Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

119. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation (Murray) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, April 9, 1979

SUBJECT

• PRC on the Consolidated Guidance

In a note to Charles on March 20th, you asked that I chair a working group in preparation for a PRC on the CG.² The group—consisting of Les Gelb, Randy Jayne, Dan Murphy, Walt Slocombe, Bill Smith, and Vic Utgoff—met for the first time on March 30th to hear suggestions for the PRC meeting agenda. Those suggestions are summarized in this memo. To the extent that you approve them, the working group will turn next to the preparation of suitable back-up material for the principals.

Fortunately, all members of the working group agree on the principal issue for discussion at the PRC meeting: the adequacy to the needs of national security of the forces and capabilities assumed in the CG.³

That is an issue that the CG was never really intended to address. Though adequacy is in no small way dependent on funding, the CG does not determine the fiscal guidance—it merely reports it. And since the CG is intended primarily to guide the preparation of the Service POMs, we labor to assure that its forces and capabilities are at least consistent with that (exogenously determined) fiscal guidance. But whether that funding—and the forces and capabilities that flow from it—is adequate to the needs of national security is quite another matter, and one the working group agrees is the biggest loose end of all concerning the CG.

Though no great surprise, the most consistent charge from the Services and Chiefs in their comments on the CG was one of inadequacy to the needs of national security. Our response to the effect that the CG was never intended to define “how much is enough”, though correct, begs the question. While the PRC alone cannot resolve the issue, it’s hard for us to imagine anything of higher priority for the agenda. In fact, discussions of lesser issues in the CG could well be idle so long as that basic issue remains unresolved.

A suggested agenda based around that central issue (and fleshed out below):

1. The Needs of National Security

A. The Basic PD–18 Criterion

B. Strategic Forces

C. NATO

D. Non-NATO

2. Affordability of Current Programs

A. Navy

B. Air Force

C. Army

3. Alternatives

As for 1A, PD–18 states that “the United States will maintain an overall balance of military power between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other at least as favorable as that that now (August 24, 1977) exists.”⁴ The PRC might want to address our performance in that regard during the intervening year and a half, and we can supply some background material to illuminate the issue. But it might also want to reconsider the policy itself, since it states only that the balance shall get no worse, but does not explicitly address the balance itself, or the possible need for a worldwide perception of a positive (rather than merely non-negative) first derivative of the balance function over time.⁵

As for 1B, we can furnish the principals with a great variety of both static and dynamic indicators of the strategic balance, both now and in the future, and with all sorts of alternative assumptions as to both US and Soviet programs. While all that is essential background material, the larger issue has to do less with our own mathematical calculations of that balance than with how others perceive it. Essential equivalence—which PD–18 adopts as a central policy—is largely, if not entirely, perceptual.⁶ The group believes that an evaluation of that perception and its likely trend for the future is a most important issue for the PRC. Subsidiary issues such as MX basing, targeting policy, etc., no matter how important in their own right, should not displace an evaluation of the adequacy of our programs to carry out the policy of essential equivalence.

As for IC, our announced policy is to have “the capability, in conjunction with (our) allies, to stop a Warsaw Pact attack with minimum loss of territory and ultimately to restore prewar boundaries.” The analyses in the CG give little if any reason for confidence in our ability to carry out that policy. However, at least as important an issue is whether the force balances we calculate are adequate to deter a Pact attack, quite apart from any consideration of restoring prewar boundaries. The judgement of the PRC on that issue would be important.⁷

A possible additional issue for consideration in connection with NATO is the allocation of forces to the flanks as distinct from the Central Front. We could lay out the opposing forces as an aid in making a judgement of this issue (which is of great importance to the Navy). However, we must guard against loading down the principals with so many subsidiary issues that they never arrive at the all-important central judgement as to adequacy in the aggregate. Much depends, of course, on how much time you believe will be available.⁸

1D on the agenda is a particularly difficult issue—whether our forces are adequate to handle non-NATO contingencies. We have reasonable confidence in our estimates of the military balance for Korea, but not for areas such as the Persian Gulf, where our analyses still have a ways to go, and where our understanding of the issues is nowhere near as developed as it is in our more traditional areas of interest. Yet, the issue cannot be ignored, and I would suggest that we do the best we can. One special point worthy of consideration by the PRC is the CG’s assumption—based on our estimated capability—that we will not have to cope with a mobilization or war in Europe sooner than 45 days after we start a deployment to the Persian Gulf.⁹ We can calculate the cost of being able to cope with greater degrees of simultaneity, but adequacy is a matter for PRC consideration.

