Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

142. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council¹

Washington, June 5, 1979, 6–8:24 p.m.

SUBJECT

• US Strategic Arms Policy and US Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President

• State

  • Cyrus Vance

• JCS

  • General David Jones

• OMB

  • James McIntyre

• OSTP

  • Frank Press

• NSC

  • Victor Utgoff

• OSD

  • Harold Brown
  • Charles Duncan Deputy Secretary
  • William Perry Under Secretary for Research and Engineering

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner

• ACDA

  • George Seignious

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron
  • Hamilton Jordan
  • Jody Powell

DETAILED MINUTES FROM THE NSC MEETING

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by noting that there were four items on the agenda: first, the choice of the missile, second, the question of basing mode (four concepts would be discussed), third, the question of verification, and finally, the conclusions and recommendations of the principals, including public relations aspects. (C)

Secretary Brown opened the question of missile size by describing the 190,000 lb. missile and stating that it was deployable in all of the ground deployment modes, though not in aircraft or in the Trident submarine. He stated that this missile was designed to carry 10 Mark–12A warheads, though, if necessary, it could probably be uploaded to as many as 12. He also argued that this missile was already designed whereas other possibilities such as the partly common missile or common missile would involve at least a one year delay. He noted, however, that the 190,000 lb. missile involved no common elements that would be usable in the Trident missile. Finally, he stated that the capability of this missile would be comparable to that of the SS–18. He then discussed the 110,000 lb. common missile, stating that this missile could carry 6 or 7 Mark–12As, or a mix of 4 Mark–12As plus 6 smaller Mark–4 RVs. He said that the effectiveness of the smaller RVs would be more sensitive to the accuracy achieved by the missile. (S)

The President asked if the common missile would be as accurate as the larger MX missile. Secretary Brown responded that this would depend upon whether we were thinking about the sea-based or the land-based deployment. At sea, the missile would certainly be less accurate, and in this case it would be hard to make the argument that its capabilities would be comparable to those of the SS–18. (C)

Secretary Vance asked what RV sizes were being considered. [1 line not declassified] (S)

Secretary Brown said that DOD had also looked at the 160,000 lb. partly common missile, and that he had come to the conclusion that this was probably the worst of both worlds. In particular, it would pose quite a management challenge to design a single missile for operation in both the Air Force and the Navy environments. (C)

Secretary Brown and General Jones responding to a question from the President, noted the differences in the two environments, and cited the fact that the Air Force employs missile designs that use a liquid fueled post-boost vehicle, while the Navy is not willing to use liquid fueled rockets aboard submarines for safety reasons. (C)

Secretary Brown noted that savings could probably be obtained, but they would be delayed until we actually decided to go forward with deployment of the Trident II missile. He said that he had actually been through a program to design a major piece of hardware for use by both the Air Force and the Navy, and that while such joint use programs were feasible, they were a great strain. (U)

General Jones noted that he would prefer a survivable MX missile to an SS–18 based in a silo. Secretary Brown replied that Jones had combined several questions here, and asked him how he would feel about the two missiles if they were both based in silos. General Jones responded that this would be a wash in his view—his point was that deployment of the large MX missile would defuse concerns about the Soviets’ large missile advantage. (C)

George Seignious commented that he thought it was extremely important that we take full advantage of the single ICBM exception that was allowed under SALT II, by deploying the largest missile permitted. (C)

Secretary Brown argued that many in the Congress want the largest allowable missile, and that he also prefers the 192,000 lb. MX, although he was not convinced of this several months ago. (C)

The President asked if there were any contrary opinions. (U)

Frank Press responded that he supports Secretary Brown’s preference for the larger missile, but he went on to note that we would have greater flexibility in going to alternative deployment modes if we deployed a somewhat smaller missile. (C)

Stan Turner then raised a concern he had about the possibility that the Soviets might want to keep our land-based missile force vulnerable and thus might try to stay ahead of our effort to deploy more aimpoints than they could attack. [3 lines not declassified] He noted that while we might be able to achieve our aims if the Soviets remain within the limits of SALT, if their desire to keep us vulnerable were strong enough, this might make them unwilling to agree to any future SALT limits. (S)

