The attached memorandum (Tab A) fulfills your direction to produce a joint
NSC-Domestic Council-OSTP-Bourne proposal—except that Bourne’s people do not agree with it.
In sum, we made a good faith effort to produce a consensus proposal—but ended
up as far apart from Bourne’s office
as we were at the first meeting. Frankly, all of the rest of us who
participated in this effort (including Hormats, Hansen,
Huberman and Denend) were amazed at Jerry Fill. I am sure he has honest
convictions on this issue, but he has been totally unresponsive to our
efforts to reach consensus and move forward.
If you approve of this proposal, I would suggest that we draft a memorandum
to the President explaining what we have done and what we are proposing.
Specifically, we would want him to understand that under this plan, major
Presidential initiatives on this issue would be postponed until the PRM is completed—probably around the end of
the year.4
Tab A
Memorandum5
TOWARD A PRM ON WORLD FOOD
POLICY
I. The Mechanics of the Study
A. Process: We are agreed that the PRM process is appropriate for this
review. The strengths of the PRM
process are that it is a tested approach to problems which cut across
departments and agencies, and it is respected by the bureaucracy which
will delegate high-level attention to its preparation.
B. Participants: Every agency which will play a
significant role in the policy implementation should be included, but
every effort should be made to limit the participants to those who have
a legitimate interest. Suggested participants include:
Agencies
- State
- Treasury
- Commerce
- Agriculture
- Health, Education and Welfare
- Agency for International Development
- Central Intelligence Agency
- United States Representative to the United
Nations
- National Science Foundation
- National Institutes of Health
|
Executive Office of the President
- National Security Council
- Office of Management and Budget
- Domestic Policy Council
- Office of Science and Technology Policy
- Office of the Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations
- Office of the Special Assistant for Health (Bourne)
|
C. Chair: Since a committee cannot be successfully
run by a committee, the PRM would be
run under joint NSC-Domestic Policy
Council management with full participation by other Executive Office of
the President offices as appropriate.6
Serious problems have arisen in
[Page 693]
the past due to joint management arrangements and the consequent lack
of a single point man. There are strong reasons to strive for joint
domestic-international management but this may prove to be infeasible. A
more precise definition of who will do what can probably be arrived at
during the process of drafting the PRM
tasking memorandum.
D. Timeframe: There are several studies in
progress now which bear on this review, PRM–8 (end of July),7
AID (September 1), Brookings (October
15).8 The conclusions of these studies should be
digested before another is begun. Therefore, we would expect to issue
the PRM in late October for a study
requiring several months.
II. A Role for Chip Carter
A. Chip Carter, following his father’s initiative, is anxious to get
started and do something about world hunger. He will be a valuable asset
after a policy is defined. However, until we have a policy, his efforts
should concentrate on drawing attention to the broad dimensions of the
problem, and stressing the notion of a world responsibility to solve
it.
B. Chip will need some staff assistance in whatever he undertakes. Given
the nature of his efforts, the best points of contact are probably in
the Office of the Assistant to the President for Public Liaison.
C. Specific activities might include:
—Attendance at public hearings by various interest groups.
—Travel as a concerned member of the “world community”.
—Sponsorship of an information clearing house.
D. Care must be taken so that Chip is not seen as a government spokesman during the early stages. His exposure
should give him credibility as a spokesman on the issue, and later, when
we have a policy for him to support, he will be an effective
advocate.
III. A Focus of the Study
A. The concern of the President and Chip Carter is hunger. We have
learned through painful experience in this field that well meant efforts
to produce short term benefits (i.e., by trying to directly feed people)
can often produce counterproductive results. To avoid a “quick fix”
solution to an emotional and pressing issue, the study must be broadened
to include the full scope of international agricultural policy and many
central aspects of domestic agricultural policies so that an effective
long-term policy can be developed. While the issue of world
[Page 694]
hunger is obviously related to
the whole spectrum of human needs, the scope of the study must be kept
to manageable limits.
B. Consequently, our efforts should center on three sets of issues:
1. Food Production
—Fluctuations in world-wide production, including climate change.
—LDC food production.
—Pre- and post-harvest losses.
—Agricultural research.
—Production incentives.
2. Food Distribution
—International trade and commodity policy.
—Domestic and international food reserves—control and access.
—Role of food aid and grants.
—Food distribution systems—efficiency, equity, different available
mechanisms.
3. Food Consumption
—Social change—land reform, urgan-rural balance, etc.
—Economic change—purchasing power, income distribution, etc.
—Nutrition.
These three broad areas may be well studied without in depth
consideration of issues of health or population planning.
IV. First Steps
This paper represents a first step towards a full definition of the scope
of the PRM. During the interim period
between now and October, in addition to monitoring the progress of the
related studies mentioned above, we will want to undertake the
following:
—Lay the bureaucratic groundwork through detailed consultations with key
individuals in the involved agencies.
—Continue to define the study and begin drafting the PRM.
—Collect and classify work that has been done to date in and out of
government on this issue and broadly related topics.
