Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

162. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, November 8, 1979, 3:30–5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• FY 81 Defense Budget

PARTICIPANTS

• The Vice President’s Office

  • Capt Ralph Crosby

• OSD

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • W. Graham Claytor, Jr. Deputy Secretary
  • Ambassador Robert Komer Under Secretary of Policy
  • Mr. Russell Murray Assistant Secretary, Program Analysis and Evaluation

• OMB

  • Mr. James McIntyre
  • Dr. John White Deputy
  • Mr. Randy Jayne Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Mr. David Aaron

• JCS

  • General David Jones
  • Lt General John Pustay Assistant to the Chairman

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Mr. John Koehler Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

• OSTP

  • Mr. Ben Huberman

• ACDA

  • Mr. George Seignious
  • Mr. Spurgeon Keeny Deputy

• NSC

  • Maj Gen Jasper Welch
  • Dr. Victor Utgoff

DETAILED MINUTES

Harold Brown presented a summary of how the defense budget increases in the proposed 5 Year Defense Program (relative to the FY 80 real spending level) are allocated among major mission areas. The $116B cumulative increase over these five years that results from the “basic” budget real rate of increase of between 4 and 4½ percent, would provide $34B additional dollars for Naval forces, $30B for improvements to NATO, $29B for strategic forces, $16.3B for the rapid deployment force and $6.2B for intelligence. (S)

In response to questions by Dr. Brzezinski, Secretary Brown noted that his assessments of the effects of these defense increases assume that our NATO Allies will match our defense spending rates of increase or decrease. He also noted that he has not attempted to accelerate the MX program in this proposed defense plan. (S)

Gen. Jones remarked that there are few new programs in this budget, outside the RDF, but that he was not looking for new starts, preferring to place emphasis on improvements in readiness. Jim McIntyre supported this emphasis and remarked on how infrequently programs are stopped once started. Several remarks were made to the effect that Congress tends to reduce defense budgets by making cuts in readiness funding rather than in acquisition, and that the effect of arbitrary cuts in defense spending can often only be accommodated with cuts in readiness related purchases. (U)

In response to questions by Secretary Brown, all agreed that the allocations of increased dollars among the various mission areas seems correct, particularly given the fact that some funding counted under naval forces and NATO yields capabilities that are applicable to the RDF. (C)

In discussing proposed improvements to the RDF, Secretary Brown pointed out that at the basic budget level he proposes to begin purchase of commercial ships that would be loaded with Marine equipment and forward deployed to increase the speed of response of the RDF. He also noted that in the basic level, the RDF would get 20 additional KC–10 cargo tanker aircraft and initial development of a large new intertheater transport aircraft (“CX”) would be begun. Russ Murray noted that enough of the new RDF ships would be available to support a brigade by 1983, with further additions coming shortly thereafter. He also noted that the RDF needs aircraft carriers and asked what we might do to free a few of them from their current commitments. (S)

David Aaron remarked on the importance of the various RDF programs that DOD proposed to buy at the enhanced level and even at the basic budget levels and said that these programs would be needed even if the budget were to come in at or somewhat below the basic level. He noted that programs such as reengining the KC–135 cargo tanker aircraft could improve our RDF capability in the short term, whereas efforts such as development of the CX transport would have an effect only much later. Gen. Jones supported the notion that reengining the KC–135 would help our RDF capabilities. Secretary Brown said that Aaron’s point concerning short term versus longer term improvements in the RDF is a legitimate concern, but also noted that the new intertheater transport he proposed to develop would increase our capability to carry outsized cargo. (C)

Reggie Bartholomew noted that the effectiveness of the RDF can be enhanced through arrangements with other governments for overflight and basing rights. He suggested a study of the objectives of the RDF in order to understand where we should be making diplomatic efforts to gain such rights. He noted that an understanding of our RDF objectives would be important as we entered into negotiations next year with Spain and Portugal over basing rights. (TS)

Harold Brown responded by saying that studies of such issues were already going on in DOD, and that the President would be receiving a memorandum today on some of the questions involved.² He agreed, however, that State should be involved in these studies. (U)

David Aaron noted the dangers that would be involved if we let the notion get out that defense programs trade off against base and overflight agreements. Finally, Stan Turner remarked that the RDF would probably be the most significant feature determining how the budget is perceived in other countries. He noted that the Allies will probably like the RDF, provided they don’t see it as challenging NATO improvements—the Soviets clearly won’t like it. (S)

Harold Brown opened the discussion on shipbuilding by noting that the central issue is numbers, and more specifically, should we reduce the number of AEGIS ships that provide air defense capabilities that the Navy says are its greatest need in favor of more frigates, which can be bought in greater numbers and may provide more presence? (S)

Reggie Bartholomew noted the fact that the decreasing size of the Navy will create pressures for reducing the numbers of ships that are committed to NATO. He also noted that many people in the world are impressed by fleet size—a measure of naval capability that even influences our own debates. (S)

David Aaron remarked that he was in favor of improving perceptions of our military strength, but that he was not willing to trade off real military capabilities to meet the most worrisome threat to the Navy, just to get ship numbers up. He noted that there are other ways to increase the presence value of our Navy, such as increasing steaming hours and numbers of exercises. (S)

Secretary Brown noted that the effect of increased POMCUS in Europe is to reduce the demand for convoys, and thus to reduce the requirement for ASW capabilities. He also remarked that if more ASW capability were required, he thought additional buys of P–3 aircraft might be a better idea than additional frigates.

Stan Turner said that, provided we had enough AEGIS ships to escort our carriers, he was in favor of purchases of additional frigates. He remarked that the air defense problem will not be solved by AEGIS alone, but by a combination of measures—land based air defense, greater ship numbers to increase the number of targets that the Soviets would have to attack, etc. Secretary Brown noted Stan Turner’s caveat that our carriers should be protected by AEGIS, and remarked that emphasizing numbers of ships at the expense of buying AEGIS ships, reflects a great underestimate of the Backfire threat. He noted Admiral Train’s remark that whether a submarine or an aircraft shoots at you, the threat comes through the air and you need something to stop it. Stan Turner noted that many submarines are not armed with cruise missiles. (S)

Stan Turner went on to note that the building rates assumed for the 500 ship Navy Harold had presented were not realistic. In practice ship life times were considerably shorter than the 30 years Harold has assumed. Gen. Jones said that in terms of warfighting capabilities, 1 AEGIS ship was a much better idea than 3 frigates. He noted that we are fairly rich in frigates already, and that the Navy’s proposed mix of ship types looked about right to him. (S)

Randy Jayne remarked that frigates provide some useful military capabilities. He also remarked on the complexity of the AEGIS air defense system, suggesting a slower initial rate of construction would be prudent. Harold Brown responded by saying that the AEGIS system had been very thoroughly tested, and that any implied comparison with the Tartar, Terrier, and Talos air defense systems was inappropriate. Finally, Russ Murray noted that the budget includes a proposal to begin the design of a newer, cheaper, smaller frigate, suggesting that this ship might be bought to get ship numbers up. (C)

Harold Brown opened discussion of the question of whether we should proceed with construction of a pilot binary chemical weapons plant in 1981 by noting that there are two issues: what are the political implications of such an action, and what are the military needs for an improved CW capability particularly as a deterrent to Soviet use of chemical weapons? (C)

David Aaron noted that proceeding with construction of a CW plant will create political problems in Europe. He noted the upcoming FRG elections, and said that while he was not questioning the need for this plant on its merits, we don’t need to open up another political debate right now. He also noted the possibility that such a debate could create problems on the Hill, particularly given the possibility that the TNF and CW modernization issues might get aggregated. Reggie Bartholomew said that it was important to get past the long range theater forces modernization issue before opening up the CW question, and that it might be appropriate to consider the binary CW plant early next year, perhaps with a supplemental appropriation. (TS)

Harold Brown noted the importance of having a CW capability that would deter Soviet use of CW, and the enormous disadvantage that results if the Soviets can force us to try to fight in CW protective gear, while our lack of an offensive CW capability lets the Soviets fight without being similarly encumbered. He asked however, how we could answer the strong political questions that had been raised about the wisdom of going forward with the CW plant now? (S)

George Seignious remarked that the idea of building a new CW production plant had been around as long as he could remember and that he had never heard a really good case for it. He said that if the deterrent argument is a good one, we should build a good case for the plant that develops that argument. He also noted that we should have a better understanding of the potential effect of starting with a new plant on the CW negotiations. He suggested that we carry out a study of these two questions and go forward only after a strong case had been developed. All agreed. (S)

Secretary Brown opened discussion of the last question: Is development of a ballistic missile defense system for MX justified as a hedge against loss of the SALT fractionation limits? (S)

Randy Jayne remarked that the Army appeared to be planning a major $1B deployment program for this purpose. Reggie Bartholomew noted that critics of the MX might take the program as an indication that the MX system “needed a crutch.” (S)

Jasper Welch noted that the Congress has had this idea explained to it before, in the course of consultations on the MX. Harold Brown said that it had been presented as an alternative to building additional shelters. He also noted that if this system is ever really needed, it will only be one among many things that we will have to do to improve our strategic posture. (S)

Reggie Bartholomew said that the proposal might play in a reasonable way, but that was not certain, and in light of the risk, is it really necessary to begin this year? Harold Brown responded yes, if we want an option for this system to be available as the MX comes on line. (S)

There was a short discussion of the consistency of this system with the ABM treaty. It was noted that development of components such as missile launchers and radars was permitted provided that they were not mobile. It was also noted that the Soviets are making an effort to develop small ABM components, that though fixed, had the potential of being made mobile.

George Seignious suggested that we should redirect our ABM research in this direction, but that we should not advertise it. We can clarify the potential value of such efforts, perhaps two years from now, if that became necessary. All appeared to agree with this proposal. (TS)

Harold Brown then asked all but Jim McIntyre to express their opinions on the appropriate level of the budget from a foreign policy point of view. All responses were in the range from “a strong increase in excess of 3% is needed” to a program “at the basic level or perhaps a bit more” (4.5–5% real increase). (S)

There were a few remarks on the importance of making the increase in straightforward and easily understood terms. Jim McIntyre responded that the calculations of the sizes of the increases we have made in the past have been straightforward. Stan Turner noted that some parts of the public have seen past claims about the sizes of our budget increases as less than straightforward. (C)

Finally, David Aaron remarked that increases stated in terms of total obligation authority may play better in the public perception. He also remarked that it was important that the defense program we settled on be politically sustainable for years to come—that it not be something designed to respond solely to the current debate which will collapse after SALT II is behind us. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 129 FY81 Defense Budget [1]. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting is ibid. Brzezinski forwarded the detailed minutes and the Summary of Conclusions to Carter under cover of a November 13 memorandum. Carter wrote on the first page of Brzezinski’s covering memorandum: “Noted only, J.” (Ibid.)
2. See Document 163.