Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

141. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, June 4, 1979, 3–4:20 p.m.

Minutes from NSC Meeting on Strategic Issues and US-Soviet Relations (C)

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by stating that its purpose was to review the trends in the US-Soviet balance as indicated in CNA–78 and the recent PRC on the Consolidated Guidance,² and to reach some decisions concerning tactical nuclear forces and the M–X. He noted that other meetings would be needed later on to discuss some related issues such as strategic targeting, C3I, and our strategic doctrine. He then stated the following seven key conclusions that he had drawn from CNA–78 and the Consolidated Guidance meeting:

1. The US continues to enjoy considerable advantages in all non-military aspects of the US-Soviet competition. (TS)

2. Only with our Allies do we have an advantage over the Soviets in the crude dimensions of military power. Thus we cannot afford to jeopardize Alliance cohesion and confidence which are crucially dependent on US power and resolve. (TS)

3. With respect to trends of the regional military balance, in the Far East favorable political trends may offset an unfavorable military balance; instabilities in the Persian Gulf/Mideast region create an adverse balance with an uncertain future; and in NATO the balance is slowly improving. (TS)

4. The strategic nuclear balance is deteriorating faster than we expected two years ago and will continue to do so to the early ’80s. The Soviets have been outspending us in defense since the late 1960s and military investment is important because it accumulates. (TS)

5. In the early 1980s we will face “a strategic dip.” We will not meet the criteria established in PD–18 that we maintain essential equivalence and a balance no worse than that existing in ’77.³ (TS)

6. The strategic gap of the early ’80s could produce damaging political perceptions and encourage assertive Soviet behavior. (TS)

7. If these trends are not corrected, the US will be able at best to wage a spasmic apocalyptic war rather than one controlled for political purposes. Because of this situation, the US will be less able to bargain stably in a protracted crisis situation and therefore the US may be less able in the ’80s to deter the Soviet Union from assertive behavior. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski also noted that it would really be an irony if our strategic position in the 1980s forces us to again rely on massive retaliation just as we did in the ’50s when we possessed a massive strategic superiority. Finally, Dr. Brzezinski said that he recognized that there were some divergent views with respect to these conclusions and suggested that the other principals comment. (TS)

Secretary Vance said that he agreed with all Zbig’s conclusions, with two exceptions. First, he felt that characterizing the situation outside NATO as adverse was too pessimistic, that it would be more appropriate to characterize it as uncertain. More important, however, he felt that we will have a situation of rough strategic equivalence in the early ’80s and that we should not take the position ourselves that we are inferior—this is a very dangerous way to characterize our situation, and we may hurt ourselves in doing it. (TS)

Secretary Brown began by saying that while he felt the comprehensive net assessment was in some cases too pessimistic—the strategic forces balance being one example of this—he thought the assessment was too optimistic overall. In supporting this view, Secretary Brown made the following points:

— While relative dislike of the Soviets felt by other nations is a modest advantage to us, making too much of this point draws attention away from the fact that the Soviets can play on other nations’ fears of them to achieve their objectives.

— We would be hurt more than the Soviets by adverse events in the Third World.

— While the gross resources available to, and the military efforts being made by the US and its allies were larger than those of the Soviet Union and its allies, they can’t really be added together since our objectives are not always the same. Further, our column includes the resources and efforts of countries like the People’s Republic of China and Iran.

— The military investment imbalance in favor of the Soviets may be far more significant for the future than we realize. By 1985 the Soviets will have greater strength than the US in almost every military category, no matter what we do. We are going to have to be prepared to live with this. (TS)

Secretary Brown also noted that there are some bright spots working for us, particularly in the area of technology, and he mentioned the space shuttle in particular. However, given the Soviets’ large efforts in the technology area, they might produce something revolutionary in the way of military capabilities. (TS)

Finally, Secretary Brown commented that we must be careful that we don’t let spending for strategic forces improvements absorb too much of the resources that we devote to defense. (TS)

George Seignious commented that perceptions of Soviet superiority will have to be handled carefully in order to make sure that they do not have major adverse effects on our arms control efforts. (TS)

