Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

163. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, November 8, 1979

SUBJECT

• U.S. and USSR Capabilities to Project Power

(S) A recent net assessment addressed US and Soviet abilities to project military power and examined related means such as friendship treaties, aid, advisors and proxies which have been used to achieve strategic objectives beyond national borders. The utility of this comparative study to me was primarily in three areas: defining the growth in Soviet intervention capabilities, showing that US capabilities need broad reexamination, and suggesting some specific approaches that might be fruitful.

(S) Early in this Administration we recognized a competitive Soviet strategy of jockeying for position while avoiding undue risks, especially of directly confronting the US. We identified several features of Soviet style including:

— Choosing areas where the US is inhibited from responding.

— Seeking invitations by a government or faction.

— Providing equipment rapidly to clients.

— Using proxies.

— Cementing relationships by continuing arms aid, building military facilities and concluding treaties of friendship.

(S) The net assessment highlighted another development which has been overshadowed so far by more obvious Soviet activities. We are seeing a big shift in Soviet thinking about, and capabilities to project, military power into areas distant from the USSR. For example,

— Training manuals have appeared containing material on previous Russian or Soviet use of military forces beyond Soviet borders.

— Capabilities have been developed that allow them to project and support forces at a distance—e.g., a new class of amphibious assault ships, several classes of cruisers, V/STOL carriers, large underway replenishment ships, etc.²

— Command, Control & Communications (C3) capabilities to manage distant operations have been improved by incorporating sophisticated long-haul systems in naval ships and by establishing C3 facilities in places such as South Yemen, Vietnam, and Angola.³

— An overseas base structure has been established although Soviet access to certain overseas facilities may be tenuous and even reversible.

These trends strongly indicate real trouble ahead for us, especially when they are coupled with the other features of Soviet strategy in the third world with which we have become familiar.

(S) In light of this I believe that, in addition to our programs for improving our rapid deployment forces, we must look to some broader approaches. These include designing a counter-strategy and ensuring continued management attention to this problem within DOD. Obviously, developing a strategy that effectively counters Soviet power projection cannot be done by DOD alone. Indeed, competing with the Soviets in a way that raises the costs that they perceive (in terms of risk, resources expended, and the effect on their image) will require a wide range of political, military and economic activities and policies. For example, the effectiveness of our MAP and IMET programs and our covert action capability (or absence thereof) will have a large effect on whether, or at least at which point in the conflict spectrum, DOD would have to be able to intervene in the future.

(S) Finally, examining US and Soviet capabilities to project power suggest two problem areas for US military forces that require correction.

— With respect to rapid deployment forces, being able to deploy a battalion on day 1 may be more important than being able to deploy a larger force on day 10. This may be crucial to preempting a coup or threat to our friends, or to deterring the Soviets from intervening by making the risks of escalation clear. Accordingly, I have directed the JCS to consider how to improve our ability to get small, effective forces into a crisis area early. In particular, I have asked the CJCS and CMC to consider whether the Marines should have a larger role in such planning.⁴

— A major factor that will influence our ability in the long term to react quickly as I have just described is specialized weaponry. We are looking at options for arming light, highly mobile US forces of the type that may be needed for rapid insertion into crisis areas. New designs would take a long time to reach inventory. In some cases, existing non-military (or non-US military) equipment may be best. After the technical possibilities have been defined, we can then judge whether practical programs for reequipping some of our forces can be devised.⁵

Harold Brown

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 4, Middle East/Persian Gulf: 9/79–1/80. Secret. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum. In a November 30 memorandum entitled “U.S. and USSR Capabilities to Project Power,” Brzezinski wrote Brown: “Attached is a copy of your memorandum to the President of November 8 on the above subject, together with the President’s comments and notations.” (Ibid.)
2. Carter drew a checkmark in the right margin next to this paragraph.
3. Carter underlined “Yemen, Vietnam, and Angola,” and wrote beneath this paragraph: “Afghanistan?”
4. Carter wrote “ok” in the right margin next to this paragraph.
5. Carter drew a checkmark in the right margin next to this paragraph.