The President asked Admiral Turner what sort of a solution he would suggest to such a problem. Admiral Turner responded that we should go to a more flexible missile, and place more emphasis on our SLBM and bomber forces. (C)

Secretary Vance asked Admiral Turner if he would still want to go to a smaller missile if our SLBM force and our bomber force were already much stronger. Admiral Turner responded that he would still like to see more flexibility. Frank Press added that flexibility is particularly important if we run into obstacles in our pursuit of a survivable land basing system. (C)

Secretary Brown noted that the large missile would be deployable in the small submergibles that had been suggested by Frank Press’ panel. He further noted that while the large MX missile would not go in the Trident submarine, we might end up building only ten of these submarines and thus these boats might be only a minor part of our SLBM force. He remarked that he was reluctant for that matter to depend too much on SLBMs. He also noted that if we did not pursue a survivable land-based missile system, this almost implies an invitation to the Soviets to concentrate on reducing the survivability of the other two strategic force components. He noted the diversity of problems that the Soviets would face in trying to find counters to some sort of a multiple aimpoint scheme as well as to our SLBM force. Finally, he remarked that given the large R&D efforts the Soviets were making, there was always the possibility of a technological breakthrough against one of our strategic force components. (S)

Stan Turner remarked that yesterday the President had criticized the principals for not presenting more information on the SALT impacts of the schemes they were discussing.² He noted that, in his view, staying in the land-based missile business may work to the disadvantage of our long term SALT interests. He remarked that if we got out of the land-based missile business, and then deployed the Trident II missile, which would be good enough to put Soviet land-based ICBMs at risk, this might push the Soviets toward adopting mobile survivable systems as well, and thus we would have created a very good situation in which neither side’s forces would be vulnerable. (S)

The President asked how many missiles the Soviets had deployed in silos. [1 line not declassified] (S)

Secretary Brown disputed Admiral Turner’s arguments by arguing that if the Soviets can concentrate on anti-submarine warfare, they might actually succeed in threatening the survivability of our SSBNs. He argued that maintaining a variety of survivable basing modes may pose such a challenge to Soviet interests in gaining counterforce capabilities as to encourage their acceptance of arms control. He also noted that by pursuing survivable basing modes for all our systems, we would be in a posture in which it would be easier for us to accept arms control reductions. He noted that with a fully survivable Triad we could probably reduce our forces by a factor of two or more. (S)

The President remarked that the main point of all these arguments seems to be that there is no flexibility if we proceed with 190,000 lb. missile. (C)

David Aaron asked if [less than one line not declassified] the Soviets can really outrace us [less than one line not declassified] Secretary Brown responded that calculations the Defense Department had done indicated that fractionation would be a losing proposition for the Soviets. He remarked that under current plans, a large margin of extra shelters would be built into the initial basing deployments. He also commented that even if the Soviets did choose to attack our forces, they would have to accept a very adverse exchange ratio in the process of destroying our forces. He went on to remark that if the Soviets choose to build more missiles in order to increase their capability to attack our land-based deployment, we would have to build more trenches or shelter arrays, but that calculations done within DOD suggest that the cost to the Soviets to jeopardize our basing deployment with more missiles would be approximately twice as large as the cost to us to maintain our survivability. (S)

Admiral Turner disagreed with Secretary Brown’s calculations, [2 lines not declassified] He also remarked that the Soviets may be willing to spend more money trying to overcome our efforts than we will be willing to match, even at an economic exchange ratio of 2 to 1. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that we will be better off politically if we build a survivable land based missile force, because it will be easier to increase our forces—moving to a dyad implies an inherently poor SALT bargaining position. (C)

