121. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

SUBJECT

  • Ground Mobile M-X (U)

Harold has responded (Tab A) to your questions of last week regarding the study of ground mobile basing systems for an M–X missile.2 In reading the memo you might note the following points:

First, the road mobile system that the study team seems to favor carries an “M–X” missile that is about the size of the Minuteman III missile. While its more energetic fuel allows it to throw more RVs over [Page 565] a longer range than Minuteman III, it has about half the throw weight of the larger M–X variants that the Air Force wants. (S)

Second, the memo gives no indication that DOD is giving the issue of strategic surprise more than superficial treatment. For example, in order to deny us strategic warning the Soviets might have to leave themselves so much more vulnerable to our retaliatory strike as to more than offset the extra counterforce effectiveness they might gain. I will ask Harold to look into this issue carefully. (S)

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter3

SUBJECT

  • Ground Missile M–X (U)

(U) You asked for a status report on Ground Mobile M–X. We have had a team restudying this problem the past few months in parallel with our study of Air Mobile M–X. Both studies were under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. The Ground Mobile team consisted of senior personnel from the Air Force Office of System Analysis and two contractors (Boeing and Martin). All of them have had extensive experience in missiles and their basing systems (the Air Force team leader was the same officer who led our design team on GLCM basing). Their study is essentially finished and will be ready for review, along with the Air Mobile report, in a week or two.

(U) The study has considered two different types of ground mobile systems—road mobile and off-road mobile. Preliminary findings on each of these follow:

Road Mobile:

(S) The missile would be carried on a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) which would weigh (including the missile) about 200,000 pounds (limited by the load-carrying capability of the interstate system). [3 lines not declassified]

[Page 566]

(S) The system would be based in the southern part of the U.S. where weather problems would be minimal. Each of the bases would have security appropriate for the protection of nuclear weapons on day-to-day alert. The TELs would be kept in the open at known locations to facilitate verification. On the receipt of strategic warning, the TELs would go out on public roads at maximum speed until they were so widely dispersed that they could not be successfully barraged.

(S) The baseline system would have 250 TELs and missiles and 1250 warheads. We estimate the acquisition cost at about $16B (in FY 78 dollars) which is about $5B less than MPS. Annual O&S costs would be about $0.5B, about $0.1B more than MPS.

For a postulated attack of 70% of the Soviet ICBM RVs (the same threat we used for MPS and Air Mobile calculation),

a)
None of the systems survive a surprise attack, even with a full 30 minutes of tactical warning;
b)
With 1 hour of “strategic” warning, none survive;
c)
50% of the systems survive an attack for which we have 4 hours of strategic warning;
d)
80% of the systems (1000 RVs) survive an attack for which we have 6 hours of strategic warning.

(S) To achieve a degree of survivability against a surprise attack it is necessary to maintain some percentage of the systems dispersed on the highways. The difficulty with peacetime dispersal is the public interface problems created by moving nuclear missiles about on public highways and the possibility of an accident. We will continue to examine the legal and environmental aspects of such a peacetime dispersal.

Off-Road Mobile:

(S) In the off-road mobile concept, the missile achieves its survivability by being moved about on its TEL at frequent intervals. To avoid public interface problems, its movement during peacetime is limited to Defense Department bases in the southwest (Yuma Bomber Range, Nellis Air Base, e.g.). Because of the possibility of barraging this limited area, the TEL would have to be very hard [less than 1 line not declassified] and therefore very heavy (on the order of 1,000,000 pounds), and expensive. If confined to DOD land, such a system would be able to provide the equivalent of 1,000 to 2,000 independent aim-points for Soviet 1 MT warheads.

(U) Further consideration and detail will be included in my presentation of ICBM rebasing options to you following a PRC on the subject later this month.

Harold Brown
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 3–4/79. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.
  2. See Document 117.
  3. Secret. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum.