Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

98. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, October 23, 1978

SUBJECT

• Central America: An Emerging and Urgent Issue for U.S. Policy

As the dust blown up by the crisis in Nicaragua settles for the moment, and the mediators try to patch together an “enduring democratic solution,” I think it is important to step back and ask ourselves: Can a Nicaraguan-type crisis happen again?² And, if so, what are we doing now to prevent similar crises?

The simple answer is that it can happen again, and is likely to in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. The conditions which gave rise to the crisis in Nicaragua exist in these countries, only in a more advanced state.

The unique element in Nicaragua is, of course, Somoza, but I believe that his presence meant only that violence and polarization would occur in Nicaragua first; not that it won’t occur elsewhere. In a few years, if we don’t address the underlying problems in Central America, the Nicaraguan crisis of 1978 will seem easy in comparison. I would urge you to place Central America relatively high on your list of priorities for 1978–1979.

I. Characteristics Common to the Region

The three Central American countries share (with Nicaragua) the following tragic characteristics:

1. Political Alignment: Three Groups. (1) A strong, intransigent military government with little or no popular support; (2) revolutionary guerrilla groups which are predominantly indigenous but maintain ties with the Cubans and with each other; and (3) a relatively weak but hopeful middle, which includes political parties (Christian and Social Democrats), the Church, and small business. Since the middle of the political spectrum in Central America is considerably to the right of that in the U.S., the political middle is generally quite conservative by U.S. standards.

2. Severe Structural Problems. Economic inequality; rapid population growth; inadequate bureaucratic capabilities; and slow economic growth.

3. Continued Massive U.S. Presence. The U.S. influence and presence in this region remains very formidable. The perception of U.S. influence often is greater than the reality but in Central America that is both an asset and liability: it enables us to more easily achieve some of our objectives, but it also stimulates a negative and reactive nationalism among some and a “Fanonian” immaturity among others.³

The U.S. commitment to human rights and democratization is clearly and widely understood. The military governments that once felt they could serve the U.S. interest in stability in whatever way they wanted now feel inhibited from using violence or torture to suppress political opposition or to eliminate guerrilla movements. As Torrijos likes to say, “After Carter, military dictators have to count to 10 before killing someone.” Both the democratic opposition and the guerrillas seem intent on taking advantage of this new situation.

4. Political Polarization. Government-sanctioned counter-terrorism was the rule before the Carter Administration. Now, the military governments—like Somoza’s—have begun harassing the middle. The left has done this as well. Polarization has increased as the middle has been forced to choose sides. If the opposition prevails in Nicaragua, the democratic middle in these other countries may conclude that it is time to throw their fate in with the guerrillas against the government.

5. Transnational Linkages. The extremes have obtained help, training, and encouragement from abroad. The military has obtained arms from the Israelis, Argentines, and the international black market. The left is getting increasing help from each other. A recent intelligence report suggests that the Cubans have also decided to encourage local—in this case, Honduran cadres—to assist in training and equipping their comrades, the TP faction of the Sandinistas.

These conditions combine to present U.S. policy with two major problems, perhaps dilemmas:

1. How do we deal with the fact that the political middle is under attack from the two extremes? What can we do to effectively promote our human rights policy?

2. How do we reconcile our goal of wanting to discard a century of U.S. paternalism with a need and an instinct to try to manage events rather than let them manage us?

Regardless of the outcome in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala will continue to be plagued by polarization. The left will harass, and the right will repress, creating more support for the left. The political dynamic is almost inevitable. Moreover, whatever happens in Nicaragua will spill over to its neighbors, and indeed it already has.

II. How to Tackle the Issues? A Conceptual Framework

If I may borrow one of your analytic modes, I think the problem of Central America can be best understood by viewing it in three concentric circles:

1. The internal political upheavals in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala.

2. The relationship of those countries with each other and with Costa Rica and Panama. (Dealing not only with the problem of international terrorism, but also with the El Salvador-Honduras border dispute, Belize, and the Central American Common Market.)

3. The larger relationship of Central America to the U.S., Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and the Caribbean.

A. Our goals are the following:

1. Internal Politics in Central America.

(a) Strengthen the democratic center in each country and the links between these groups in different countries.

(b) Provide an atmosphere conducive to the eventual evolution of democratically-elected governments.

(c) Encourage a more equitable distribution of wealth and the necessary socio-economic reforms which will permit this.

2. Central America

Our goals are to strengthen the peace by assisting in the settlement of long-standing territorial disputes and to promote economic cooperation and integration.

3. Caribbean Basin

Our goals have been spelled out in the President’s Caribbean policy.