The President suggested that we look at potential Soviet reactions to the various options. He said that his sense is that choice of the dyad will be interpreted as a yielding to them, a sign of weakness. In addition, if the Soviets aren’t interested in further SALT treaties, he would feel better with the MX ready for deployment, even if we had to put it in a basing mode that was not verifiable. He remarked that backing away from the Triad would be an error. He went on to say that he felt our objectives should be to arrange for a situation in which the easiest path for the Soviets would lead to a treaty and a strategic posture that would allow verification and be stable. He said that his guess is that the Soviets would respond best to a strong move on his part. He remarked that in his contacts with the Soviets, he had come to believe that they suffer from a sense of inferiority and that strategic equivalence with us may make them somewhat easier to deal with. Finally, he noted that they would be ahead in conventional forces for a long time. (TS)

General Jones remarked that one aspect of arms control that had struck him as having something of an Alice in Wonderland aspect was the fact that during the many years of negotiations we had been engaged in, the number of strategic weapons deployed had continually and rapidly risen. He remarked that in the past we had not wanted warhead limits perhaps because that was our only advantage, but that given the situation that was emerging now, such limits may be far more acceptable. He said that he would like to see warhead limits in SALT III, and that such limits would be far easier to accept with a fully survivable Triad than with the augmented Dyad. [2 lines not declassified] He also remarked that the augmented dyad would lead to increased pressure on our ALCM carrier—first, because we will be depending more upon that force, and second because the Soviets will be able to better concentrate their efforts against it. He said that we would probably need a hardened cruise missile carrier that will have many of the characteristics of the B–1, but that our need for this aircraft will be somewhat less under the Triad options than under the dyad. He also remarked that he wouldn’t recommend the airmobile approach because of the C3I problems it would pose, and the reduced accuracy that would result with an airborne missile system. Finally, he remarked that he did not like the fact that the dyad option would require us to use a smaller missile. (TS)

Secretary Brown noted that the survivable Triad options did not require us to make a decision on ultimate force size until 1985. Secretary Vance asked why, and Secretary Brown responded by noting that IOCs of the systems we would be pursuing under this option came slightly after 1985. He went on to note that with this option, the survivability of our land-based missile force could be made independent of the number of missiles deployed in it. (C)

The President asked if it was true that we were deploying three additional RVs every day. He was told that we were deploying more like one a day (this was later corrected to approximately one a week). The President noted that some of the anti-war literature he had seen had made the statement about three. It was also noted that the Soviets are currently deploying approximately 5 RVs each day. (S)

Secretary Vance asked if warhead proliferation wasn’t mostly a matter of ALCM deployments. Secretary Brown reviewed some of the numbers involved, and drew the conclusion that the options that were being discussed involved deployments of comparable numbers of ALCM and missile warheads. (C)

The President asked what the maximum allowable range of the ALCM was, and was told that it was intercontinental. He remarked that this suggested that additional cruise missile deployments might provide a good response to a Soviet breakout, but he wondered where we would find targets for all of the additional warheads. (S)

Frank Press remarked that if we can find a way to build a survivable Triad that is secure, verifiable, and feasible, it would be the best idea. The President remarked that the question was whether or not there existed a land-based deployment scheme with these three characteristics. He added that it is obvious that the point of the small missile is that it really keeps the dyad option open. (C)

Secretary Brown noted that we should look at ways to get the 190,000 lb. missile to sea. Bill Perry commented that we have put $40M for Trident II into the ’81 budget. Secretary Brown remarked that perhaps the best policy would be to push both Trident II and the large MX for a year. (C)

Frank Press suggested that we pursue the idea of putting Minuteman on trucks as an interim measure, while pushing forward with the large MX missile and looking at alternative ways to deploy it. Secretary Brown commented that he has examined the truck idea in some detail and it doesn’t look practical to him. Bill Perry added that 200 Minuteman IIIs can be deployed on trucks within three years for approximately $3B. Secretary Brown responded that such a deployment would be easily destroyed by the Soviets if we didn’t get sufficient strategic warning. Bill Perry remarked that Minuteman III deployed on trucks would have considerably higher survivability than they would have in silos, if ten hours of strategic warning were available. (C)

