Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

120. Memorandum From Charles Stebbins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 10, 1979

SUBJECT

• The President as Commander-in-Chief (U)

I have listed some substantive and cosmetic actions at the Tab that the President could take to enhance the public’s perception of him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and to reverse what I sense to be a growing alienation of the military community from him. (C/S)

Certainly, the President’s decisions on Vietnam amnesty, B–1, Defense veto, military pay cap, etc., have been controversial, and he faces some similarly difficult decisions in the near future (SALT, CTB, M–X, the military retirement system, etc.); but I do not believe that the inevitable consequences of such decisions need be a lessened leadership image and an alienated military community. (C/S)

Rather, I believe that the perception of the President as Commander-in-Chief can be improved perhaps substantially by our making his already considerable contacts and involvements with the military more visible to the public, and by increasing their number and scope. (C/S)

I also believe that the President can reverse the alienation process by being sensitive to the special psychological needs of the military community in making its members feel that as their Commander, the President regards them with “special” affection and not just as another category of “federal government employees.” Very simply, these people—who endure the hardships of life in missile silos, submarines and remote locations away from families—believe they are indeed “special” and that their peacetime sacrifices deserve public recognition and appreciation no less than their wartime sacrifices. I feel that some additional and carefully considered bows in this direction by the President could produce dramatic results. (C/S)

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council²

Washington, undated

SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS

• Deliver a major, nationwide address on the importance of the Armed Forces and of their special relationship with the President. Put Vietnam behind us by eliminating the “second-class citizen” stigma that has been attached to the military since that conflict. Recognize the wartime and peacetime sacrifices of the military community, with a special bow to the families of the KIAs/MIAs (who are still regarded with considerable reverence in the military community). Recognize also the special demands placed on the Services as a result of our more complex two-tracked approach to national security—arms plus arms control. (Suggest: Memorial Day, Armed Forces Day, Veterans Day, or Vietnam Veterans Week.)

• Continue the above theme in every subsequent major address (where feasible), including State of the Union message.

• Deliver a major, nationwide address on SALT TWO, explaining: the hard choices that were made and why they were the right ones; that we are committed to essential equivalence; and that JCS advice played a prominent role in making these choices. Announce the M–X decision or expand on it. (Suggest: the AF Academy Commencement Ceremony.)

• Announce “quality of life” decisions (e.g., the military retirement policy, Ethics law, pay caps, selective service decisions, etc.) at the opening of press conferences or in other fora with nationwide audiences. If the decision will be unpopular in the military community, announce it as the Commander-in-Chief expecting his subordinates to rally to the decision.

• When traveling, attempt to visit an important military installation enroute or near the destination, with appropriate pomp and publicity. Where possible, inspect facilities and talk to enlisted personnel. Attend important missile, aircraft or ship launchings (or significant tests).

• After the fact, publicize any direct Presidential involvement in military exercises or crises (e.g. Yemen), to demonstrate a readiness and determination to take actions as Commander-in-Chief when necessary.

• Meet with the JCS perhaps once a year away from the White House to discuss their view of the state of the world. Invite the JCS to important state dinners, and dine with the JCS, the CINCs and their wives once each year. Meet the JCS and their Operations Deputies in the Pentagon nerve center (the “Tank”) perhaps once a year, focusing on readiness and leadership instead of programs and management—which absorb the bulk of the JCS/Presidential discussions. Announce and publicize each meeting with the JCS—wherever held and on whatever subject.

• Host a Q and A session with the senior enlisted members of the Services (each Service has one member so designated) to hear the views of the people at the bottom of the pyramid.

• Improve liaison between the President and the Services/JCS in administrative, morale and welfare matters, by appointing a senior military office to serve as Deputy Military Assistant to the President. (in Marty Beaman’s office).

• Attend Service Academy football games and one of their commencement exercises each year.

• Establish a Presidential-level program to reward military achievement or excellence, akin to the Medal of Freedom program.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 59, Administration’s Policy: General: 1–7/79. Confidential; Sensitive. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote “good, ZB” in the upper right corner of the memorandum.
2. Confidential; Sensitive.