—Develop a fairly detailed understanding of just how the many agencies
involved in food participate in the policy and implementation
process.
—Identify and categorize areas of persistent and acute hunger in the
world by country, region, distribution methods, agricultural technology,
hunger causes.
Tab B
Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for
Health Issues (Bourne) to the
Members of the World Hunger Organizing Committee9
SUBJECT
The following are my views on Ms. Tuchman’s discussion paper on the
President’s interest in developing a World Hunger Initiative.10
I. The Mechanics of the Study
A. Process. The PRM process is an appropriate policy review mechanism for
the National Security Council. It is not clear that this process, in the
absence of early public involvement (i.e., a
Washington Conference on Food and Nutrition), is the best approach to
deal with competing domestic and international interests, both within
the government and the private sector, and promote high-level attention
and the attendant constituency in the development and execution of a
U.S. policy. Therefore, I would propose that this initiative not be
viewed as a study, but instead, a policy review which includes
involvement by the private sector.
B. Participants. Several other agencies should be
included in the process. Suggested additional agencies would include:
Department of Transportation which effects domestic price and therefore
distribution of international food commodities; the Department of Labor;
and perhaps ERDA.
In addition, I believe it is sufficient to mention HEW and not also the National Institutes
of Health. Also, I believe that mention of the State Department is
sufficient and that special consideration of the U.S. representative to
the United Nations which falls under the organizational framework of the
Department of State is unnecessary.
With respect to the Executive Office, my view is that the Office of the
Special Assistant to the President for Health Issues should be included
in the consideration of the institutional entities included as major
participants in this review. The Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP) is not relevant to this issue. In
addition, and transcending my
[Page 696]
own interest in involvement, is the concern that we have an overabundance
of Executive Office representation and that this would have a tendency
to detract from the Cabinet-level responsibility. Therefore, I am
suggesting that a structure be developed which includes only one EOP individual within the Executive
Committee level of any cross-cutting mechanism developed.
Consideration must also be given to other options which are not included
in this particular discussion paper, e.g., a
public/private cross-cutting mechanism, or a solely private mechanism
with private leadership dependent upon the final decision.
My principal concern is that there is no mention of the public’s
participation in the development and formulation of the world hunger
policy of the United States government. The point was made at the
initial meeting chaired by Dr. Brzezinski (and I believe agreed to by him)11 that crystallizing
attention on hunger and involving the public would be a useful approach
for the President to mobilize constituent support for foreign policy
initiatives across the board. This position is not reflected in your
paper. Basically I disagree with the tactics regarding the development
of this initiative where it concerns the President’s involvement.
C. The Chair. A joint NSC-Domestic Council management mechanism does not meet the
need for a single individual to manage, arbitrate, and mediate the
government review on world hunger. Furthermore, it detracts from the
relevant Cabinet agency leadership. I believe that major visible
participation by the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture
and AID is essential to this
review.
D. Timeframe. Should there be a policy review
which involves the private sector, it would be necessary to develop
guidelines for the conduct of the review that would take the better part
of 8 weeks. However, it is questionable whether it would take more than
that time to plan. October 15 seems later than necessary.
II. A Role for Chip Carter
I believe that it is unnecessary for Chip Carter to wait until a
government policy is established. As I understand it, Chip wants to be
only involved as it relates to the private sector initially. It would be
inappropriate to provide him with staff assistants within the government
regardless of where that assistance comes from. Therefore my suggestion
is:
Not to wait until the completion of the policy, but encourage, advise,
and assist Chip in the development of, for example, an informa
[Page 697]
tion clearinghouse on world
hunger, but with assistance from the private sector.
Regarding section II, C, attendance at public hearings of various
interest groups seems to be inappropriate. Chip can attend any public
hearing he wants to as a citizen of the United States as well as travel
throughout the world. More pertinent is his participation as an active
spokesman within the private sector articulating a particular point of
view. We need a sound proposal for his participation within the private
sector. We should encourage him to hire an appropriate consultant to
work closely with him so that his efforts are productive and
complementary to the activities going on within the government. This
strategy will ensure that Chip not be viewed as a government spokesman
in the early stages. Later, perhaps, and after the government has
initiated a number of actions over the short term or intermediate term
of the long-term policy that I assume would be developed, he may be more
closely associated with Administration initiatives.
III. Focus of the Study
A. Again, we believe the word “study” will have a negative connotation.
The Congress and the private sector have been overwhelmed by a multitude
of studies for the past decade on this subject. The approach that I
believe is most appropriate includes the development of a basic policy
framework, within which any initiative should be developed. My own view
is that the expression “international agricultural policy and domestic
agricultural policies” is inappropriate. My recommendation is to conduct
an International Food and Nutrition Policy Review and to characterize
relevant domestic policies as domestic food policies. This approach
transcends agriculture assistance, removes the connotation of welfare,
and develops a posture of looking at this issue as an international
economic issue. A welfare approach would be objectionable to
multilateral organizations, the Congress, and the private sector.
