A zero based budget is a major accomplishment of your Administration, but
it is important to recognize that it is biased against innovation and
new investment. This is because overhead, O&M and continuing
activities are always protected in a minimum program.
This year, Harold is trying to protect crucial new nuclear programs such
as LRTNF and, in particular, MX by placing them well within the minimum
program. As a consequence, procurement for general purpose forces has
been pushed to the margin where you must decide among a welter of
programs and activities whose military importance may not be immediately
self-evident.
To help you through this thicket, these are the programs I consider it
essential to include and the reasons therefor:
I have directed my staff to look hard at alternatives.
Both Harold and Jim have kept their personal positions close to their
vests and rightly so. But it is our clear impression that the OMB staff is pushing for Band 1 which, in
our judgment, would kill SALT
outright; and DOD is pushing for Band 4
or 5 which is clearly excessive. The program I recommend involves an
expenditure in the area of Band 3; that is, $156.4 billion TOA, $143.6 billion outlays (current
dollars). This would provide total growth of 5.8 percent in TOA and 4.1 percent in outlays. This
presumes Jim McIntyre is correct that he can squeeze $3 billion out of a
vigorous budget scrub.
In my judgment, any less will not make clear our determination to reverse
recent military trends and over the next decade eliminate the most
important deficiencies and imbalances. As Harold points out, this is
where OMB’s analysis is most deficient.
It is these trends that have fueled the political pressure for a more
vigorous program to modernize our military posture. If we go for less, I
do not believe we will have the broad consensus to support both SALT and an adequate yet prudent defense
program—a consensus that has eluded us since the war in Vietnam and
which you have an opportunity to forge, not only for FY 81 but for the difficult decade
ahead.
Attachment
Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President
Carter3
SUBJECT
- FY81 Presidential Review,
Department of Defense
I am concerned that the OMB paper,
subject as above, does not by itself provide an adequate basis for
your consideration of the FY81 DoD
budget and FY81–85 program. In
particular, the first two sections (“Overview” and “Issue #1: Level
of the Defense Budget”) represent a perception so different from my
own, and bear upon matters of such fundamental importance to the
security of the nation, that I believe you are entitled to these
additional views as a matter of fairness to you in the
decision-making process.
It is of course true that the level of the Defense budget always has
been, and always will be, decided in the light of other demands that
compete for our national resources. But, it is just as true that the
choice—unlike much of the rest of the federal budget—must also
reflect demands over which we have little control because they are
imposed on us by the Soviet Union and its allies. In my opinion, the
treatment in the OMB paper of this
latter factor—the Soviet threat, the balance, and the trends in that
balance—is inadequate and misleading.
The situation we face today is the result of 15 years or more of
failing to match a steady, resolute, and comprehensive growth in the
Soviet Defense program. During each of those years, when the budget
was being formulated, similar arguments to those contained in this
week’s OMB analysis could be and
were made. They were made successfully, and the present situation is
in part the result. While we were spending hundreds of billions of
dollars in Vietnam at the expense of building our forces for the
future, the Soviet Union was building the unprecedented force we
face today. While we have stopped the decline in Defense spending
and—much to your credit—have even turned it around to real growth,
it is important to understand that the results of a 15 year trend
cannot be repaired in one, or even five years. In my view, the
OMB paper does not address that
key point satisfactorily; the
[Page 731]
problem did not start last year or the year
before, nor will it be cured in the next five. We must broaden the
horizon from such a narrow concentration on this budget year.
The situation in Europe, in my opinion, is far from satisfactory. The
OMB paper, on the other hand,
states that the military balance will show continued improvement
even at the Minimum budget level. That is correct but—because it
deals only with trends in the balance, rather than the balance
itself—is seriously misleading. The trend in
the balance—now badly adverse—will improve; the balance itself will
remain adverse and by many measures will not improve. In the
material we prepared for the PRC
last week on the Defense budget4—which I take to be
the source of the OMB’s
statement—there was only one indicator in
which NATO showed a superiority in
1985, given the Minimum level program. That was in the maximum
number of air-to-ground capable aircraft, where we showed a
superiority of 1.3:1. However, under the same conditions, we would
also be outnumbered in air-to-air capable aircraft by 2.3:1, raising
a serious question as to the survivability of our superior number of
air-to-ground aircraft, and the significance of that sole area of
superiority in Europe.
In all the other measures we calculated, the
Warsaw Pact would have an advantage over NATO: a slight advantage in total number of tactical
aircraft, a 10% faster rate of tactical aircraft modernization, a
70% advantage on the ground on the Southern Flank, a 100% advantage
on the Central Front, a 180% advantage on the Northern Flank, and a
3:1 or 4:1 advantage in sustainability. Those balances are what we
will face in 1985, in spite of the “improvements” that the OMB has highlighted. In my opinion,
they are seriously unfavorable.
I also caution you not to be misled by OMB’s table showing that “our projections of Soviet
forces’ readiness against NATO has
declined sharply as more and better intelligence has become
available.” What you see there is not a marked reduction that has
occurred in the readiness of Soviet forces, but a marked increase
that did not occur. Actually, part of that is because we have changed our counting rules. The
OMB comparison also fails to
note that in 1970 we predicted that the effectiveness (i.e.,
measured in Armored Division Equivalents) of a Soviet division would
increase by about 15%; now that 1979 is here, we find that it has
increased by twice that much. But all of that is quite beside the
point. No matter who predicted what how long ago, today NATO is at a disadvantage on the
ground in Central Europe at M+10 by a factor
[Page 732]
of 2.2:1, which in my opinion is cause, not
for complacency, but for deep concern.