The President then said that much of this perception of Soviet superiority is created by this group. He noted that he had just convened a group of experts to discuss the problem of public perceptions and attitudes, and their discussion had convinced him that maintaining a balanced view of our actual situation is a serious problem. He noted how the newspapers tend to distort the testimony given about military matters by high-level DOD officials. He commented that the eleven members of the House of Representatives he had recently met with at Camp David had expressed concerns about the problem of perceptions. He commented that it seemed strange that we would hear so much about emerging military problems, given the fact that we have been increasing DOD funding. He remarked that we should do what we can to let people know that we have a strong, powerful, permanent government and that we are not crawling abjectly before the Soviets. He pointed out that we have military advantages over them such as the fact that the Soviets have multiple enemies, where we do not. (TS)

Stan Turner commented that he generally agrees with Harold Brown’s assessment of Zbig’s conclusions about the overall balance. [4 lines not declassified]

General Jones remarked that the Chiefs have muted their concerns about the evolving military balance and cited as an example of their care to contain their concerns that it took three months for their memo to the President about SALT to leak to Evans & Novak.⁴ Jones noted that it poses a real dilemma to the Chiefs to be so muted when they have such concerns about where we are going, and he commented that he has never seen his fellow Chiefs or the Allies more concerned than they are now. He remarked that the NIEs sound more pessimistic now and that past NIEs have proven optimistic in their projections of the future. He said that he expected that the Soviets may be very assertive during the early ’80s and that thus this period will be far less stable. He noted that we are far more vulnerable today than we used to be, particularly given our dependence upon imported oil. He also remarked that in his view the Soviets probably could achieve a conventional victory in NATO though they cannot feel confident of it. Finally, General Jones said that his colleagues told him that they don’t believe that it will be possible for Jones to express their concerns strongly enough. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that the meeting was already behind schedule and suggested that the discussion of tactical nuclear forces be skipped except for a request to Secretary Brown to develop specific deployment plans for tactical nuclear forces for discussion in another meeting. Dr. Brzezinski also suggested that the President show Chancellor Schmidt during his upcoming visit⁵ the illustrative plan for long-range tactical nuclear forces that was forwarded to him during the weekend, and thus attempt to smoke out his attitudes about having Pershing II only in Germany and only GLCM elsewhere. Finally, Dr. Brzezinski noted that we should consider possible short-term fixes to the strategic imbalance problem that is going to appear during the early ’80s, and he listed several possibilities including uploading more weapons on our Poseidon SLBMs and accelerating B–52/ALCM conversions. Secretary Brown responded by noting that he also has other options for alleviating the early ’80s imbalance, such as deploying SLCMs. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we meet in July to discuss these problems. (TS)

The President then said that he had decided to notify the Allies that we are ready to take a leadership role on tactical nuclear forces. He said that we have told our Allies that we will try to accommodate their political needs and will try to get them to support each other. These points will be made to Chancellor Schmidt in the upcoming visit. (TS)

The President also said that he recognizes the MINUTEMAN vulnerability problem and the nation’s longstanding commitment to the concept of Triad. He noted, however, that his decision was made more difficult by the fact that he had been presented with options that were stated only in counter-force terms. He remarked that we should also pay more attention to the capabilities of ALCMs and bombers. He also said that he sensed that many in the group did not sufficiently share his concerns about the effects this decision might have on SALT, and that his own attitude was not a question of timidity. He said that he needed the assistance of the assembled group, and he remarked at the progress that had been made in getting the Congress to accept the idea of proceeding with an M–X missile, which was quite a reversal of their previous attitudes. He also remarked, however, that there are limits on the amount of money available for military expenditures, and that large increases in military spending must be recognized for the threat they could pose to our economy. (TS)

The President suggested that the group should make a greater effort to put themselves in his shoes—that he was not interested in destroying SALT and then having to embark on a massive arms race. He suggested that the group had not explored nearly enough means for solving our strategic forces problems and that getting on with a solution was not a question of lack of will to solve the problem or dollars. He remarked that the effects on SALT III of this decision are very important. The President suggested that a longer meeting would be required to discuss the M–X issue and that an evening meeting be scheduled. Finally the President asked Secretary Brown if he needed more guidance concerning theater nuclear forces. (TS)

Secretary Brown remarked that he thought that he had enough information on TNF to proceed. He then stated that he thought that the President should make as much of the decision on M–X as possible before the Summit. He noted that there are two general options. The first is Option A; this option preserves the Triad and presents opportunities for scaling-back production of new strategic forces later on. Thus it would be compatible with reductions achieved in SALT III. Option B, on the other hand, is more of a force increase and is thus somewhat less compatible with our ultimate goal of reduced strategic forces. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that if the President is interested in choosing Option B, he should do so before the Summit. It was important that such a decision not be seen as the result of his discussions with the Soviets. Dr. Brzezinski also argued that the missile decision can be made before the Summit. (TS)

The President responded that the missile decision is easy; it’s just a question of money. The basing decision, however, is a much tougher question, and until late last night he had not even heard of the covered trench. He noted that he had an exchange of correspondence with President Brezhnev discussing the question of verification of mobile systems, and that he had assured the President that the US would not deploy a system that was not verifiable.⁶ The President commented that he could not see how a 20-mile trench that could be opened once per year after 10,000 tons of dirt had been scraped off, could lead to a verifiable system. In his view, a decision in favor of such a system would mean the end of SALT, though perhaps he did not understand everything. Secretary Brown responded that the President didn’t understand the concept. The President continued by noting the problems we had had with canvas covers over the MINUTEMAN silos, and the problems created as a result of darkness and cloud cover, and the possibility of openings for extra missiles along the sides of the trenches. Secretary Vance remarked that he could not recommend the non-open trench, and then said that the open trench is what he had thought the group was talking about, a concept that he could recommend enthusiastically. (TS)

Secretary Brown said that there is an open trench variant that could be put completely on DOD land. The concept would be to build the system and cover it later if expansion of the Soviet threat required it. The President responded that this sounds like a better idea. Secretary Brown then continued by noting that the covered trench is not as difficult to verify as you might think. The trench would be open to view for a long time during its construction process, which would presumably rule out the possibility of hidden chambers for extra missiles. The launchers that would be used are million-pound vehicles that would only be assembled at the deployment site and the trench would be openable in as little as two hours in that enough of the section can be removed to guarantee that no more than one missile is inside it. He then remarked, however, that given the President’s and Secretary Vance’s perceptions, it looked like we would have to stay with an open trench although it would not be as good. The open trench would require large amounts of land to be fenced off and might have more impact on the environment, and it might not be as good militarily either. (TS)

Secretary Vance then remarked that the Soviets might want to do the same thing. Secretary Brown responded that this question had been discussed before and that the real issue was whether we were deploying an unverifiable system. (TS)

Frank Press commented that going to the open trench concept will lead to closing off 3–4000 sq. mi. of area that is currently open to public use. Secretary Brown responded that only the area immediately around each trench would have to be fenced off. (TS)

The President then remarked that the capability to cover the trench is okay in his view, but that he would not want to try to explain the covered trench concept in Vienna. He then remarked that if we proceed with the largest M–X missile allowed under SALT and the cruise missile improvements as well, we will be in a good position to expand our forces if SALT breaks down. He also noted that at this point he really didn’t know how many TRIDENTs we might ultimately need, or if the TRIDENT II missile would be needed. Finally the President remarked that the $75–80B figures that Harold Brown is citing in the memo he forwarded are going to come as a big shock to the public and Congress since so far we have only been talking about numbers like $25B. (TS)