B. I believe that the expression “food production” is inappropriate. I
recommend that the category be called “food supply.” Furthermore, the
statement at the end of this section that these two broad areas could be
studied without in-depth consideration of domestic agricultural
subsidies, health, nutrition, or population planning, I believe, is
inaccurate.
I have given this issue considerable thought and would like to propose an
alternative focus for the policy review conducted by a public or
public/private organization as follows:
1. Strategy: First, the President should be able,
with the assistance and advice of the various agencies in the government
and key public interest organizations in the private sector, to develop
a set of goals that
[Page 698]
he wants
to move toward by 1980 so that a measure of his Administration’s
progress on hunger and malnutrition in foreign countries can be taken by
the American public. Broadly stated, the policy review should focus on
the following basic areas:
a. Policies to provide more equitable access to
available food. People are hungry today not only because there
is a scarcity of food but because many are poor; food goes to the
highest bidder not the neediest person. Therefore,
—U.S. policies should be designed to encourage poor nations to become
more self-reliant in the development of their own agricultural
capacity.
—U.S. policies should encourage an increase in income and development for
the poorest billion people on earth.
b. Policies to increase the supply of food in relation
to demand. This includes the following types of actions:
—Policies to increase food production and rural development in the
developing nations.
—Policies to encourage a higher level of food production in the United
States.
—Policies to provide food security through our
international system of grain reserves. Perhaps serious consideration
should be given to an international insurance scheme as now being
debated within the World Bank community for this particular problem
area.
—Policies to eliminate the waste of food, particularly post-harvest food
losses.
c. Policies to provide food or food assistance for
those unable to purchase sufficient food for adequate
nutrition.
d. Policies to deal explicitly with the organization,
management, and resources appropriate for the United States
government to implement these policies. This is a universally
accepted problem of governments’ inability to come to grips with this
important responsibility area.
This would lay the groundwork for a set of goals broadly stated with
which the President could establish the basis for specific actions
designed to move toward an action-oriented government policy. It is
extremely important that we do not send a signal to the Congress or to
the American people and our neighbors abroad that the most President
Carter is going to do is “study” the issue. At the same time, we
certainly would not want to pursue a policy of “quick fixes” as is
pointed out in the first draft discussion paper outline. However, this
is not to suggest that short-term, intermediate and long-term approaches
cannot be developed throughout the process.
Having established a broad policy framework, the President then can
decide with minimum delay what kind of measurable goals he wants to move
toward so that by 1980 the public and Congress will un
[Page 699]
derstand what he has accomplished in this
critical international human needs area.
2. The following represent actions that could potentially engender the
kind of position in 1980 where the President could say he has met
specific milestones established in 1977 to pursue the concept of meeting
international human needs in the food and nutrition area. They are as
follows:
—A redeployment of U.S. foreign assistance resources that reflects the
highest priority he has accorded to helping poor countries solve their
most pressing food consumption problems. His redeployment might include
a “food and nutrition discretionary fund” to allow quick response to
crises and to targets of opportunity. It might require consolidating and
rationalizing foreign aid, food-for-peace, and other legislation and
agencies.
—A significant and measurable decrease in malnutrition-related child
mortality in prospect in selected recipient countries as a result of
this redeployment of foreign aid resources.
—A procedure to test proposed U.S. policies and programs in terms of
their effect on food consumption and nutritional effects (e.g., trade policies that may encourage
inappropriate food exports from food-poor countries). This test could
also be applied by U.S. government representatives to policies, programs
and projects of international organizations.
—A set of U.S. trade policies (e.g., sugar quotas,
most favored nation treatment) that take into account opportunities for
encouraging countries to adopt equitable food and nutrition policies in
their own countries.
—Special food and nutrition consortia of donor countries in place and
working with, say, five countries with serious nutrition problems that
are committed to actions on food production, distribution and
consumption policies, programs and projects.
—An efficiently operating international grain supply and price
stabilization system of demonstrable benefit to the poorest countries in
backing up national food reserves arrangements.
—A vigorous internationally coordinated food and nutrition research
program under way in the U.S. and, especially, in developing countries
dealing with those technical and scientific issues that represent
potential breakthroughs toward solutions of key problems.
—Government policy machinery with public and private sector
representation in place and at work in recommending and overseeing the
implementation of changes in the U.S. food systems that will harmonize
conflicting interests and objectives as they relate to broad pol
[Page 700]
icies, key commodities, and the
balancing of economic, health, and social policy considerations.
Having told the agencies where he wants to be by 1980, the President must
then ask them to tell him what must be done now to get there:
—Mobilize private sector efforts
—Refine the objectives
—Establish an adequate organization
—Propose legislation
—Assignment of lead agency responsibility
—Develop public understanding and support.
Attacking world hunger by mobilizing public support, setting some
reasonable attainable 1980 goals (this does not take a year to decide),
and assigning a high priority to this human needs initiative can and
will foster support for the President’s overall foreign policy
objectives.
