Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

125. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, March 11, 1978, 1121Z

3851. Subject: 34th Human Rights Commission—Positive Balance Sheet.

Summary: In terms of U.S. interests and objectives the results of this HRC session taken as a whole were notably positive. For the first time action was taken under the HRC’s confidential “1503” procedures² to investigate the situation in Uganda and Equatorial Guinea and establish “contacts” with Paraguay through the Secretary-General. Bolivia, Malawi, Republic of Korea and Ethiopia will be kept under scrutiny by the HRC, while Indonesia is simply invited to continue cooperation with the commission. Uruguay has been asked to provide further information to the HRC. The “public” resolution on Chile was formulated to meet U.S. conditions for co-sponsorship, forcing out Cuban and Yugoslav cosponsorship. Moreover an implicitly critical “decision” on Cambodia was adopted which invites information from all sources on human rights conditions in that country for inclusion in a report by the UN Secretary-General. The Soviets elicited no significant support for an attempt to inject the neutron bomb issue into HRC business. On the other hand predictable resolutions were adopted on the Israeli settlements issue and Palestinian self-determination rights over U.S. opposition, although even here language in the settlements

text concerning the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention was modified to enable U.S. support.³ The resolutions on the Southern African apartheid issues, while unacceptable, were nevertheless purposely moderated to enable U.S.–WEO abstentions. Useful Third World initiatives on new national and regional human rights commissions were adopted. The U.S. candidate for the HRC’s subcommission was re-elected. USDel was able to keep the idea of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights alive. Measured against Soviet wishes to extinguish the idea, this was an accomplishment. African and other non-aligned support was key to the success of U.S. and WEO efforts to achieve the positive actions recorded by this HRC session. The cooperation and skill of the Senegalese chairman was important to the success of our efforts. Just as important, however, there were clear indications of a continuing new non-aligned thrust on human rights issues that is compatible with and contributive to our policies. End summary.

1. The 34th session of the HRC, comprising 32 nation-members, ended March 10 and represented a singularly successful session from the U.S. standpoint. The following is a preliminary assessment for the Department’s possible use in transmitting to those posts we approached on HRC issues. USDel believes that the pre-session groundwork efforts at USUN and in capitals with other governments contributed importantly to the overall positive outcome of the session.

2. The conference was generally characterized by an atmosphere of principled compromise and substantive progress on most of the human rights issues before it. Confrontations were rare and when they did occur the Soviets-EE’s and especially the Cubans were more often the losers than the U.S. and WEO’s.

3. For the first time meaningful follow-up action was taken under the HRC’s confidential “1503” procedures, i.e., closed debates and votes. Moreover Uganda was the first country ever to be singled out for further investigation under these procedures. A “prominent African” is to be approached to investigate conditions there. Additionally a decision was taken to require Equatorial Guinea either to respond meaningfully to the complaints against it under the confidential procedures or be confronted with a public debate at next year’s session. Solid African pressure (Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Rwanda, and especially Senegal and Nigeria) pushed through these decisions over Soviet-EE and some other Third World opposition. It was decided to ask the Secretary-General to establish “contacts” with Paraguay to obtain further information on the situation there. Decisions were also taken to keep the situations “under review” in Bolivia, Malawi, South Korea, and Ethiopia. Uruguay will be asked to provide additional information on “respect for human rights” and to provide “fullest possible explanation” re the “prospects for an early restoration of political rights” in that country. Their responses will be considered at the next HRC. While Indonesia, Korea and Ethiopia were treated more lightly than the magnitude of complaints against those countries would seem to merit, all will be kept under scrutiny and have been asked to continue their cooperation with the HRC.

4. Public resolutions were adopted on Chile, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, Palestinian self-determination rights, South African apartheid policies and South African-Western “assistance.” However we believe it is fair to say that when these are considered together with the 1503 decisions the HRC clearly disavowed selective morality.

5. Specifically, the Chile resolution was shaped to accommodate U.S. conditions for co-sponsorship to the extent that the Cubans and Yugoslavs withdrew their co-sponsorship in the eleventh hour. A particular point of contention was whether or not the resolution would “take note” of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission’s most recent report on conditions in Chile. This was anathema to Cuba which regards this as an implicit expression of support for the OAS.

6. As in other multilateral fora, the Soviets raised the issue of the neutron bomb under the item concerning the impact on human rights of scientific and technological development (see septels).⁴ However their efforts were only rhetorical and tentative and they did not in the end press the issue via an allegedly Polish resolution (circulated informally). Indeed the Soviets responded weakly to strong UK and U.S. statements on the issue.

