning so that it is more flexible. It is also more accurately calculating air and sealift requirements for unit movement.

— Interagency Coordination

— NIFTY NUGGET showed that we need better coordination between Defense and other Federal agencies. One example was the difficulty experienced in the reception and relocation of the large number of noncombatants assumed to be evacuated from the war zone. Both Defense and the civil agencies had made incorrect planning assumptions about the others’ responsibilities and capabilities. As a result evacuees would not have received adequate care nor would they have been screened by customs or immigration officials.

— In May, you directed a comprehensive review of mobilization planning. An interagency group under the National Security Council was formed. This group has representatives from seventeen Federal Departments and Agencies. The efforts of the interagency group are beginning to pay off in the identification and resolution of mobilization jurisdictional issues. This group will develop mobilization planning guidance for all agencies and the means for periodic assessment of capabilities. In addition, the formation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in mid-1979 has already had a positive effect on mobilization planning and coordination at the interagency level.

— Resources

— We also learned that our operation plans need to be adjusted to take into account current resource limitations. For example, our plans were developed on the basis that we would have ample stocks of ammunition and equipment in Europe and that trained manpower would be available to fill all units to wartime strength and replace casualties. Moreover, as NIFTY NUGGET unfolded, the demand for transport aircraft in the several theaters far exceeded those available. Some of these resource limitations will be cured in the next several years, but operation plans should be based on current resource levels and changed when resource levels are improved.

— We have already informed our Unified Commanders that fewer cargo aircraft are likely to be available. We are developing revised guidance for military operations planning that would specify resource limitations for major contingencies.

NIFTY NUGGET heightened concerns about critical resource shortfalls. These deficiencies come to my attention and yours during our annual program and budget reviews. During the NIFTY NUGGET exercise these same shortfalls were portrayed for our senior military and civilian Defense officials for the first time in a simulated crisis. Because our Five Year Defense Program is designed to provide the means to respond to a crisis not unlike that simulated in NIFTY NUGGET, the exercise has strengthened our desire to achieve the improvements contained in that five year program.

In sum, readiness and mobilization are separate but complementary elements of military preparedness. We are taking actions necessary to maintain the readiness levels of our active forces, to improve readiness in our reserve forces, and to continue improving and testing our mobilization plans and procedures.

Harold Brown

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 113, Mobilization Scenarios, 8/79–4/80. No classification marking. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: “cc Harold—(a) I should have been more thoroughly informed earlier (b) when would it be feasible to have another similar exercise? J.” Brzezinski returned the memorandum to Brown under cover of a December 10 memorandum in which he noted: “The President notes that he should have been more thoroughly informed earlier and asks when it would be feasible to have another similar exercise.” (Ibid.)
2. Carter met with Brown, Brzezinski, Claytor, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Camp David the morning of November 24. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the discussion was found.