Secretary Brown responded that the figures we are giving are the acquisition costs for a number of systems that will be purchased over a number of years. He suggested that perhaps it would be better to think about strategic costs in year-by-year terms and wondered if we wouldn’t have a different attitude towards our domestic programs if their costs were presented in terms of sums for a large number of years. He then presented figures comparing the costs of the systems being proposed today to those of the corresponding submarine and land-based missile systems we built in the ’60s. These comparisons showed that those original systems would be quite expensive in ’80 dollars and that the strategic modernization effort we made in the late ’50s and early ’60s was really massive. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we clearly cannot solve the whole problem today but perhaps some parts of the overall question can be resolved. The President responded that he would hate to see us give up land-based systems and that he agreed with the concerns that have been expressed in the memos that had been sent him that this would be a serious political blow. He stated that it would be worth a great deal of effort on our part to avoid such a setback. He also stated that over the years a mystique had built up about the M–X and that not going forward with it would also be a political blow. The question of exactly what kind of a force mix we might want is another issue and a very complex one that he is not ready to decide. The basing issue in particular is complex, and though he liked the open trench idea, he must analyze this concept further. He remarked that the environmental questions are going to be very tough and he cited a problem that had been related to him during the weekend with the opening of a single copper mine in Utah. He said that this mine had been blocked by the environmentalists by the expedient of having a series of people file suits against it over a long period of time. He said that he thought that the statements that had been made that the governor of Utah was for the M–X deployment were a little glib and that one could conclude that the problem was much bigger, if you consider the problems we have had in places like Michigan. The President stated that he was prepared to make preliminary decisions to maintain the Triad and proceed with the large M–X. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski asked if the President was saying that he was deciding against Option B though not among the various ways of realizing Option A, and that he was also deciding that there would be no common missile, at least as tentative decisions. The President said Yes, but that the question of the 190,000 lb missile versus the 170,000 lb missile isn’t completely closed. (TS)

Jim McIntyre then stated that he saw some technology and cost questions associated with the trench concepts. Secretary Brown responded that we know a great deal about the trench already and have developed some of the machinery required to build it, and have even built several segments. Jim McIntyre continued that he was uncomfortable about some of the costs being cited for the mix of systems being considered. He also saw the schedules that were cited as uncertain, and was also concerned that there might be serious environmental problems. (TS)

The President suggested that the entire basing issue would have to be discussed further and asked Zbig to schedule an evening meeting for this purpose. The President then remarked that we needed a fallback on the basing question if we are to hedge against the possibility that we run into insurmountable difficulties. However, for the moment, the decision to proceed with the M–X should be enough to keep us busy. He then remarked that we have serious problems in getting Congressional support for our defense spending and that the scare language that might be needed to gain another $5B in defense spending might work to reduce our confidence in ourselves by the equivalent of $20B in defense spending. (TS)

Secretary Brown commented that one fallback position would be to put M–X in silos. He thought however that moving MINUTEMAN around would be a real problem. The President responded that if you had 50–100 MINUTEMEN on trucks that would be something—but that he was not trying to dodge the issue with suggestions like this. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski, referring back to the question of perceptions, said that we must of course say that we are strong, but on the other hand, we can’t close our eyes to the possibilities six years from now. (TS)

The President responded that we have done all right in our approach to the Congress for defense funding. The Congress used to cut the defense budget by $5B automatically but in recent years the reasonably unified position that we have presented to the Hill had done all right. He said that he would hope that we can sell our solution to the MINUTEMAN vulnerability problem to the Hill without using scare tactics. The President remarked again that while the trends are against us, we are strong, and that we must solve the problem posed by perceptions that we are not. (TS)

Secretary Vance suggested that we attack the SALT critics head-on and as part of combatting these misperceptions. Jody Powell remarked that he thought the problem is an overall unease with our situation and that we need an honest and frank assessment of our problems. He said that if we don’t play it straight, “we will get our heads beat in.” Secretary Brown said that there are some very respectable people who believe that we may actually have too much military strength. (TS)

Finally the President closed the meeting with a request that the charts Dr. Brzezinski had used in his presentation be returned. He said that he hoped that they would not show up in Evans and Novak. (TS)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 2, NSC Meeting: #19 Held 6/4/79, 5–7/79. Top Secret. According to the Summary of Conclusions of the meeting, in attendance at the meeting, which took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House, were Carter, Mondale, Vance, Jones, McIntyre, Press, Utgoff, Brown, Duncan, Turner, Seignious, Brzezinski, Aaron, Jordan, and Powell. (Ibid.)
2. For the May 14 PRC meeting on the Consolidated Guidance, see Document 134.
3. See Document 31.
4. Reference is to Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “The Chiefs Knock SALT,” Washington Post, June 4, 1979, p. A27. In the article, Evans and Novak referred to a March 12 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Brown requesting that he send it to President Carter. The memorandum, dated March 16, is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Documnet 236. According to a June 12 memorandum from Ermarth to Brzezinski, “Harold apparently decided not to send the JCS memo. His office told me ‘not to worry; Harold is taking care of this by himself.”’ (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 54, SALT: 3/79)
5. See footnote 3, Document 140.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 189.