16. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Meeting on the Force Posture Study (PRM/NSC–10) (C)
(S) This memorandum is for your information and provides a brief description of the work to date in the force posture part of PRM/NSC–10.
(S) The basic US national security objective is to preserve the US as a free nation, maintaining the nation’s economic, institutional and social well-being. Fundamentally, the US must be able to deter war or, should it occur, terminate it favorably in terms of that objective. This requires deterring, in conjunction with our NATO Allies, a Warsaw Pact attack or coercion in Europe; maintaining a balance of power in Asia among the US, China, Japan and the Soviet Union; in other areas, supporting the integrity of Allies, ensuring freedom of movement in international seas and air space, and promoting access to raw materials and markets. Agreement on these general objectives, however, does not translate directly into agreement as to what US military strategy would best advance those objectives or what mix of forces best supports such a strategy.
(S) The purpose of the final PRM–10 report will be to highlight critical issues and to define alternative military strategies and force [Page 52] postures to assist you in the formulation of policies to guide the Department of Defense in developing its future programs and establishing a peacetime posture.
(S) Shaping an overall military strategy requires judgments about how the world is evolving politically, economically and technologically. The other part of PRM–10 (Net Assessment) is addressing this broad setting: the sources, nature and severity of threats; the political and economic health of the West; the degree and forms of competition with the Soviet Union; and the extent of instability in the Third World.
(C) Our approach to formulating alternative integrated military strategies (AIMS) is through substrategy building blocks that are interest-oriented, focusing on what the US wants to achieve as well as the threats to that achievement. Five analytical areas were defined:
TAB A: NATO-Warsaw Pact Conflict in Europe
TAB B: Non-European Operations During a NATO–WP War in Europe
TAB C: East Asia
TAB D: Peacekeeping Activities and Potential Local Wars
TAB E: US–USSR Homelands Nuclear Conflict2
(C) Military substrategies were chosen to provide a range of alternatives. Each needs to be considered as an individual, potential element in the design of overall US military strategies. The areas were chosen as sufficiently distinguishable to be analytically useful, though obviously they are interdependent. Resultant overlap will be eliminated as integrated strategies and force postures are evolved. For example:
Nuclear Forces: A major nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union is addressed in the context of US–USSR Homelands Nuclear Conflict (TAB E), but strategic and theater nuclear forces are also addressed in the context of linkage to NATO (TAB A), political perceptions in China and Japan (TAB C), and nuclear proliferation in the Third World (TABS C and D).
Forces in Peacetime: Requirements for military forces are derived from wartime functions; i.e., what forces are needed to accomplish specific tasks in battle. However, military forces also serve a variety of peacetime functions, such as reassurance of allies and demonstrations of commitment. It is unlikely that forces need to be procured for those purposes that would not serve important wartime purposes. However, the peacetime functions can require some forces being deployed in different postures from those dictated by a pure warfighting perspective. Thus the peacetime functions of military force are analyzed not only in [Page 53] peacekeeping activities and potential local wars (TAB D), but also as a backdrop to diplomacy in Europe (TAB A) and in East Asia (TAB C).
Forces for Asia: Military forces in Asia are addressed in the context of maintaining a balance of power in East Asia (TAB C), of providing a capability to counter the Soviets in a worldwide war (TAB B), and of providing for peacekeeping activities or intervention in potential local wars (TAB D). If the US pursues a strategy in East Asia requiring a major military presence, the US would then have the ability to intervene in most potential conflicts, including conflict with the Soviets in Asia during a war in Europe. Conversely, if a strategy involving reduced peacetime presence in Asia were to be chosen, the US might still want to acquire deployable military forces for intervention in potential conflicts, including those in Asia.
(U) Included in the descriptions of the substrategies for each analytical area is a brief discussion of the likely political and military force implications. Unless explicitly indicated otherwise, it has been assumed that the military objectives and programs of both hostile and friendly nations will remain as described in existing intelligence projections. Thus, allied contributions and enemy threats have been taken as constant, across the spectrum of US strategy alternatives. This is an approximation that needs to be refined in subsequent study.
(U) The final chapter (TAB F)3 describes current US military strategies (or postures) and capabilities; the latter does not always correspond to the former. The next steps in the PRM–10 study will be:
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- To integrate the substrategies into a representative set of alternative worldwide military strategies (the AIMS).
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- To estimate a reasonable range of force postures, phased programs and funding, appropriate to each overall strategy. It should be recognized that the uncertainties or differences in judgment about what forces and programs are appropriate for which strategies are likely to be as great as the variations between adjacent strategies in the tabulation of alternative strategies.
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- To assess the adequacy of alternative strategies and forces in terms of the ability of each strategy to achieve objectives. In this regard, the non-military components of national strategy (economic, diplomatic, etc.) are of major importance in determining such adequacy.
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- To describe the domestic, economic, foreign policy, and arms control implications for each alternative strategy, as well as likely allied, Soviet, and third country reactions.
Key Questions:
(S) Prior to the meeting, you may find it useful to focus on the following key questions which govern the development of military strategy and force postures. (Additional questions are presented at the end of the discussion of each analytical area.)
(1) NATO-Warsaw Pact: Should the US continue the current policy of urging NATO to improve its capabilities for conventional response to conventional attacks, or consider policies which would place greater reliance on nuclear weapons?
(2) NATO-Warsaw Pact: Should the US consider policies under which NATO would take the offensive against Warsaw Pact territory in response to aggression?
(3) NATO-Warsaw Pact: How much divergence should the US be willing to accept between its policies and those of its NATO Allies?
(4) Worldwide War: In a worldwide war with the Soviets, should the US be prepared to engage in operations outside of the European theater, recognizing that current strategy calls for the redeployment of some forces from the Pacific to reinforce NATO?
(5) East Asia: Should criteria for the selection of US military strategy in East Asia emphasize global containment of the Soviet Union or regional stability, which would presumably allow the Soviets more initiative?
(6) Local Wars: Should the US have military forces available to intervene in a crisis or local war situation, such as in the Middle East, without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes, such as reinforcing Europe?
(7) Homelands Exchange: To what extent should the US procure strategic nuclear forces, above and beyond those required to achieve other US objectives, in order to respond to major US-Soviet force asymmetries? In other words, should we insist on perceived parity?