Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

37. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, April 19, 1977

SUBJECT

• Call to President Regarding Lipshutz Opposition to the IFI’s Bill

Zbig’s office tells me that he spoke to the President this morning about Bob Lipshutz’s opposition to the Humphrey approach to the IFI’s bill. The President said he would re-read Lipshutz’s memo. Zbig suggests that it is important for you to “weigh-in” with the President today, if possible.

Robert Lipshutz’s April 17 memorandum to the President (Tab 1)² sets forth a number of arguments which appear to favor Administration support for the Harkin Amendment. Apart from the substance, the timing of Lipshutz involvement presents important procedural and credibility problems. He began asking questions after the President’s press conference remarks endorsing the Humphrey approach (Tab 2).³ A reversal by the President on this issue would be harmful in his relationships on the Hill; the delay may already have been costly. On the substance, I am setting forth below a point-by-point rebuttal of Lipshutz’s arguments (using his paragraph numbers and letters).

1. Lipshutz suggests that opposition to Harkin might “undermine much of our credibility in our espousal of human rights as a fundamental cornerstone of our foreign policy.” This is erroneous because the reason for opposing Harkin is not that the Administration should moderate its position on human rights, but rather that the Harkin Amendment will prove weak and ineffective and thus will impede the Administration’s efforts to promote human rights.⁴ Lipshutz observes that a recent Brzezinski memorandum⁵ casts aspersion not only on the Harkin Amendment, but also on the Badillo, Humphrey, and Reuss Amendments, and deduces from this that Brzezinski would have us “give only lip service and diplomatic efforts” to human rights. Whatever Brzezinski’s position may have been, it was made quite clear in your memo to the President of April 15 that we enthusiastically favor the Humphrey language and also favor the second section of the Badillo Amendment⁶ (requiring the Secretaries of State and Treasury to initiate international consultations) (Tab 3).⁷ Thus, we are proposing far more than “lip service.”

2. (a) Lipshutz states that the Harkin Amendment permits us to retain a “clear definition of what constitutes a consistent pattern of deprivation of human rights.” To the extent that a “clear definition” is feasible, the Humphrey Amendment affords the same opportunity.⁸

2. (b) Lipshutz argues that the Harkin Amendment does not really tie our hands because it will be possible for us, before voting against a loan application, to ascertain through an established and fair procedure, the facts pertaining to human rights charges against a prospective borrower. This view rests on an unduly optimistic assumption about the speed and certainty with which facts may be gathered and determined. In any event, application of Harkin would require us to develop a “black list” which would have many undesirable overtones.⁹

2. (c) Lipshutz also argues that the “needy people”¹⁰ exception in the Harkin Amendment provides adequate flexibility, but it seems clear that the process of interpreting and applying that exception on a case by case basis would be difficult and time-consuming¹¹ and would be likely to lead to erratic results. For example, would money for completion of a factory producing construction materials (undertaken perhaps with prior IFI loans) come within the exception? Similarly, Lipshutz’s argument that Harkin does not rule out bilateral agreements or “Congressional-Presidential action” as to “important” matters suggests that Lipshutz himself sees the need to avoid the Harkin strait-jacket.

3. Lipshutz next selects a number of excerpts from the draft Treasury memo that was attached under Tab 4 of your memo of April 15¹² and argues that they represent “opinions” rather than “facts.” It should be noted that the Treasury memo was only a draft prepared hurriedly the day before your memo to the President and your memo did not vouch for all of the Treasury arguments. Nevertheless, I will comment briefly on Lipshutz’s points, in case the President raises them.

a. Lipshutz claims some inconsistency between arguing, on the one hand, that most loans will be approved over our veto and that “no” votes will eliminate negotiating flexibility and, on the other hand, that using our “voice and vote” for human rights as provided by the Humphrey language is, according to Brzezinski, “a major bargaining chip.” Perhaps Mr. Lipshutz sees some inconsistency between these arguments, but I certainly do not.

b. The Treasury paper contained a statement that most donor and recipient nations would view automatic “no” votes on human rights grounds as inconsistent with the IFI charter requirements that lending decisions should be made only on the basis of economic considerations. Lipshutz attacks this as proving too much, in that it would also prevent us from even using our voice and vote for human rights. It is not clear where the argument leaves Mr. Lipshutz since if in fact human rights considerations may not be taken into account, then it would avail us nothing to have the Harkin Amendment on the books.

c. Lipshutz then selects an excerpt from the Treasury paper and attacks it apparently solely on the grounds that the statement contains three conclusions stated as facts. He does not, however, challenge the validity of the conclusions, namely that Badillo would undermine the integrity of the IFI’s, would represent unilateral amendment of the bank charters, and would severely harm our policy interest in enhancing the role of the banks. While these arguments may have been somewhat overstated and could stand some fleshing out, I think they are basically sound.

d. Lipshutz then attacks the Treasury memo’s conclusions that a certain percentage (42 percent) of loans in FY–1976 would not have been approved by us had the Harkin Amendment been on the books. The Treasury paper also observed that Congress might reduce the appropriations to the IFI’s by an amount commensurate with the loans which we would vote against under Harkin. Lipshutz interprets these points as suggesting that the past practices of the banks are inviolate and that a reduction in the banks’ budgets is inconceivable. Again, Lipshutz is straining to make an argument that leads nowhere. It is not necessary to justify the past practices of the banks or to argue that their budgets ought not be reduced in order to decide the question presently on the table. That question is simply whether it makes any sense to adopt legislation which may have the effect of causing Congress to reduce by almost one-half the level of U.S. funding for the IFI’s.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 7, Memoranda to the Secretary—1977. No classification marking. Christopher did not initial the memorandum. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Vance saw it.
2. Attached; printed as Document 36.
3. Attached but not printed is an undated excerpt from the press conference, which took place on April 15. In response to a question regarding administration support for the Harkin amendment, the President asserted, “I think the Harkin amendment is a mistake. The Reuss amendment and the Senator Humphrey amendment, which are the same, provide me with an adequate authority to deal with the question of human rights as it relates to international and regional lending institutions. To have a frozen mandatory prohibition against our nation voting for any loan simply removes my ability to bargain with a foreign leader whom we think might be willing to ease off on the deprivation of human rights. But when the requirement is frozen into law, there is simply no reason for a foreign leader to try to comply. I think we need to have the flexibility that we proposed. My heart is with the Harkin amendment because I want to do everything I can to assure a maximum amount of human rights commitment around the world. But I think that to give us the authority within the lending institutions to use our best judgment and to negotiate for an easing off of human rights restraints before a loan is made is the best approach to it.” (Department of State Bulletin, May 9, 1977, pp. 458–459)
4. Vance underlined this sentence and placed a vertical line in the margin.
5. See Document 33.
6. Vance underlined a portion of the sentence beginning with the word “we” and ending with the word “Amendment.”
7. Attached; printed as Document 35.
8. Vance underlined the second clause of this sentence.
9. Vance underlined the remainder of the sentence beginning with the word “application” and ending with the word “overtones.”
10. Vance underlined the phrase “needy people.”
11. Vance underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with the word “seems” and ending with the phrase “time-consuming.”
12. See footnote 7, Document 35.