Another example that I consider seriously misleading—even if
literally correct—is the statement that our projections show
continued improvements in the ratio of ROK/US ground forces versus North Korea in the next
decade even at the minimum level. At the minimum level, that balance
will by 1985 still be 1.74:1 in favor of the North Koreans. In 1977
(when in PD–18 you directed a policy
of no further degradation in that or other such balances), we had
thought the ratio was 1:1, or slightly better. But now, at the
current rate, the balance will still be 1.46:1 against us and the
ROKs as late as 1990. The fact
that the balance is improving should not be allowed to obscure the
fact that it is currently unsatisfactory and likely to remain so for
some time to come.
And in one final geographical assessment, I consider the treatment of
the Persian Gulf area totally inadequate. The PRC material, which the OMB has, points out that if we had to
counter the Iraqis alone—quite apart from any Soviet or Cuban
forces—today, we would be at more than a 2:1 disadvantage on the
ground (measured in Armored Division Equivalents) for at least 3
weeks, even if we could devote our whole current mobility force to
the deployment. If there were also to be a simultaneous NATO crisis (perhaps orchestrated by
the Soviets), the 3 weeks would grow to 5. Our capability for
intervention with more than a token force in that area of the world
today, therefore, depends on 1) weeks of advance warning, 2)
immediate action on that warning, and 3) no
simultaneous crisis elsewhere—far from an impressive capability and,
in my opinion, quite unsatisfactory. The OMB paper gives no inkling of that, but I think it must
enter your deliberations.
Beyond the question of specific military balances, there is the far
larger issue of US leadership. The
OMB paper cites a decision by
the FRG to limit its real growth in
defense spending to 1½–2% (we feel that a higher figure is likely
for 1980 before that year ends), points out that the Japanese have
been reluctant to increase the allocation of their resources to
defense, and notes that the US
allocates more to defense on a per capita basis and as a percent of
GNP than Japan, Germany, the
UK, or France. Though perhaps not intended, one possible
inference—the most likely one, I think—to be drawn from all that is
that if our allies are devoting less to the common defense than we
are, we should cut back.
We must press (and we will) for greater efforts on the part of our
allies. But I urge you not to abandon our position as leader of the
free world’s military alliance. If we elect to cut the burden we
bear to no more than that borne by any of our allies, we will have
become a
[Page 733]
follower rather
than the leader. We will have said that our alliance is like a
convoy in which the speed of all is set by the speed of the slowest
member. We must continue to lead and continue to spend what is truly
required if we are to maximize the incentive for our allies to hold
up their end. If we fall back, there is, in my opinion, no chance
that they will carry on without us.
We must not look at this issue as making sure that no slacker takes
advantage of the United States. Rather, we must continue to
recognize that the common defense is not only in our own
interest—even if we should have to bear
an extra measure of the load—but is actually a matter of the
survival of our world. I urge that you not let recitations of our
allies’ performance distract you from the real issue. We will work on our allies, and have been far
more successful during the past thirty months in pushing them to
greater efforts than ever before. But we must maintain our
leadership to be able to do so, or for there to remain any point in
our even trying.
I mentioned that we held a PRC
meeting last week on the Defense budget and program. With the
exception of Jim McIntyre, whom I did not press because I recognize
that doing his job requires him to take a different perspective, every participant at that meeting agreed that
a growth in defense significantly higher than the earlier projected
3 percent per annum is needed. I think that view has also become a
consensus of the country at large. It clearly is shared by some key
members of the Congress and other persons of influence. Yet the
position recommended by the OMB
staff in this paper is wholly at odds with such a view. I recognize
that the OMB has its own
responsibilities to you, and that they must play the Devil’s
advocate. But the contrast between their position and the vast
majority of other responsible voices, my own included, is very
great. Moreover, I remain concerned that we will be correctly seen
as justifying inadequate defense program growth by using
questionable arithmetic.
I feel quite sure, were you to adopt anything like the OMB staff’s recommended analysis,
budget level or program, that all chance for the ratification of
SALT II would vanish. The
consequences, political, military, and international, would be many
and damaging. As one of them, I have no doubt that in the aftermath
our requirements for strategic forces would rise. We would then face
the choice between paying for them by cutting back on our general
purpose forces, or increasing the defense budget, or some
combination thereof. Given the unsatisfactory nature of our general
purpose force balances as outlined above, the former would, in my
opinion, be unacceptably risky. The latter would face you with a far
greater economic problem than the one before you now.
[Page 734]
But the need for a larger defense program—considerably greater than
suggested by the OMB staff—is not
merely or even principally a question of the ratification of SALT II. The need in terms of our
national security is, in my judgment, absolute—and absolutely
critical—in and of itself. The ratification of SALT II will only prevent an even
greater, and perhaps insurmountable problem.
Let me summarize by noting that the trends in the military balance
between the free and the communist worlds have been deteriorating
for well over a decade. Over the past five years or so, the analysis
has developed a familiar ring: the balance is still all right, but
the trend is unfavorable, and we’ll be in trouble soon if we don’t
do something about it. I’ve said it often enough myself, and meant
it. But then when we get down to deciding on a particular defense
budget for a particular year—when we come to the hard choices and
the actual bottom line—we have cut some things out on grounds that
delaying for a year won’t hurt, and others because their immediate
worth is not analytically demonstrable, and we have cut funding in
the hopes that offsetting efficiencies will somehow be found later.
In that process of putting off the day of reckoning, the point when
the balance will finally be no longer tolerable has been moving
closer and closer.
That procedure has gone as far as—and possibly further than—is
prudent. It must stop now. We cannot risk even one more year of
temporizing. We must face the serious military imbalances that have
grown so large, and resolve to remedy them starting now. The United
States has come to a cross-roads, and the world is watching.