David Aaron said that it was important to note the long period of ICBM vulnerability that we were going to face. He said that the Congress will say that if we can live with this period of vulnerability for awhile, why can’t we live with it forever. He suggested that we should look at the Minuteman on trucks idea in light of this question—in other words, it may be a suitable, short term fix to our problems. Secretary Brown said that he thought other alternatives should be looked at for dealing with the period of vulnerability, and that he had some better alternatives. (S)

The President asked how long will it be until we had deployed the first ALCMs on B–52s. Bill Perry answered that the first deployment will take place in 1981, but that we will not have a complete squadron of B–52s with ALCMs until 1982. Dr. Brzezinski remarked that pushing the B–52/ALCM program somewhat harder might represent a good interim fix to the early ’80s problem. (S)

David Aaron remarked that simply assuming the Soviets will make every effort to stay ahead of us may not be reasonable in the light of history. He noted that they were ahead in the ABM area, but that once we demonstrated our willingness to compete, a process began which resulted in the ABM treaty. (C)

Secretary Brown remarked that this outcome probably resulted from Soviet fears that we would deploy a better system. He went on to note that the only thing the Soviets would probably feel comfortable with is the complete vulnerability of all our strategic forces, a situation we should certainly not cooperate in arranging. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that the Soviets would be most worried if we proceeded with the dyad option, because this option would involve the largest expansion of our forces, and would pose the greatest threat to them. (C)

Jim McIntyre said that he wanted to go on record that OMB supported the 190,000 lb. MX missile, despite its larger cost, because of the political and technical problems that would be involved in proceeding with the smaller missile. (C)

The President asked if anyone knew how much money might be saved with smaller missile. (jocularly) Bill Perry responded that $2–3B might be saved, if one assumed that the alternative would be to proceed with both missiles. (C)

Secretary Vance commented that in his view the 192,000 lb. missile was politically the best choice and would provide the best bargaining position with the Soviets. He disagreed with Stan Turner’s arguments that the Soviets might try to stay ahead of our efforts to achieve a survivable land-based deployment. (S)

The President said that Stan is apparently saying that proceeding with the Triad option would lead to a larger Soviet threat—Stan responded that that was not quite his point. (C)

The President said the problem he saw with Stan’s calculations was that they placed too much emphasis on our current vulnerability. The President argued that it would be better to show the Soviets that we are resolved not to accept their attempts to make us vulnerable, and that if we do so, they will respond better than Stan is suggesting. (S)

Secretary Vance again stated that he likes our position better if we proceed with the survivable triad option. (C)

David Aaron remarked that the Soviets might simply want to match our numbers of warheads in which case proceeding with the dyad option will pose the larger problem for our arms control interests. (C)

George Seignious noted that going to the large numbers of warheads provided by the dyad option creates a situation that would place maximum stress on our verification capabilities. This is because the Soviets will be more motivated to proceed with mobile systems, and they may elect to proceed with SS–16 type systems which are particularly difficult to verify. (TS)

The President then noted that he’s not prepared to decide this issue now. He must first understand better the possibilities for achieving a survivable land-based deployment mode. (U)

Bill Perry began the discussion of ground-based deployment modes by describing the track mobile system in the covered trench. He said that he believes that this is the best system because it has two modes of survival, its position is normally hidden, and it can randomize its position in a very short period of time if desired. He said that this system was designed to deploy missiles on large trailer erector launcher systems that would be the size of railroad locomotives, and would be capable of moving at maximum speeds of approximately 30 knots. He said that the system was designed to enhance two features: verifiability and survivability. (C)

Dr. Perry went on to describe two classes of mobile deployment modes. The first, which he called “full-mobile systems”, included the road mobile, the air mobile, and the submarine mobile deployment modes. He said that these systems are soft and that they achieve their survivability by hiding in very large deployment areas. The other class of mobile systems which he referred to as “confined-mobile systems” included multiple silos, the track mobile system, and the horizontal MPS system. He pointed out that these systems are deployed in a very limited area, and are therefore required to be very hard. He went on to compare the verification difficulties encountered with each of these systems. He said that the confined-mobile systems were an advantage for verification in that one knew where to look for them, though seeing the missiles in these systems required opening them up for verification. He then remarked that the full-mobile systems can pose trickier verification questions—and that submarine launchers are verifiable only because they are so large that they can be easily seen during construction and when in port. (C)

