Your phone call this morning deeply saddened me. It revealed that for five
months and three weeks I have worked for you with so little communication
that I have wasted your time and mine, and it appears that no constructive
purpose has been served.
When you asked me to come on board for six months, the purpose was
specifically stated: “to get PRM 8 through
the bureaucracy in a way
[Page 830]
that
allows us to reconceptualize North-South relations”. That is what I have
been trying to do ever since the last day of January; that is why the Track
II group was eventually set up after the failure of the EPG effort; and that is why the PRM 8 before you now2 is
not a Roger
Hansen think-piece, but the very best I could squeeze out of
the bureaucracy after three months of hard work. It is still so “out-front”
that the Van Dyks’, the Bergstens’,
the Paul Boekers’, etc. are at work desperately trying to produce a deadlock
tomorrow.3
I finally thought that the best I could do for you was to start a process for
thinking about North-South relations, based on four major elements (p. 37–38
of PRM). That is what I hoped the PRC meeting would produce.
What follows is an attempt to set forward in less than five pages an overall
approach to North-South relations, followed by much more specific emphasis
on the “Carteresque” centerpiece, as I read the President’s instincts and
think about the domestic and international constraints with which he must
deal in proposing North-South initiatives.
Attachment
Paper Prepared by Roger
Hansen of the National Security Council
Staff4
A NORTH-SOUTH POLICY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION
A lengthy reconsideration of US policies toward the “Third World”
countries leads to the following conclusion:
I. Overall Scope
US North-South strategy should consist of four component parts, each
aimed at the accomplishment of a different set of US foreign policy
goals (with some overlap between them).
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1. Those changes in direction in what have in the
past been thought of as the central core of US policies vis-a-vis the
developing countries: trade liberalization; substantially increased
economic assistance; a system of global food reserves; and a
strengthening of such central financial institutions as the IMF and the World Bank. In these areas of
“traditional” North-South policy, the Administration has already made
important commitments which will be of considerable interest to the
so-called “middle tier” LDCs, neither the strongest nor the weakest. The
US goal in these policy arenas will be to keep Administration
commitments made already by defending them successfully before the
Congress and the American public. This job will be neither easy nor
glamorous, but nevertheless second only to a Basic Human Needs
initiative described below in importance to more constructive
North-South relations.
2. A second ingredient in an appropriate North-South strategy will entail
greater flexibility needed to deal with the problems and the opportunities
presented by the emergence of the so-called “upper-tier” of developing
countries. Some are financial powers, e.g., Saudi Arabia; some are
industrial powers, e.g., Brazil; some are rapidly becoming potential
military powers (at the regional level), e.g., Iran.
The United States must develop a set of policies and bilateral
relationships with such countries which will allow us to incorporate
such emerging local powers into all of our trilateral global systems of
consultation and management which are appropriate. A major element in
this set of policies will be greater flexibility in encouraging such
countries to become members of such organizations as the Group of Ten on
monetary affairs, particular working groups of the OECD of special interest to them,
etc.
This set of policies is of particular importance if we are to gain the
cooperation of these countries in the achievement of our policy goals in
such realms as human rights, non-proliferation, conventional arms sales,
and cooperation in such bodies as the UN, CIEC, and others where
they can sometimes act as a “bridge to the
South”.
3. The third element, far less specific yet terribly important as one
looks to the longer term, concerns a concentration on the need for
global reforms where more-than-incremental approaches may well be
necessary to deal effectively with “world order” problems over the
coming decade. The vision needed in the North-South area is similar to
the Presidential mandate given to the CEQ in his May 23 Environmental
Message.5 Clearly a strong case can be made for
systematically studying such linked issues as food production, health
facilities, popu
[Page 832]
lation growth,
and the fulfillment of basic human needs. If we do not begin to examine
these problems in their aggregate and in their linkages to one another,
we may well miss the opportunity to find “simultaneous” solutions which
detailed study of each issue in isolation will not produce.
4. Finally, and for reasons detailed below, the Administration should
make a major commitment to a Basic Human Needs (BHN) approach in its support of development progress
bilaterally, together with OECD
associates, and through such multilateral institutions as the World Bank
and the International Development Association. This initiative would be
of more benefit to the “lower tier” LDCs where the largest numbers of
the so-called “absolute poverty” population is to be found. In this
sense it would add balance to our entire package of North-South
policies. But it is recommended for far more important reasons detailed
in the next section.
II. An Initiative on Basic Human Needs:
Rationale
An initiative on a Basic Human Needs (BHN) approach should become the centerpiece of our
North-South strategy for the following reasons:
1. The time is right. Development economists
throughout the world, North and South, are stressing the fact that older
approaches to development have failed to spread the benefits of growth.
The result is that approximately one billion people within the LDCs
today are living in what is described as “absolute poverty” (as measured
by infant mortality, caloric intake, longevity, health and sanitary
facilities, etc.). Many economists are turning to the concept of the fulfillment of basic human needs by which they
mean assured levels of food, health and educational facilities, clean
water, etc. Measurements and definitions differ; all are beginning to
come together.
2. The US foreign policy setting is right. Given
the Administration’s emphasis on human rights, a new and added emphasis
on BHN would not only be a natural
complement but also an integral part of a global
stress on human rights. North and South have long feuded over
the divergent emphases in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the
North emphasizing personal, civil and political rights; the developing
countries, basic economic rights (needs). The US can take a major step
toward closing this “values gap” by embracing jointly the concepts of human rights and basic human needs,
and by proposing a major development program to see that the fulfillment
of basic human needs is achieved throughout the world by the end of the
century.
3. A BHN focus can help the North and
South to break out of the presently deadlocked “dialogue” last noted at
CIEC. It can provide a comprehensive framework in which general
North-South agreement can
[Page 833]
be
reached, which would then facilitate the solution of many other specific
political and economic problems between North and South. Although many
southern elite groups would initially oppose such a program, this
opposition is to be expected and not to be a cause of concern. Far
better than “fairness” among nation-states, a concept difficult to
defend philosophically or support empirically, “fairness” among people
in delivering to all a package of basic human
needs can be seen as the ultimate purpose of all other economic
policies, and a global norm to which all
countries can subscribe.
4. BHN is also an integrating concept
which has great potential for producing greater coherence and sense of
direction to the entire UN system in the
development field. Already the embryonic notion is beginning to provide
an integrating framework for mutually supporting efforts at increasing
food production (in FAO, the WFC, and IFAD); at developing integrated basic services to reach the
billion poorest people of the world (UNICEF, WHO, etc.); and at
formulating more sensible and integrated strategies of so called
“self-reliant” development (UNESCO,
UNIDO, ILO, etc.).
5. BHN could produce the same result for
the development efforts of the OECD
countries. That is, it could give the aid programs of the OECD countries a common purpose and a
shared methodology in approaching the problem of the world’s poorest people. It would not interfere with other
aspects of development assistance serving different goals (e.g.,
infrastructure projects in “middle tier” countries not related to BHN).
6. Finally, it could also become (and is already becoming) an organizing
principle within the international community’s International Financial
Institutions. Again it would infuse these heterogeneous agencies with a
common purpose, program, and methodology for approaching the problems of
the poorest.
III. Outline of a Specific Proposal on BHN
1. It has been very roughly estimated that a BHN program which would make available to the “absolute
poverty” population minimum acceptable diets, drinking water, sewage
facilities, minimum public health standards and basic education might
cost about $10 billion a year over a twenty year period (1975 dollars
and prices). If housing were included, the figure would rise somewhere
between $2–6 billion. (While the comparison is not relevant, it is still
somewhat unsettling to note that the estimated annual investment cost of
a BHN program is about 3% of annual
global defense spending.)
2. The United States, which has already requested that the OECD countries mount a serious study of
the BHN concept and the problem of
making it operational, should develop a set of proposals to provide a
[Page 834]
minimum of $10 billion
(1975 dollars) per year for the financing of a global BHN program. The money should be
contributed by the US, as many other OECD countries as we can engage in the effort, and by the
OPEC countries.
3. The program would need a great deal of technical work before it could
be presented in detail. Among the most difficult problems would be:
a) The raising of the minimum $10 billion per annum contribution. (Not
all would be “new” money. The DAC
countries now give close to $14 billion in assistance. The more of these
funds that were allocated toward a BHN
set of programs, the less “additionality” over present levels.)
b) The “conditionality” problem. Northern
countries would insist on oversight mechanism which assured that the
money was being spent on projects agreed upon. But the LDCs will resist
any overt “intervention”. Thus the problem; how to develop a new (or
old) mechanism which can receive the funds from the North and distribute
them to the South in accordance with agreed-upon ground-rules.
c) To work best, Southern countries must be assured that the funds will
be available for lengthy periods of years. So the North must be prepared
to pledge lengthy automatic commitments just as the South pledges to
undertake serious policy reforms to become eligible for the funds.
d) In sum, there is the difficulty of striking a major North-South
bargain, and of developing a mechanism to receive and allocate funds and
monitor expenditures. All of this could be done
bilaterally, but, far less effectively.
e) Finally, there is the problem of operationalization of such a program.
How much does one count on the market system? How much on administrative
decision? What kind of “delivery” systems will actually get food,
medical care, etc., to the target population?
4. In light of the international political, financial and institutional
issues, and the very technical issues about the mounting of a BHN program in any particular country, any
US proposal will need to be carefully constructed. Therefore, it is
urged that an inter-agency group be assembled immediately under the
chairmanship ofto develop the appropriate range of options for a major
US BHN initiative within the coming six
weeks.