7. The Arab-Israeli resolutions were tough and clearly unacceptable to the U.S. but, in light of particularly strong Arab emotions at this juncture in the Middle East dispute, they could have been much worse. Part A of one resolution condemned the Israeli settlements policy and alleged torture of “prisoners of war.” Part B of the same resolution, however, was substantively unchanged from the 1977 resolution regarding applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Territories, in order expressly to enable U.S. participation in a consensus. The final Arab resolution asserted a Palestinian right to self-determination to be pursued (implicitly) by armed struggle. It was significant, however, that the tone of these resolutions was moderated to split the WEO’s between consistent U.S. and Canadian “no” votes and other WEO abstentions.

8. The HRC also adopted two South African resolutions. The first dealt with the HRC working group report on Southern African human rights violations. However, due to African desires to avoid provoking outright Western, especially U.S. opposition, it was toned down substantively and rhetorically from the counterpart resolution adopted in 1977, despite Cuban preferences and pressure for explicit endorsement of the 1977 Havana Seminar decisions on Africa. Similarly a resolution concerning WEO commercial-nuclear links with South Africa was also notably free of anti-Western verbiage. Instead the emphasis was on introducing pressures for practical application of the concept of apartheid as an international crime. This was coupled with other resolutions bearing on implementation of the Anti-Apartheid Convention and the celebration of 1978 as International Anti-Apartheid Year. It is possible that for the longer term the Africans have decided to move for increased practical pressures in UN fora rather than indulgence in emotional anti-Western outbursts.

9. UN human rights machinery: HRC actions on improving human rights reporting and procedural mechanisms were mixed but generally positive. Other Commission members were clearly unreceptive to endorsing or taking steps toward the creation of the post of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights despite our strong urging. This idea was listed along with a number of other suggestions bearing on practical aspects of the UN human rights machinery that are to be studied in an overall analysis to be presented to the next session. However, if considered against intense Soviet efforts to have the idea either disavowed or buried permanently, the fact that the concept has been kept alive and will be discussed further is significant. Clearly a lot more work has to be done with the Third World countries who seem to perceive a High Commissioner as being uniquely a high level investigator with a UN carte blanche to interfere with or embarrass member states.

10. Similarly, a Jordanian proposal to lengthen HRC sessions was not pressed to a vote, but forwarded as an idea to be considered in the overall analysis exercise, when it became apparent there was insufficient Commission support.

11. However, the Commission did adopt an Indian initiated resolution advocating the creation by all UN members of national human rights commissions. Even more significantly, the Commission adopted a Nigerian proposal calling for the creation of regional human rights commissions where none presently exist. It was stated publicly as well as privately by Third World proponents, e.g., Egypt, that the intended model for Africa is the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. We consider these ideas sound steps in the right direction and find even more significance for our long range human rights policy in the fact that key Third World countries initiated and pressed them to formal adoption. In sum, others well outside the WEO human rights “bloc” are independently moving to enhance human rights mechanisms.

12. The U.S. role as a prime mover in the HRC was preserved by the re-election of Ambassador W. Beverly Carter, Jr., (23 votes) to the HRC’s Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. This body, comprising 26 members serving in a private expert capacity, is the channel through which complaints of human rights violations lodged with the UN are directed for scrutiny and recommendations for transmittal to the HRC.

13. Cambodian human rights violations were eased into the spotlight of UN attention by consensus adoption of a “decision” that asks the Secretary-General to submit the relevant records of this session’s proceedings to the Government of “Democratic” Kampuchea for its response. That response together with “all information which may be available about the situation” is to be reported back to the HRC next year through the subcommission. The decision was a compromise on a UK-initiated resolution that called for a more straightforward investigation. However, minimal as the decision was, it was implicitly critical and seems to permit the consideration by the HRC of information submitted from all sources, including the detailed charges made in the UK’s speech. Successful pursuit of the case against Cambodia will require close and careful coordination before the 1978 HRC session.

14. Additionally, the Commission was able to address, at least initially, far more agenda items than it has been able to in recent years. Results were mixed. The most notable failure was the effort to move forward on a draft declaration on religious intolerance. The draft foundered due to angry Third World opposition (Moslem and Christian alike), to Soviet insistence on language providing for the freedom not rpt not to believe in a religion. On other subjects, initial steps were taken by the establishment of various working groups to come up with proposals on measures to (a) promote rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities; (b) enhance rights of migrant workers; and (c) reconsider the religious intolerance declaration. The Swedish-initiated text of a draft convention against torture was accepted as a basis for further discussion by a working group to meet just before the next HRC session. UN member states will submit comments that will be compiled for the working group’s consideration. Under the heading of the role of youth in promoting human rights, the issue of conscientious objection to military service was held over for the HRC agenda.