The President then asked if B–52s are required to be visible under the SALT II agreement. He was told that there are no such constraints, and that these systems are often under cover—they are monitored as they were built and deployed, and through the use of COMINT. The President noted that this was an interesting point, and then asked what the problem was with the covers that had been placed over the Minuteman silos. Secretary Brown answered that the basis of the Soviet objection was that these covers might be hiding a change in the size of the silo. (TS)

Dr. Perry continued his explanation of verification problems by noting that the problem with the vertical MPS system is that the launcher is very small and difficult to see into, thus raising suspicions that there might be a missile in every silo. He contrasted this system with the track mobile system by pointing out that track mobile would use a very large locomotive type launcher that is easy to count. (S)

Frank Press remarked that we could still hide extra missiles in the trench. Bill Perry responded that the current SALT limits are not based on limiting missiles, but rather on limiting launchers, and that the trailer erector launchers used in the trench system are too large to allow extra ones to be hidden. Frank Press responded that a single TEL could nonetheless launch extra missiles. Bill Perry agreed but said that the same thing was true for silos. (C)

The President then asked about the MPS system using horizontal shelters. He asked if we could deploy 200 missiles in such a system, on the surface, and completely within DOD land. Secretary Brown responded yes. The President said that he hadn’t heard of this system before, and went on to note that, provided we had hard points within which to hide the missiles, it would seem that the need to have a trench would be smaller, which should lead to smaller environmental problems. (C)

David Aaron pointed out that there are two basic possibilities for systems that rotate missiles among a large number of shelters—we can proceed with systems that use very fast transporters, allowing very rapid rotation between shelters, or go with systems that use slow transporters in which case there might be a requirement for decoys to help hide the movements of our missiles. (U)

The President commented that while he now sees the problems with covered trenches as somewhat smaller than he had before, nonetheless it looks like a surface system would be more acceptable for environmental reasons. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that for safety reasons it might still be necessary to fence off the roads or rails connecting the shelters. It was noted that while railroad tracks aren’t generally fenced off today, we might have a tough time introducing a railroad system into the country now, given current concerns about environmental impact. (U)

General Jones noted that the track mobile concept being considered does not involve putting the entire system on military bases. The President asked why not—to which Jones responded that there aren’t that many large military bases, and the cost for such a system would be very much larger if it had to be broken into numerous small deployments. The President asked why it was necessary to have 20 miles of track for each missile. He was told that approximately 40 shelters would be needed for each missile, and that they could not be spaced closer together than approximately a half a mile, given yields of current Soviet warheads. The idea is to ensure that a single warhead will not destroy on the average more than one shelter. (C)

Frank Press noted that there was not enough area on military bases to allow for deployment of the 3–4,000 square mile system envisioned. Secretary Brown responded that the suitable bases could provide approximately one-third of the total area required. He also noted that it would not be a good idea to go to a substantially smaller deployment because the purpose was to reach deployment levels that would discourage the sort of scenario that Admiral Turner had described. (C)

Bill Perry noted that if we made the planned deployment, we could create a situation in which the Soviets would have to use up all of their ICBMs in order to destroy our ICBMs—this would leave our bomber and SLBM forces facing the corresponding forces on their side, a situation that they certainly wouldn’t like. Thus, they would be deterred from making such an attack in the first place. (S)

In response to Secretary Brown’s request for a discussion of the open trench, Bill Perry said that they were looking at the possibility of putting an open trench system in Nevada and Utah. The President interjected that he thought that pursuing such a system was a pipe dream and that the environmentalists would simply never let it happen. Bill Perry responded that the governors of these states had been asked about the acceptability of an MPS system with 4–5,000 shelters and point security. Such a system would involve fencing off 4–5,000 small areas of about four acres apiece, and the governors had said it would be acceptable. Perry noted that the covered trench system he had in mind would result in the same sort of situation. A fairly large number of small areas fenced off, but the bulk of the deployment area open for public use. (C)