The first circle—internal politics in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala—is the most urgent, but we will not have a coherent and positive policy until we have begun to address all three sets of problems associated with each concentric circle.

B. Our means for pursuing these goals are considerable. We have relatively large bilateral assistance programs to these small and poor countries, and a large proportion of the loans they receive from the Inter-American Development Bank are concessional (from FSO) over which we have a veto. This leverage has in the past translated into real influence. For example, our decision to withhold support for a loan to build a hydroelectric project in El Salvador last year led the government to lift the state of siege. Unfortunately, we continue to deal with aid and loans one at a time without any overall strategic approach.

Perhaps the most important source of U.S. influence is simply U.S. symbolic support, including Presidential attention. An expression of interest by the President in the 10-year-old El Salvador-Honduras border dispute encouraged the Hondurans to ratify a mediation agreement in September 1977 (during the Canal Treaty signing in Washington).⁴ I would guess that a small touch by the President at a well-timed moment could have a large impact on this area. (We may want to factor into a future review the possibility of a short visit by the President—perhaps as a follow-on to a Mexico trip⁵—to the area, and to stimulate negotiations on El Salvador-Honduras, Belize, or on economic integration to try to reach a conclusion before that. Such a visit would also help to restore some sense of stability to a region still rocking with Nicaragua.)

III. A U.S. Strategy for Central America

I think Central America is a powder keg of instability which could blow up and take with it Carter’s Latin American policy. The scenario is the same as what may face us in Nicaragua: a choice between supporting an unpopular military dictator or intervening to prevent a Communist take-over. Neither alternative is satisfactory, but in order to face a different choice, we have to begin developing a strategy now to mobilize U.S. influence in support of the goals listed above.⁶ We currently have no strategy and are doing nothing positive which contributes to the realization of these goals except in an ad hoc fashion. We are reacting to events at points of relatively little influence; we need to get in front of the political process in Central America rather than get pulled along by it.

I have spoken to Vaky, and he agrees on the urgency of this matter and its great importance, but he doesn’t think that his Bureau has the capability of handling it now.⁷ He suggested that I work on it with Richard Feinberg of Policy Planning in State. I don’t think we can wait, and if there are few people in State who can work on it, we can turn to the Agency and to our Embassies for support. Indeed, I think it would be very useful to involve our Embassies in this exercise as fully as possible.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That you agree that Central America is an area which requires our urgent attention.⁸

2. That you approve, in principle, my drafting a terms of reference for inter-agency review with Vaky and Policy Planning (Richard Feinberg). The terms of reference will proceed directly from the analytic framework suggested in this memo, but I will send the final version to you for your approval when it is completed.⁹

3. Would you like me to draft a short memo from you to the President on this subject?¹⁰

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 54, PRM/NSC–46 [1]. Secret. Sent for action. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the page: “a good memo. ZB.” Inderfurth and Bartholomew also initialed the top-right hand corner of the memorandum.
2. Documentation on the Nicaraguan “crisis” and the mediation effort is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XV, Central America.
3. Reference is to Frantz Fanon, an influential anti-colonial theorist and author.
4. In his diary entry for September 8, 1977, the President noted that he had met with President Romero that day: “My major purpose was to get El Salvador to agree to a mediation formula for the border dispute with Honduras. He agreed to move on this, which has kept the Pan-American Highway closed for a long time and resulted in severing of relationships altogether between Honduras and El Salvador. Before they left Washington, this was done.” (White House Diary, p. 94)
5. Carter visited Mexico in February 1979, but no other Central American countries.
6. An unknown hand underlined the word “now.”
7. Reference is to Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Vaky.
8. According to Aaron’s handwritten notation in the left-hand margin, he supported this recommendation.
9. According to Aaron’s handwritten notation in the left-hand margin, he supported this recommendation. Next to the recommendation, Inderfurth wrote: “Why not a PRM? RI.” Brzezinski approved this recommendation and wrote “PRM” on the “Approve” line.
10. Next to this recommendation, Inderfurth wrote: “Alternatively, have Bob reduce this to one page for use in this week’s WR [Weekly Report] as an ‘Alert’ item.” According to a handwritten notation below Inderfurth’s comment, Aaron supported this recommendation. Brzezinski also indicated his approval by writing “OK. ZB.” Brzezinski also wrote “1 page alert”—RI—WR” beneath the “Approve” line.” Inderfurth wrote an additional note to Brzezinski and Aaron: “ZB/DA, I also suggest that Turner be tasked with preparing an intelligence assessment on prospects for instability in Central America. Rick.”