Part 2 of the agenda deals with the general subject of affordability—whether the current programs will “fit” within the likely fiscal guidance.¹⁰ As you know, the CG addressed that issue directly in the case of tactical air and the case of amphibious assault forces. Since that time, we have seen some preliminary work by the OpNav staff on the affordability of the Navy as a whole, the results of which imply perhaps an even more serious problem than we understood. (Tom Hayward tells me he will be glad to make this analysis available to us, and enthusiastically endorses the idea of having it on the PRC agenda.) PA&E has continued to work on the affordability of USAF tactical air, and should be able to have something worthwhile by way of background material before the PRC. I am less confident in the case of the Army, but it does seem to me that the general problem of affordability—even with a real 3% annual growth—is liable to be serious, and that we may be faced with a declining force structure. If the analyses now being worked out substantiate that concern, there is no question in my mind but that the PRC principals should be made aware of it, and that it should be discussed in the context of adequacy.¹¹

The final part of the agenda would deal with alternatives, which seem to be:

• If necessary, alter the fiscal guidance to match the policies and objectives, or

• If necessary, alter the policies and objectives to match the fiscal guidance, or

• Try to influence our Allies’ actions (which would include the issue of our shared commitment to an annual 3% real growth in defense expenditures), or

• Some combination of the above, or

• Decide that the current situation is satisfactory, and do nothing.

While the group agrees that some rough indication of the quantitative aspects of these alternatives is important, there should be no attempt to turn this PRC meeting into a budget-setting exercise.¹² Rather, the emphasis should be on reaching a judgement as to the general adequacy of the forces and capabilities implied by the CG and, should they appear inadequate, a further judgment as to which alternatives should be pursued in more detail.

If you will give us your reaction to these suggestions, or others of your own, we’ll get busy on the back-up material. (Vic Utgoff tells me that Zbig would like a cut at this suggested agenda.)¹³

Russell Murray, 2nd
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Program Analysts and Evaluation

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 75. PRC 106, 5/15/79, DOD Consolidated Guidance. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Duncan. A stamped notation on the first page indicates that Brown saw the memorandum. In the upper right corner of the memorandum, Brown wrote: “4/10, RM II, Good, see my notes. HB.”
2. Reference is to Charles Stebbins of the NSC. Brown’s March 20 note was not found.
3. In the right margin next to this sentence, Brown wrote: “and is the Financial Guidance enough to fund it.”
4. The full text of PD–18 is printed as Document 31.
5. In the right margin next to this sentence, Brown drew a vertical line and wrote: “I agree—this is the most important issue—even if PRC can’t resolve it.”
6. In the right margin, Brown drew an arrow pointing to this sentence and wrote “largely, but not entirely.”
7. Brown drew a vertical line and put a check mark in the right margin next to this and the preceding sentence.
8. Brown wrote “This is one issue we ought to include” in the right margin next to this paragraph.
9. Brown drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this sentence and wrote: “worth asking for judgments.”
10. In the right margin next to this sentence, Brown wrote: “Should perhaps put another way: 1) are present pgms sufficient 2) can we afford present pgms within fiscal guidance.”
11. In the right margin, Brown drew an arrow pointing to the end of this paragraph and wrote: “I’d like to approach this differently: 1) what can we buy within present FG? 2) how well does that meet needs of national security, 3) with added funding increments, what added forces can be procured/maintained, 4) how do these add to security.”
12. Brown underlined the words “there should be no attempt to turn this PRC meeting into a budget-setting exercise,” drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this sentence, and wrote “very important.”
13. Brown drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this paragraph and wrote “OK—invite Vic to show it to Zbig with my comments.” In an April 11 memorandum from Utgoff to Brzezinski, Utgoff endorsed Murray’s agenda, noting that it was “reasonable provided the Working Group can develop good background information, and provided we can control it well enough to make it a respectable examination of the issues rather than simply an attempt to high pressure the White House into a larger DOD budget.” Bartholomew underlined the words “an attempt to high pressure the White House into a larger DOD budget,” wrote “*” next to this phrase, and wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “ZB: Murray’s memo is very good, but Harold’s comments on it are even better. His notes on page 3 on how the discussion of force and fiscal adequacy should be structured are right on—and the best way to head off the pressure Vic notes (* above) and to avoid putting the President in (too much of) a box. (Even though I think we should be spending more.) Reg.” Brzezinski indicated his approval of the agenda set out in Murray’s memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Russell, Box 117, Security Analysis Chron: #24–36, 4/79)