The President said that you are coming close to convincing me. He then asked: if the Soviets were to do the same thing, what would we want them to do for us to allow for adequate verification. (U)

Dr. Perry said that he would ask for two things: first, he would want them to use a large enough transporter system so that there was little possibility that it could roam freely outside the nominal deployment area; second, he would want the Soviets to open their trench system every several months to allow for verification. (At this point there were a number of joking comments about the possibility of allowing the Soviets to walk through a U.S. trench system or having a JCS representative walk through Soviet trenches.) Bill Perry continued there were three possibilities for connecting our shelters. We could leave the connectors completely open, we could close them with some sort of heavy structure, or we might use some sort of effectively transparent covers. Of the three, Dr. Perry felt that only the open trench was a non-starter because it would restrict so much land from public use. He said that he had very high confidence that we could get the covered trench accepted by the people of the states where we would hope to deploy it, certainly by their governors. (C)

The President asked if it wouldn’t be possible to use an arrangement of shelters and connectors like spokes, radiating from a hub. He wondered if such an arrangement might reduce land requirements. He was told that the constraints of the rough topography in Nevada and Utah implied that the spoke arrangement would require more land rather than less. (C)

Frank Press asked Stan Turner for his view on the verifiability of the trench concept. Admiral Turner responded that the concept had evolved fairly rapidly, and that he had not yet had time to carry out a thorough study of its verifiability. He said that he expected that it would be more verifiable than the vertical MPS system. He went on to note, however, that our arms control efforts will eventually require cooperative measures and on-site inspection. He suggested that the verification requirements of the systems being considered now might actually be a good thing, in that they might motivate us to seek improved verification arrangements in the near term rather than putting it off. (S)

Dr. Perry noted that the trench system might lend itself to verification through the use of various types of black boxes which could provide electronic verification information to the other side. (S)

Secretary Vance remarked that even aside from the verification problems, anything but an open trench or one covered with transparent plastic would generate complaints from the Soviets. David Aaron expressed skepticism about proceeding with any system if it required on-site inspection, cooperative measures or other special procedures that might have to be negotiated. (S)

John White remarked that it’s important to understand the need for the dash requirement—he was told that it simply reduces the need for location security. (U)

Frank Press noted that a system of this type, with interconnecting roads or rails on the surface, might be particularly susceptible to attacks designed to reduce the system’s mobility. The movements of the transporters might be observed, and their positions reported back after their mobility had been lost. (S)

Secretary Brown said that most of these questions are probably resolvable in several weeks, but he asked whether we don’t already know enough to be able to choose to go ahead with some sort of ground system. If we can choose, then we can get started on a missile. (C)

Jim McIntyre remarked that there are a great number of uncertainties to be resolved. (C)

The President remarked that he has no doubts that we should proceed with a large MX missile, but that we must look more to the question of which land-based system to deploy. He noted that we will face a massive outcry which could delay its deployment, at least outside DOD land. (C)

The Vice President then began a discussion of some of the political problems involved with this decision. He said that we may wish to look at the possibility of legislation similar to that used to overcome environmental opposition to the Alaska Pipeline. He also noted that we are going to be in a touchy position on the Hill. If we make a very specific choice on the MX, we may lose some pro-SALT II votes. If on the other hand we make no choice at all, we will raise concerns that we are not maintaining an adequate strategic balance which will also reduce support for SALT. He suggested that the best policy may be to identify with the 190,000 lb. MX missile, yet stay in a reasonably flexible position with respect to basing mode. He noted that Senator Jackson would take anyone’s help in beating SALT, and that he might be very ready to suggest an MX deployment for every state. (C)

Secretary Vance said that he agreed with much of the Vice President’s argument, but he felt that we should definitely eliminate the MPS system. The President said that the appropriate thing to do would be to say that we are going to proceed with a verifiable land-based system, and that this approach would enhance stability and eliminate the Soviet counterforce advantage, and that it would also enhance the possibility of deep cuts later on. (C)

Secretary Vance asked how this would solve the MPS problem. The President noted he’d been against MPS on verification grounds all along, and that MPS was simply not verifiable. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that the President’s posture should have three elements: (1) that we were going to proceed with a verifiable land-based deployment mode, (2) that we were going to proceed with the largest missile allowed under the SALT II agreement, and (3) that we would resolve the question of exactly which basing mode we would use within several weeks. He suggested that it might be useful not to preclude MPS before the Summit—it might be possible to trade MPS for some sort of a concession from the Soviets. He noted that MPS can be eliminated as something desirable for us on a number of grounds. He went on to suggest that the President surface this posture with Senator Nunn, and that the Vice President talk to those on the other end of the political spectrum about this posture being necessary for SALT III. (C)

Secretary Vance said that he really disagreed with the idea that you can simply gut it through on the MPS issue. He said he wasn’t sweating the possibility of leaving this system in play for another seven days, but that going much longer would be a mistake. Secretary Brown commented that if we hold off until after the Summit to eliminate the vertical MPS system, we risk accusations that we gave the system away. (S)

Frank Press said that we would not know that much more in several weeks, and wondered if we wouldn’t be better off by proceeding with the idea of Minuteman III on trucks which would buy us enough time for a more careful study of the basing mode question. Secretary Brown responded that this would be seen as simply waffling the issue. (C)

The President said that unless unforeseen circumstances arise, he proposes to go ahead with the full size MX. He said, however, that he wanted to reveal his decision in his own way, and that he would like for the people in the room to concentrate on how to present the decision to the Soviets, and to the public. He said that he would like them to evolve the best possible approach to briefing the Senate, and that he wanted to brief all kinds of Senators—that he was not interested in separating them into different groups. Thus he must understand the arguments that would appeal to both sides. He gave several straightforward examples of the sorts of arguments that might be used, and noted that we would have to decide what to tell the Soviets if anything, and that it would be very important to make a strong presentation of this decision. Finally, he remarked that he feels at ease with the decision to go ahead with a full size MX in the land-based mode. In response to Dr. Brzezinski’s suggestions, the President instructed everyone not to brief anyone outside this room on this decision. However, the President went on to say he wants the republic to know of this decision before the Summit. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said that it was important to announce this decision soon, and suggested that it should be done before the end of the week. There were several comments to the effect that the decision should be announced before there was much chance of its leaking to the press. Dr. Brzezinski continued that the announcement should not be too close to the Summit, where it may seem heavy handed. (There were a number of jocular remarks about the possibility of combining the announcement with announcements on Rhodesia and health care, and perhaps having the MX decision announced by Secretary Califano.) Dr. Brzezinski asked those assembled to send in their contributions on how to present the decision. He told the President he would try to have a package assembled by the next evening. (C)

The President said that we should list all the points bearing on the decision and base all our arguments on hard facts. He also said that he would need a specific plan on how to approach the Senate. The President also asked if any of the principals would have to seek help in making the preparations he had requested—help from people or subordinates not currently in the room—the principals all said no. (U)

Secretary Brown asked how we were going to approach resolution of the basing issue. The President responded that it would have to be resolved before the SALT vote. Secretary Brown answered: perhaps even earlier, perhaps before the debate. The President commented that it will help to know the reactions of some of the more influential Senators, such as Nunn, Culver, and Glenn. (C)

General Jones noted that while he needn’t tell any one about this decision, he would like to be able to tell his colleagues before any Senators became aware of the decision, and he was told that this would be possible. (U)

Jody Powell asked if the President’s decision should be considered tentative, pending receipt of the material that he had requested. The President agreed and the meeting was adjourned. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 2, NSC Meeting: #19 Held 6/4/79, 5–7/79. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The date on the original, June 4, from 3 until 4:20 p.m., is incorrect. A handwritten note on the first page of the minutes reads: “Note: These notes are from evening portion of June 4–5 meeting (3:00–4:20 was only 1st portion.” The meeting actually took place June 5 from 6 p.m. until 8:24 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)
2. See Document 141.