15. One area of particular potential concern for the U.S. emerged at this HRC: the American Indian issue. A representative of the International Indian Treaty Council spoke twice, as reported septel.⁵ Speaking on the item of the right of self-determination the IITC effectively presented though exaggerated the argument of consistent USG denial of this right to our Indian population. They again spoke late in the session on the topic of alleged calculated judicial prejudice against Indians and alleged brutal mistreatment of Indian prison inmates. While no resolutions were presented, the statements at this session may well be laying the groundwork for escalated action at future HRC sessions.

16. Many other delegations were favorably impressed by the USRep’s reply to the first of the above statements that we welcomed the Indians’ use of the HRC forum, and promised continued USG efforts to respond to Indian complaints. However, it was our impression that most other countries, quite apart from the Soviets-EE’s, believe the Indians’ complaints have some validity. Unless we show positive improvement in this area, we might find others raising this subject at a later time.

17. Lastly, the Commission must also be considered from the standpoint of its function as a forum to expound and exchange views, as well as to function as a mechanism. From this standpoint the U.S. also profited considerably. For example, Soviet discrimination against its Christians and Jews was raised vigorously for the first time in recent years in strong statements by U.S. Chief Delegate Mezvinsky and Congressman John Buchanan. Several Christian and Jewish non-governmental organization reps, as well as the Israeli observer del here, expressed their deep appreciation. Additionally there were several exchanges between the U.S. and the USSR, Cuban and Argentine dels. None responded and all seemed decisively outpointed when the U.S. offered to accept HRC investigation of racial ethnic minority human rights in America upon the expectation that the Soviets, Cubans and Argentinians would also open their doors to the HRC to investigate the complaints against them.

18. However, exchanges of rhetorical blows were rare. More striking, particularly in the closed session debate, was the lead in defense of respect for human rights taken by such developing countries as Senegal, Nigeria, Colombia, Lesotho and Panama. These responded strongly to reject Soviet-Cuban arguments that revolutionary situations “justified” the violation of human rights in the interests of the “majority.” There was also a notably high level of debate on the Southern African issues. The theme pressed time and again was that the West was “guilty” of a double standard on human rights by refusing to take practical action on South Africa. Even this debate had some comfortable moments for the U.S. when, for example, the delegate from Lesotho in tracing historic low points of man’s inhumanity to man cited “Prague, 1968.”⁶ Nevertheless, it was clear that South Africa will continue to be one of the most important measures of U.S. moral credibility in this forum.

19. Indeed the Africans throughout the HRC were the key, generally controlling factors. In particular Keba M’baye, Chief Justice of Senegal, proved himself to be a superb chairman. As Department will recall, he promised and delivered a credible and creditable session of the HRC. He was a tough and efficient manager of session proceedings and yet politically deft enough to pre-empt several developing confrontations by work behind the scenes to obtain consensus actions or at least soften the sting of decisions unacceptable to US (African and Arab-Israeli issues) and to others. USDel would strongly recommend that Department consider an appropriate expression of U.S. appreciation for M’baye’s contribution at the highest levels in Senegal. Indeed only next year when M’baye is no longer in the chair of the HRC will we be able to see clearly whether this session was a phenomenon or a step forward toward a fragile but promising new international human rights understanding. In any event this session has demonstrated that human rights objectives in the UN fora can be pursued with, rather than in spite of, the Third World.

20. The private remarks of a Soviet DelOff to one of our DelOffs yesterday suggest the Soviets are considerably less than content with this session. The Soviet observed that the U.S. should be pleased with the meeting’s result. Our DelOff remarked that share-and-share alike was presumably acceptable to any Marxist-Leninist. The Soviet response was: “yes, but not here.”

Vanden Heuvel

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780109–0829. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated for information to USUN, Dakar, and Monrovia. The Department repeated the text in telegram 70504 to all diplomatic and consular posts, March 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780121–1124)
2. See footnote 3, Document 2.
3. Reference is to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted in Geneva on August 12, 1949. Commonly known as the Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV), the treaty contains provisions relating to the status and treatment of protected persons in occupied territories.
4. Telegram 2317 from Geneva, February 15; telegram 3496 from Geneva, March 6; and telegram 3792 from Geneva, March 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780069–0465; D780101–0039; and D780108–0500)
5. In telegram 1941 from Geneva, February 8, the U.S. delegation indicated that Jimmy Durham, representing the International Indian Treaty Council, had delivered a statement on February 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780060–0167) In telegram 2116 from Geneva, February 10, the delegation reported that Mezvinsky had delivered a statement to the Commission in response to Durham’s earlier statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780067–0543)
6. Reference is to the late August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.