171. Memorandum From William
Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
Washington,
December 21,
1979
SUBJECT
- NORAD Computer System
Failure
I have attached at Tab A a MFR from the JCS which explains what happened during the NORAD 18-minute failure on December
19th.
The warning system worked during the 18 minutes, DSP East and West. The information went directly to SAC and the NMCC. The major loss was speed in processing the
information, a delay of approximately two minutes.
Tab A
Memorandum for the Record2
Washington,
December 20,
1979
SUBJECT
- NORAD Computer System
Failure (U)
- 1.
- (S) On 19 December 1979, at
1526 EST the NORAD computer
system experienced an eighteen minute failure which required
NORAD to manually process
missile warning information.
- 2.
- (S) There are two primary
computers which process missile warning communications in and
out of NORAD. They are backed
up by a third, older computer, called the Digital Information
Processor (DIP). At the time of the failure, one primary
computer was online and in use; one was undergoing program
testing and was not committed to automatic take over. The DIP
was undergoing corrective maintenance and was not operational.
Under those conditions, when the primary computer failed (cause
unknown) it was necessary for NORAD
[Page 755]
to bring up the other
computer manually. This action required eighteen minutes.
- 3.
- (S) SAC, the NMCC and
the ANMCC all receive
information directly from DSP
ground processing stations. This information is processed in
computers at those three locations as soon as it is available.
Washington principals, during the NORAD system outage, would have received missile
warning information from DSP–E
and DSP–W without delay. All
FSS–7 SLBM radar information
and NORAD assessments would
have been delayed by the manual processing time (voice tell) of
approximately two minutes.
George R.
Stotser
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for Operations (NMCC)
