122. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown1
Washington,
April 10,
1979
SUBJECT
- Strategic Warning (U)
Both the truck and the air mobile basing schemes you are now studying are dependent to some degree on strategic warning. Thus, it seems important that our debate on the basing mode be supported by a better understanding of the strategic warning issue. (S)
In thinking about this issue, the following questions seem relevant:
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- Can improvements of our strategic warning capabilities significantly reduce our worries about surprise attack? Are there significant motivations to make such improvements independent of the basing mode chosen for the M–X? (S)
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- In plausible nuclear attack scenarios, can the Soviets deny us strategic warning only by leaving extra vulnerabilities to our retaliatory attack that would more than offset the increased effectiveness of their initial attack? (S)
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- In assessing the public interface issue—what has been our experience concerning public reaction to military convoys in the US, or in Europe—especially movements of nuclear missile systems such as Honest John, Pershing? (S)
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- What can be done to minimize the political repercussions of dispersing the ground or air mobile systems? Can practical arrangements be made that will (1) give the authority to disperse to an official who can be insulated from the political repercussions of such decisions, and (2) guarantee him immediate access to all the potential strategic warning information? (S)
Zbigniew
Brzezinski
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 3–4/79. Secret.↩